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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
This thesis examines the history of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East since 1945. From the
start of the Cold War immediately following the conclusion of WWII and up to the present day
(2014), U.S. policy has been subject to many revisions and simultaneously, upheld national
security measures. As the world heads toward an era where globalization is most prevalent, the
United States will have to make drastic decisions regarding its foreign policy in the Middle East.
Its alliance with Israel, oil interests, Islamic fundamentalism, an evolving Muslim society, and
supporting a national security agenda has forced the United States to reevaluate its role in the
region and throughout the world.
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Chapter 1
……………………………………..
Historiography

The contemporary history between the Middle East and The United States is saturated
with detail, and presents a series of relationships that extend far beneath the surface of the
common, yet misleading, course of logic. To clarify, the current problems that the United States
faces in the Middle East are not problems that have been generated by a single episode or based
on religious and cultural factors alone. These problems are a result of U.S. intermingling with
Middle Eastern society, and the U.S.-explicit vision of globalization in the Middle East. The
current affairs between the United States and Middle Eastern countries involve a complex series
of historic episodes that have affected U.S. policymakers’ efforts to implement globalization -composed of economic, social, cultural, and political factors. These factors are interrelated to the
problems that have plagued American policy objectives and Middle Eastern society for decades,
dating back to the end of the Second World War.
Since the dawn of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, the
Middle East has been a pivotal region for the first-world in carrying out their respected
diplomatic means and goals, furthermore, rendering the region’s global importance regarding
natural resources and community - the major resource being petroleum. The religious, social,
and political conflicts between isolated Israel and its surrounding Muslim neighbors that have
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occurred in the region over the years, were birthed decades ago by much larger, global patterns
of Cold War diplomatic rigidity, instigated by the two superpowers of the world following World
War Two.
Historians have been consistent and accurate, and for the most part thorough, with the
evidence collected in detailing the relations between Western powers and the Middle East in
recent history. For the case of this research project, the focus will be on the relationship between
the main historical figures, premises, and episodes between the United States and the Middle
East -- primarily the Gulf States -- due to the abundance of natural resources in the region
pursued by the Western powers. The Gulf States are the several Arab nations bordering the
southwestern side of the Persian Gulf, which include Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Iraq, Oman, and Qatar. These nations are pivotal to the global
economics scene, because they refine and export a major portion of the world’s oil resources to
other nations, including the United States, who have been a major trade partner since oil was
discovered there in the early twentieth century. Other nations the U.S. has had a strong
relationship with in past years has been Israel, Turkey, and Egypt, and more recently, the U.S.
has attempted to rekindle a diplomatic peace with Iran. To understand the history and the
dynamic of the Gulf States’ importance on a global scale, and for the most part their collective
relationship with the United States, one must first understand the major factors encompassing
this dynamic, often redundant, and complex diplomatic relationship with Middle Eastern states.
Moreover, with a general notion of this relationship and a contextual knowledge of this specific
area of diplomatic history, one can conclude that the United States has, and had, much at stake
regarding an impactful, state-founded legacy within a cautious foreign policy with the Gulf
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States. Likewise, the Gulf States have had a unique relationship with the United States in terms
of trade and monetary return from the sale of their most coveted resource -- oil.
Since the mid-twentieth century, historians and researchers have written some
extraordinary work on United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East. Furthermore, they have
analyzed a great deal of evidence that would establish the general mind-frame that global
economics and big business play a leading role in the creation and framework of United States’
foreign policy dating back to the first half of the twentieth century. The global impact of the
relationship between the United States and the Middle East today could be better understood
after analyzing the formation and evolution of this relationship within an accurate historical
context. For the sake of argument, the beginnings of this specific history can be traced back to
the era following the conclusion of WWII, and consequently, the outcome that presented the two
global superpowers, which dawned in the Cold War: The United States and The Soviet Union.

U.S. Foreign Policy in the Early Developments of the Cold War (1945-1991)

In 1956, the scholar C. Wright Mills published his acclaimed and pioneering work
entitled The Power Elite. In his book Mills argued that during the Great Depression, within
“[President Roosevelt’s] policies, he subsidized the defaults of the capitalist economy, which had
simply broken down; and by his rhetoric, he balanced its political disgrace, putting ‘economic
royalists’ in the political dog house.”1 In hindsight, Roosevelt’s New Deal policies allowed big
businessmen to enter the ranks of federal government and harbor more political power than ever
1

C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 274.
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before in American history. The biggest names in the American capitalist system had a major
influence in Washington and its policymaking from the 1930s onward. According to Mills, these
Americans of high military, economic, and political ranking in American society, were all part of
a power elite, and therefore it seemed only fitting that matters that pertained to foreign
policymaking fell, “in the hands of the… business and professional men who control[led]
Congress...”, and, “military men who control[led] defense and, in part, foreign policy….”2
Years after Mills published The Power Elite, historian Kim McQuaid tackled the task of
analyzing the connection between presidential power and big business. Published in 1982,
McQuaid’s book examined the United States and its foreign policy-making process from FDR
until the presidency of Ronald Reagan. He cited pivotal episodes, influential groups, and entities
involved in this historic narrative that demonstrated the union between American business
leaders and American political leaders. In the text McQuaid explained that in order for U.S.
leaders to “flex” their international strength to meet the elite’s foreign policy interests, they,
“expand[ed] the scope of American military and economic power abroad in ways amenable to
the business politicians of the Business Council and the CED (Committee for Economic
Development).”3 Kim McQuaid rationalized that as early as the 1960s and into the Nixon
Administration, new types of committees and groups such as the Business Roundtable, formed to
spawn a new era of political-economic policies to best fit their interests. “[B]ig business in the
United States may at last… have come of political age.”4 As the Cold War decades progressed
into the eras of the Carter and Reagan Administrations, the strategies imposed by groups such as
the Business Council, Business Roundtable, and CED transpired to political-economic policies
2

Ibid., 243.
Kim McQuaid, Big Business and Presidential Power: from FDR to Reagan (New York:
William Morrow and Company, 1982), 197.
4
Ibid., 308.
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which were novel in the wake of a rapidly expanding global economy. Instead of remaining with
a foreign policy designed in a political mind frame pertinent to combating the Soviets in a
“crusade” against “big government” and “socialism”, economic elites took the task upon
themselves to pursue a path that allowed them to be, “more prone to play for power” and to,
“pursue their concrete and collective and individual interests” both domestically and abroad.5
After analyzing these scholarly works, one can reason that there exists a powerful bond
between American government and big business entities. Thus it is essential to possess this
knowledge, and relate it to matters concerning United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East,
which is designed and put into action by these political, economic, and even military elite of the
United States. With this knowledge one can theorize that many of the diplomatic episodes or
actions taken between the United States and the Middle East that have occurred, or will occur for
that matter, are likely a result of the motives and goals behind these unique and powerful
relationships that exist within the upper-echelons of American and Middle Eastern society.
Beginning in 1973, The United States found itself in the midst of a foreign crisis -- one
which negatively affected and altered the global-economic scene, and which brought about an
‘energy crisis’ and a series of recessions involving inflated oil prices from OPEC exports.
Political tensions between the West and the Gulf States also grew subsequently, because of
conflicting interests involving an American alliance with the state of Israel. In the midst of this
global episode, a scholarly article was published in 1980 by Richard Barnet, David Dellinger,
and Richard Falk entitled, U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East. Invited by the Institute for
Palestine Studies, these three intellectuals were asked a series of questions regarding the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the aims of third-world liberation movements, and the United States’
5

Ibid.
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aggressive stance toward the Soviet Union that was implemented during the Carter
Administration.
During the course of these interviews, many valid points of United States’ foreign policy
were discussed and analyzed regarding the United States’ containment policy dating back to the
conclusion of World War Two. Richard Barnet addressed the interviewer by declaring that the
foreign policy implemented by the Carter Administration was just a continuation of the policy
put together by Henry Kissinger, former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State under
the Nixon and Ford Administrations.6 Barnet basically criticized the United States for following
an outdated Cold War policy of containment. He advocated that third-world nations like Iran (at
the time this article was published, the Iranian Revolution was reaching its peak, alongside the
hostage situation at the American embassy in Tehran) continued to resist American attempts to
liberate those countries, and in a sense, imperialize those economically undeveloped regions of
the globe.7
In their respective criticisms of U.S. foreign policy, all three speakers agreed on three
main points of emphasis. The first point mentioned in the article encompassed the need by the
United States to control the access of the Middle East’s oil supply. Secondly, the Middle East
was a global stage where the world’s superpowers confronted each other over diplomatic power
and resources, which in part is interconnected with the first point of emphasis. The final point,
which Falk emphasized, was a favorable American policy toward the Jewish state of Israel that
“increasingly” isolated the United States diplomatically within the entire world.8 Although this

6

Richard Barnet, David Dellinger, and Richard Falk, “Symposium: U.S. Foreign Policy in the
Middle East”, Journal of Palestine Studies 10, no. 1 (1980): 4.
7
Ibid., 4-7.
8
Ibid., 9.
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article was created during the height of Cold War tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union,
many of the factors presented by these three intellectuals remain relevant for decades regarding
Middle Eastern foreign policy. American policies established in the Middle East have left a
foundation of fragile and negative impressions, along with undesired consequences, toward
Western society.
By the end of the bloody Iraqi-Iranian conflict of the 1980s, the Muslim world had
shifted through a paradox of direction. A portion of Middle Eastern society became more
uneased and wary toward the United States’ influence in Middle Eastern political, social, and
economic affairs. As a result, an increasing number of Persians, Arabs, Palestinians, and other
groups of Middle Eastern people fostered their own practice of Islamic faith, which had morphed
into forms of fundamentalist and extremist worship, to battle what they saw as a foreign invasion
by the ‘evil’ West. Meanwhile, The United States maintained their Cold War diplomacy in the
Gulf States, all while continuing to maintain big business policies and structure between large
American companies and the Arab entities that controlled the region’s oil reserves. Renowned
activist and philosopher, Noam Chomsky, remained highly critical of United States’ foreign
policy in the Middle East during the final years of the Cold War. In 1991, Chomsky declared, in
hindsight, that the goal of American policy in the Middle East was never based on the need for
oil itself. Rather the goal was to “dominate the world system,” in order to become the world’s
sole superpower.9 In his bold and speculative conclusion, Chomsky declared that he saw:
[L]ittle reason to expect the United States to modify its goals with regard to oil
production and profits or to abandon its [sic] rejectionism on the Israeli-Arab
conflict…. There is no reason to expect changes in the principles that guide
policy. There are no significant public pressures for policy change. In polls,
9

Noam Chomsky, “After the Cold War: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East”, Cultural
Critique 19 (1991): 19.
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about two-thirds of the public regularly express support for the international
consensus on a two-state settlement, but few have the slightest awareness of U.S.
isolation in blocking the peace process…. The official U.S. position and the
record of diplomacy are rigidly excluded from the media and public discussion.
There is, then, little reason to anticipate a shift in U.S. [sic] rejectionism.10
In Chomsky’s cynical and melancholy conclusion of his article on U.S. foreign policy in the
Middle East, he portrayed the United States as the central catalyst – taking on an intentional and
unintentional role -- to the violence between the Jews, Arabs, and Palestinians in the Middle
East. Moreover, he believed that the relationship which has existed between the Middle East and
the United States is one that was parasitic in nature, where the only parties that benefited from
the diplomatic arrangement were the political and economic elite of the United States -- the elite
which controlled the capital, resources of the region, and the spreading of mainstream public
knowledge.
Researchers Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler displayed that big business,
specifically in the petroleum and weapons industries, benefited the greatest from U.S. foreign
policy in the Middle East. In effect, political conflicts over resources and control of influence in
the region had erupted into what the authors claimed as ‘energy conflicts.’ In their 1996 article,
“Putting the State in its Place,” Nitzan and Bichler conducted a study that exhibited alarming
consistencies and correlations between large oil companies’ decrease in profits and the wars that
have erupted on Middle Eastern soil since the late 1960s. Basically, “oil firms became more
inclined to accept open hostilities as a means of achieving higher conflict-driven prices and
better rates of return.”11 Their observations were more than alarming, as they analyzed several
conflicts including the Iraqi-Iranian War, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Arab-Israeli Wars
10

Ibid., 30.
Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, “Putting the State in its Place: U.S. Foreign Policy and
Differential Capital Accumulation in Middle East ‘Energy Conflicts,’” Review of International
Political Economy 3, no. 4 (1996): 612.
11
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of 1967 and 1973, and the Gulf War of 1990, as well as a few other major episodes of warfare in
contemporary Middle Eastern history. Nitzan and Bichler both declared that although the
American public overwhelmingly wanted peace in the Middle East since the 1960s, U.S. officials
under the Clinton Administration and the “Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition” had precise, yet
conflicting goals, including: the “mutual containment” of Iraq and Iran’s regional hostility
toward other nations and peoples in the region, the promotion and implementation of democracy
in the region, and advocating for the Muslim-Israeli peace - all while “undermining” Islamic
fundamentalism.12
Following the Gulf War (1990-91), it seemed apparent that the United States was in the
Middle East for the long term in order to promote their exclusive political and economic agenda.
In addition, the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the United States becoming the only
major power in the world, influencing U.S. diplomatic visions throughout the Middle East. From
the Reagan to the Clinton presidency, the directive of foreign policy in the Middle East was
twofold: American diplomacy was molded to allow big business, in the form of trading weapons
technology and oil, to maintain the profiteering standards for certain U.S. and Arab economic
entities and parties. The second goal was to establish peace between the state of Israel and the
surrounding Muslim nations, which presented a problem to America’s former objective.
Although the United States sought to establish peace between the Islamic religious sects and
Judaic religious factions of Middle Eastern society, too often, Islam was portrayed in a negative
light by the American public and by the U.S. mainstream media. Moreover, the rise of
momentum in Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East has only retarded the ongoing peace
process.

12

Ibid., 648.
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Frank Ninkovich has published several historical works on U.S. foreign policy, including
The United States and Imperialism in 2001. Ninkovich believed that during, and following the
fall of the Soviet Union, the United States altered its foreign policy to reduce its national security
state attributes. Although some elements of a national security state are still in existence today,
the United States had taken on the role of leading the rest of the world into a ‘new world order’
in a sense, which can also be depicted as the progression toward globalization. In his book, The
United States and Imperialism, Ninkovich rationalized that, “[I]n many quarters globalization
was seen as the Americanization of the world…. Americans saw little to be ashamed of in their
ambition to recreate the world in the image of their own nation… [Americans] continued to
envision themselves as the champions of a universal empire of the spirit and way of life, the
empire of modernity.”13 Americanization refers to efforts by United States’ diplomats and
personnel to instill their own cultural, political, social, and economical doctrine onto peoples in
foreign lands. This nationalistic attitude possessed by American policymakers had transpired on
the world stage as American doctrine was poised as a guiding light for the rest of the world. This
undertaking eventually led to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States due to Islamic
backlash against American policymaking. Once again, American foreign policy in the Middle
East created resentment by the Muslim extremists toward Americanization. The effect of Islamic
extremism toward United States’ foreign policy in the Developing World, especially the Middle
East, caused the United States to consider altering their entire diplomacy into a new direction.
As the United States headed into the new millennium, it remained the only standing
power that some of its elitist citizens and leaders believed would lead the world into the era of an
interconnected global society. According to Ninkovich, the notion of the Americanization of the
13

Frank Ninkovich, The United States and Imperialism (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc.,
2001), 245-6.
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world was born years preceding the official collapse of Soviet Russia. During the Iranian
Revolution of 1979, Iran had nearly 50,000 students studying at universities within the United
States. The presence within Iran of an increasingly secular, westernized elite clearly resulted in
the “explosion of fundamentalist resentment.”14 A book written by Jalal al-e Ahmed and
published in 1962, Westoxication, captured the animosities Iranians held toward the West.
Ahmed and his book heavily criticized Western cultural norms and political theories, harboring
pro-Leftist and pro-Shia clerical sentiments, and provided the underpinnings of the Iranian
Revolution years prior to its culmination.15 Yet this was just one historic example of a cultural
backlash against the United States and its attempt to lead the world into a new era. If the United
States and its leaders believe it was supposed to lead the world into the future, should it have
been done with the current power structure in place, which included the political, economic, and
to an extent, military elite?
Ninkovich argued this aspect of globalization, and explained that, “[g]lobalization is not a
temporary occupation of the world that, once lifted, would allow traditional cultural values to
reassert themselves. It is, at its most ruthlessly effective, a juggernaut that utterly destroys
traditional cultures….”16 Emily Rosenberg argued this viewpoint as early as 1983. In her book,
Spreading the American Dream, she predicted that foreign cultures would be replaced by
American influence, through the merging of “lessons” of the United States’ own economic
development with, “traditional liberal tenets about freedom and the marketplace.”17 Is this what

14

Frank Ninkovich, U.S. Information Policy and Cultural Diplomacy (New York: Foreign
Policy Association, 1996), 43.
15
The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, 15th ed. rev., s.v. “Ahmed, Jalal al-e.”
16
Ninkovich, United States and Imperialism, 251.
17
William Becker, review of Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural
Expansion, 1890-1945, by Emily Rosenberg, The Journal of American History 70, no. 3
(December 1983): 699.
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the native peoples of the Middle East feared based on this perspective? This question can be
answered within the rhetoric of the proponents and opponents of the Western trends toward
globalization, as well as the recent history between Western policymakers and actors, and the
peoples of the Middle East.

The Seeds of Globalization in U.S. Foreign Policy

President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, believed that
globalization, following the World Trade Center attacks of 2001, was the inevitable goal of
United States’ foreign policy by the beginning of the twenty-first century. In his 2004 book, The
Choice: Global Dominance or Global Leadership, Brzezinski argued that in order to defeat
modern Middle Eastern terrorism, terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda must “lose their social
appeal and therefore their recruitment ability,” as well as, “their financial backing.” Moreover, in
order for globalization to come to its fruition, the United States must “command genuine
international support,” and the proliferation of terrorism must be, “brought under control when
suspect national efforts are either subjected to effective international controls” by the use of an
organized and global coalition spearheaded by the developed nations of the world.18 While
Brzezinski believed that Middle Eastern inclusion into a global political system would be a
tedious and uphill battle, the only way to accomplish this objective would be to eliminate the
sole threat of religious fundamentalism from the mindset of the Muslim peoples across the
region.19

18

Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Global Dominance or Global Leadership (New York:
Basic Books, 2004), 33.
19
Ibid., 52.
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In her 2005 book, U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Janice Terry listed four goals
of United States’ policy, which have remained historically accurate. These four goals included:
securing the free flow of oil in the Gulf, improving relations with Muslim regimes on a bilateral
basis, preventing the region from becoming a sphere of influence to any other developed nation,
and supporting the continued existence of the state of Israel.20 Terry remained consistently
objective while criticizing the actions and portrayals that the mainstream media and political elite
display toward the Israel issue. In the midst of their overwhelming support for Israel and its
expansion into Palestinian territories, American Israeli supporters typically foster and believe the
“exaggerations” and false stereotypes about Muslims and Middle Eastern people by the
American mainstream.21 She does an admirable job in identifying the underlying conflicts
between the United States and the Middle East regarding policy-making, generated from myths
and misunderstandings of their culture and society, which found their way into the American
legislative process. In essence, Terry declared that U.S. foreign policy regarding the Middle East
was an unfair and misleading practice. On the one hand Terry contended that the Jewish lobby
within the U.S. has been very influential and committed to the State of Israel, while on the other
the lobby enjoyed the tremendous support it received from federal, state, and local levels of the
U.S. government.22
In 2010, Sean Foley constructed a very detailed narrative on the relations between the
United States and the Arab Gulf states. In The Arab Gulf States: Beyond Oil and Islam, Foley
illustrated that Arab states in the Gulf are challenged with the dual nature of being pressured by
American foreign policy and simultaneously attempting to evolve their societies into a more
20

Janice J. Terry, U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005),
23.
21
Ibid., 21.
22
Ibid., 122.
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liberal and modern one. Foley examined the influence of mass media, culture, social norms and
taboos, foreign and domestic policies, technology and modernity trends, economic concerns, and
many other factors in his analysis. A great deal of the animosity toward the United States
possessed by Arab peoples in the region, argued Foley, resulted from instances such as the ArabIsraeli War of 1973, where key figures like King Faisal of Saudi Arabia increased the price of oil
per barrel exponentially out of resentment of the United States’ support for Israel during the war
-- consequently leading to a global economic crisis.23 The United States’ alliance with Israel has
been detrimental throughout the years in that it has constantly been dampening positive relations
between the West and the Islamic nations surrounding Israel.
Foley concluded that the global recession of 2008 had major impacts on the oil-rich Gulf
countries, in that although, “[t]he current downturn has yet to devastate the Gulf petroleum
industry in the same way that the Great Depression decimated pearling and pilgrimage, there are
signs that it may accelerate social and technological trends that will reduce the importance [of oil
revenue] to the Gulf and to the world economy in general.”24 Furthermore, as United States’
power and influence declines in the Gulf states, so does the global dependence on the region’s
petroleum resources. Kingdoms like Saudi Arabia will have economic setbacks, yet they still
have “investments”, such as alternative energy and education, which, according to Foley, “have
the potential to yield significant economic growth in the future.”25
In 2012, Stephen Walt, a Harvard University professor who specializes in American
foreign policy, commented on current U.S. affairs and policies in the Middle East. He indicated
in his article, “Balancing Act: Foreign Policy in a New Middle East”, that the United States has
23
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24
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been “actively engaged” in the region since World War Two; however, now that the Gulf Wars
of the previous two decades are history, we are beginning to follow a strategy of “dual
containment,” meaning we will maintain close relationships with Middle Eastern governments,
but only “engage” our military in times of “crisis or emergency.”26 Walt concluded that there
will likely be no power vacuum forming in the Middle Eastern landscape, as we continue to
decrease our influence and military presence in the region. In addition, he explained that Israel
will “continue to be the strongest military power,” in the region while having little political
influence due to the “obvious” reasons of overwhelming religious differences.27 Walt presented
his argument that the United States will draw its focus on sharing its foreign policy objectives
with other powerful nations like China. This will allow the United States to continue to tackle
global activities such as foreign aid while, in a hopeful presumption, rising powerful states such
as Russia and China must share a multinational objective in bringing about a unipolar globalized
planet.
Forces against globalization, such as various sects of religious fundamentalists and
nationalists around the world, would surely contest an exclusively Americanized attempt at
indoctrinating globalization policy throughout the world. The rising global stature of other
developed nations, who are integral players in a global economy and political system, must all
agree on the same concept of globalization if it is to become tangible. If the United States leads
this crusade alone, it will face much opposition and resistance from foreign societies for being
too homogenous, and too dedicated to its own social norms and desires. Yet, if a global coalition
of various nations carry out a plan of globalization in their own variations of foreign policy, then

26

Stephen Walt, “Balancing Act: Foreign Policy in a New Middle East,” Brown Journal of
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perhaps globalization will face less opposition and resistance. A Strong opposition will present
itself, especially from those foreign cultures unwilling to subject to a seemingly American
policy, which was established to serve its own national interests.

The United States’ Role in the Middle East: From the Dawn of the Cold War
to the Present

The material that has been documented and published on United States’ foreign policy in
the Middle East is extensive to say the least. With the current social unrest, civil warfare,
international tensions, and terrorist activities that exist in the region today, it is difficult to
imagine that the uniform and numerous historical trends on this particular subject matter will
decline, or change substantially for that matter. Analyzing United States’ foreign policy in the
Middle East since the early-middle days of the Cold War was that there has existed several
obvious factors that have played a crucial part in this U.S. policymaking process. Beyond the
militarization by the United States in the region in order to combat the Soviet threat and Islamic
extremism and aggression toward Israel and the West, a considerable amount of evidence has
presented the solid argument that the relationship between ‘Big Business’ and government policy
is a tangible factor that plays a major role in U.S. foreign policy. Primarily in the form of large
oil companies and weapons firms, big business and the government entities of the United States
and certain Middle Eastern states present confirmations that cannot be overlooked or ignored.
The economic and political relationships formed over the years have been responsible for much
of the diplomacy, conflict, turmoil, and historical episodes, which have occurred or might occur
in the present and near future.
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Historical analysis on this matter must be constantly conducted, since it is one of the
major episodes currently being played out in contemporary global society - with the United
States being a key player in this ongoing episode. Today there is much certainty that the
diplomatic conflicts between the United States and the Islamic nations of the Middle East, such
as Iran, will not stop anytime soon, nor does it appear that the United States will abandon its
current position as a world mediator to the conflicting Middle Eastern nations in the coming
days. Therefore, taking historical trends in consideration, a new trend of American diplomacy
has evolved from within the basis of the former trend, and has existed since the latter half of the
twentieth century. The transition into a new age of United States’ foreign policy in the Middle
East began to surface following the finale of the first Gulf War (1990-91) and first World Trade
Center bombing in 1993; however the newest foreign policy trend came to full fruition following
the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001.
There are many unique, complex, and diverse factors involved in this evolving
relationship between the United States and Middle Eastern society, as well as novel aspects
forming out of this historical narrative. In the ongoing effort to lead the world toward the path of
globalization, the United States has altered its position in Middle East foreign policy over the
previous decade or so – transitioning from a conservative and national defensive policy to a
policy that has sought to find a common ground of social, economic, and cultural understanding
between the United States and the entire Middle Eastern region. Moreover, the transformation of
the Middle East into a more democratic and Western model of society, while maintaining a
position of benevolent instigators and supporters of liberalization, while attempting to cooperate
with the insubordinate theocracy in Iran, is a task that will prove easier said than done. The
Obama Administration has prolonged the United States’ stance against nations like Syria and
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Iran, who continue to resist assimilating into the global path toward globalization. Under
Obama, the United States has moderated its Middle Eastern foreign policy from an attempt to
play a neoconservative role in forcing change, to reducing their military presence and making a
more democratic attempt, using mediating techniques and negotiating peace between hostile and
agitated groups like the Palestinians and the Israelis. Numerous failures in transforming the
sociopolitical landscape of the Middle East, and the rise of Islamic extremism, have forced the
Obama Administration to seek and analyze new means and measures in order to bring about
positive change to the Muslim world.
In The Rise of Islamic Capitalism, author Vali Nasr brilliantly laid out the current
landscape of Middle Eastern society in the wake of this new path in American foreign policy.
Nasr argued in his introduction that, “[b]y breaking the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in late
2001, toppling Saddam, and then uprooting Baathism in Iraq, the United States removed local
rivals that had contained Iranian power to its east and west.”28 The following actions committed
by U.S. forces allowed Iran more freedom to carry out their plans of expansion, along with their
expansion of anti-Western and Shia rhetoric and ideologies. These actions, which were carried
out by the outdated and former foreign policy that had been rebirthed during the George W. Bush
presidency, had presented a new series of problems for U.S. policymakers. The problems from
the previous administration are what the current administration must confront and dissolve.
Nasr believed that as time persisted, the rise of a global economy will affect the Middle
East in a positive manner in regards to assimilating it with the global pattern of modernity and
liberal ideology, which typically accompanies capitalist growth and prosperity. Iran, with its
extremist Islamic nature, is one of the few and powerful nations in the Middle East which has
28
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tried to halt the momentum of globalization. Nasr added that it is the, “Middle East’s rising
middle class, and working to bring the economies of the region more fully into the web of
globalization, can push the status quo to the tipping point where national leaders have no choice
but to embrace change….”, which, in effect, is “the key first step toward liberalization of the
political systems.”29 This is Nasr’s vision of a Persian Spring, which is the hope other globalists
envision and covet as well.
Rising unemployment among Middle Eastern middle class men also poses as a major
concern. This evolution can either hurt or aid the United States’ mission of globalization. Aside
from Nasr’s argument, there are many more factors than just the economic aspects, including
various U.S. religious groups (pro-Israel lobby) that favor a stronger Israeli state, which
contribute overwhelmingly to United States’ foreign policy decisions in the region. If stability is
to come to the Middle East sooner rather than later in the form of a Western-style socioeconomic society, certain barriers must be removed in order to allow this evolution to occur.

What Does the Future Hold?

From an American standpoint, several factors exist that present a barrier for globalization
and the establishment of permanent peace and stability to the Middle East. In addition, these
factors will prevent the United States from abandoning its role as the pivotal actor on the Middle
Eastern stage of diplomacy and follow a policy of isolationism. As the United States’ makes
valiant attempts to reopen cordial relations with Iran, relations between Saudi Arabia and its
Arab neighbors who oppose Iran’s hostile regional might are weakening. Iran is a nation ruled
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by an extreme Islamic fundamentalist elite whose aspirations are to halt the Americanization, or
globalization for that matter, in the Middle East through the use of political might via nuclear
technology, promotion of terrorist actions against the West, and the threat of warfare. If the
United States wishes to continue in plunging the Middle East into the realm of a new world
order, so to speak, it must first eliminate the threat Iran poses currently on the secular states of
the region. Iran’s aggressive theocracy has held onto the ideals of Islamic fundamentalism,
which has included the jihad against Western society and the present one against Middle Eastern
Sunni regimes who have been open to the prospects of modernity. This war against the West and
Sunni Muslims, carried out by Islamic extremist organizations like al-Qaeda, have only retarded
the goals of the modern United States’ foreign policy of globalization.
The United States has exhaustedly and tediously been pursuing efforts toward some form
of peaceful and meaningful negotiations with Iran recently. In effect, relations with Saudi
Arabia have soured to a slight degree. As Iran continues to flex its regional muscle, Saudi
Arabia’s monarchy, ruled by the House of Saud, have grown very uneased by the current stance
of reconciliation that the United States has taken toward Iran. The fundamental issue of Sunni
statist governments such as Saudi Arabia’s, and Shia theocracies such as Iran is deeply rooted in
ancient Islamic religion – a problem that will not be easy for policymakers to remedy. In
October, 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal in
the city of Riyadh in an attempt by the United States to ease Saudi Arabia’s anxieties over
Iranian advancements toward an effective nuclear program. Saudi Arabia remained alarmed, as
nothing was achieved from the talks, as their media portrayed President Obama and his
administration as, “turn[ing] his right and left cheeks to his opponents in hopes of
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reconciliation.”30 The United States, on the other hand, has been agitated by the abuse of civil
rights that the Saudi government has committed on portions of its domestic population.
The Saudi impatience with the United States has been a persistent theme since the George
W. Bush Administration left power. This is likely due to the result of an absence, or lack, of
business and the sustained conservative diplomatic relationships between Saudi and American
figures within the Obama Administration, which had previously existed for decades. In previous
Republican administrations under George H.W. Bush, and his son George W. Bush, there existed
an established relationship between Saudi officials, Arab oil sheikhs, the Bush Family and their
government appointees. This diplomatic relationship has been reinforced by decades’ old
involvement in the Gulf oil industry and U.S. national security interests in the Middle East.
Currently, Obama and his administration have struck a discord with King Abdullah’s monarchy.
The current unwillingness, or lack of urgency, by the United States to dissolve Iran’s nuclear
program and its threatening regional stance, in backing the Syrian rebellion against President
Bashar Assad, and the U.S. inactivity during the 2011 overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak of
Egypt – a longtime ally to the United States -- have raised suspicions within the Saudi
government regarding the direction of U.S. policy in the Middle East.31 Saudi Arabia openly
displayed their disappointment toward the United States in late October, 2013, when the Arab
nation refused a seat on the United Nations’ newly formed Security Council.32
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Part of this growing rift between the United States and Saudi Arabia can be attributed to
other unintentional developments as well. Advancements and innovations in the energy industry,
including hydro-fracking for natural gas, has been a giant contributor to minimizing the U.S.
dependency on Saudi oil imports. On the domestic front, the United States is in the process of
possibly creating the Keystone Pipeline. This pipeline will carry crude oil, resulting from hydrofracking techniques and innovations, extracted from the earth of the northern-most lands of the
North American Great Plains and into the Canadian Provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and
Manitoba. A recent poll suggested that the majority of Americans and Canadians, to an extent,
support construction of the Keystone Pipeline project, because of their assumption that the U.S.
and Canada will depend less on “less reliable” oil exporting nations such as Saudi Arabia. In a
turbulent effort, the United States has displayed its public interest in protecting the domestic
energy market first and foremost.33 This massive pipeline will extend southward toward the Gulf
of Mexico where it can be shipped off to international markets, creating a giant stimulus for the
U.S. economy.
In effect, the United States will become less dependent on foreign oil imports from
regions such as the Middle East – Saudi Arabia being the largest of the Gulf states in terms of oil
exporting, which consequently would take on a substantial loss of revenue. Companies such as
Exxon have begun to invest heavily in hydro-fracking, and in effect, have had relative success on
the world economic stage, which has caused other oil companies to follow in Exxon’s
trailblazing footsteps. Innovations in oil extraction techniques and refining has been changing
the dynamic nature of the global oil industry and market presently. To extract, refine, and
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manufacture the Keystone oil within the North American territories will prove less costly from
global economic standards. Furthermore, global concerns and initiatives over research and
development over the usage of alternative energy will only damper Saudi Arabia’s economy
further. The unfolding of events taking place in the United States and Middle East will be
significant in regards to the path the United States takes regarding diplomacy in the Middle East
going forward.
The tendency to focus on Saudi Arabia during this research, in part, has resulted from the
tremendous amount of available public information regarding special interests, international
relationships, and other primary information that has existed between Saudi Arabia and the
United States. For example, from 1946 to 1976, the Central Intelligence Agency issued and
retained more reports on important Saudi figures, Saudi-U.S. business relations and entities, and
regional events, than the reports on the countries of Qatar, Oman, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab
Emirates, and Yemen combined.34 Alongside Israel, an established ally with the United States,
Saudi Arabia has been the one Middle Eastern Arab nation that we have had an overall
constructive, lasting, and peaceful diplomatic relationship with. A major catalyst to the SaudiU.S. relationship is its continuous big business partnerships and secular acquaintanceships –
headed by the oil trade between U.S. and Arab leaders, important figures, and multinational
companies. One very important Arab-U.S. relationship episode in the context of foreign policy
that dates back several decades is the relationship between the Bush family and The House of
Saud, alongside various oil sheikhs of the Persian Gulf. Kevin Phillips, who has extensively
studied the Bush dynasty and its reaches of power, indicated that Charles Freeman, former U.S.
ambassador to Saudi Arabia and president of the Middle East Policy Council, declared that the
34
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one Saudi business relationship that is “closely connected to the U.S.” via the Bush family is the
bin Laden Group – the family of formerly infamous al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.35 An
opponent of both Bush’s foreign policies in the Middle East, Kevin Phillips displayed partly the
reason for the Islamic-Arab resentment toward the West was due to the personal ties between the
Bush family and the power elite of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.36 Since the 1970s,
historian Janice Terry explained further that the Saudi royal family established personal and
political relationships with top U.S. officials and presidents since the day Prince Fahd visited
Washington D.C. to help establish the U.S. Saudi Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation
in 1979.37
The nations of Iran and Israel will also play significant roles in this particular research as
well. This is due to the fact that these nations remain ever so important to United States’
diplomatic goals in the Middle East – Iran playing the antagonist and Israel as the protagonist
from an American standpoint. Not without mentioning that nations such as Saudi Arabia, Iran,
and Israel contain the region’s embodiment of religious conflicts, which have taken precedence
in the Middle Eastern conflict as the world continues forward on a path toward globalization.
Religious fundamentalism, however, has played a major factor in dictating this course of
conflict. Unfortunately this religious fundamentalism has portrayed and manifested itself as
Islamic extremism carried out by various political circles and terrorist organizations within the
region. Islamic fundamentalism, which inevitably leads to acts of extremism and terrorism, is
the one and only major obstacle that stands between the violence and turbulence on the one hand,
and peace and successful efforts to globalize the Middle East on the other.
35

Kevin Phillips, American Dynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune, and Politics of Deceit in the House
of Bush (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 315.
36
Ibid., 314-9.
37
Terry, U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East, 51.

25
Islamic fundamentalism, which has contributed to the recent uprisings in Syria and
Egypt, has gained significant momentum, and will indeed halt any attempts by the Middle East
to position itself into a globalized and unified system of a world order. This form of
fundamentalism is composed of political, social, and religious animosities toward Western
culture. In part, United States’ foreign policy in the region has contributed to the overall Islamic
fundamentalists’ hatred of the West – especially in places like Chechnya and Afghanistan, where
in the past, the U.S. intervened in one way or another to prevent Soviet expansion. According to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation today, at least 13 of the top 21 global terrorist organizations
listed on their website are those composed out of an Islamic fundamentalist foundation.38
However, globalization proponents view their efforts to change the Middle East as one that
would bring about positive reform and eliminate Islamic extremist rationales and activities. With
the coming of modernization and democratic reform, traditional and cultural norms such as
religious fundamentalism will decrease, leading to less regional violence and global acts of
terror. The United States has taken a strong stance against Islamic fundamentalist-based
terrorism in its diplomacy in both, the current and previous, administrations. It is the goal of
U.S. foreign policy to eliminate the threat of Middle Eastern terrorism, or deflect it for that
matter, until the region organizes some form of peace arrangement between themselves and other
various nations and groups around the world. This peace arrangement, as the United States
would view it, has to begin or end, ultimately, with sustained and improved diplomacy with Iran.
Whatever course the United States wishes to embark on toward regional peace in the Middle
East, it will not come in a simple solution, nor will it be easily obtainable through peaceful
negotiations or mediation processes. Ultimate peace will have to involve both sides of the
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parties involved in the conflict taking steps and finding solutions that will eventually establish
lasting peace, cooperation, and civil stability for future generations.
In sum, the United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East today is an endeavor that has
been presented new obstacles as the world heads toward an ever-changing and uncertain future.
These obstacles differ from the obstacles the United States faced during the Cold War – as their
goal is not to promote democracy in order to protect the region from the spread of communism
as it was during the Cold War. Rather, Western goals, currently, are to instill democratic reform
and contain Islamic fundamentalism throughout the developing world in the name of
globalization. Defending American interests, as well as promoting and protecting democracy in
Western Europe and elsewhere, seemed to be the underlying theme of U.S. foreign policy during
the years of the Cold War. In order to protect U.S. interests overseas and establish Western
ideologies in the Third World during the Cold War years, military and covert operations were
necessary in engaging communist uprisings and deterring the spread Soviet influence. Once the
late 1980s arrived, it seemed evident that Soviet Russia would fall and the West would reign as
sole champions of the postwar world. As the Soviet Union collapsed and the United States arose
as victors, the United States spearheaded as well as continued its Western agenda of cultural,
economic, and political influence and reign in the Middle East. Yet, continuing a trend of
foreign policy that defends national security interests, which was a common United States’
theme throughout the second half of the twentieth century, should have ceased once the Soviet
Union fell. This trend of foreign policy could not prevail in an evolving front of opposition
toward the Americanization of the globe by traditionalist and extremist forces of Middle Eastern
society as a new millennium approached.
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From the time of the first Gulf War (1990-91), and into the first decade of the new
millennium, the Middle East remained a hostile environment for which the United States desired
to implement its globalization diplomacy successfully. American presence and influence in the
Middle East, in general, as well as their cultural impact on Middle Eastern peoples, would prove
to be a tedious and cumbersome venture. Resentment towards the United States increased and
manifested itself through Islamic terrorist organizations, which embraced the anti-Western,
conservative Islam, and pro-Soviet substructures of Islamic fundamentalism. It seems an
accepted globalist view that in order to make progress toward a globalized world, the United
States and other developed powers must reduce or remove the threat of Islamic (or for that matter
any religious and political fusion of conservative ideals in defense of tradition) fundamentalism,
as it was viewed as an impediment to social progression. U.S. policymakers began to realize that
successful modernization and democratization would not be seen until, “the dogmatic rule
imposed by Ayatollah Khomeini wears thin and the Iranian secular elite senses that the West
sees a regionally constructive role for Iran.”39
In addition to the growing threat terrorism imposed on the United States and its way of
life, the U.S. was dedicated to protecting Israel from its Islamic neighbors at the highest cost
through a military, economic, and cultural alliance. All while committed to preserving the peace
between Israel and its aggressive neighbors, the U.S. stationed military personnel and established
bases in Saudi Arabia to contain the turbulent and antagonistic nations of Iran and Iraq beginning
just prior to the first Gulf War. This maneuver stimulated animosity towards the United States’
presence by the ethnically-based Saudi members of al-Qaeda. Ever since, further attempts by the
U.S. in intermingling in Middle Eastern affairs have increased tensions for the United States in
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confronting this Islamic jihad. This aspect of U.S. foreign policy was known as “dualcontainment.”40 Following the tragic events of 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and
Iraq in 2001 and 2003, the U.S. government began to realize that its outdated foreign policy,
which had sustained for decades in the Middle East, had expired. This realization brought about
a new era where American foreign policy had to evolve and expand to meet the demands of a
changing world, especially meeting the demands of a rapidly changing Middle Eastern society.
Once George W. Bush left office and the Obama Administration took control of the
United States’ executive branch in 2009, many transformations took precedence regarding
Middle Eastern policy. The foreign policy agenda of President Obama and his staff began to
exhibit its reach once his administration took power, and has continued implementing a more
sustained and balanced diplomacy between the United States and Middle Eastern powers. U.S.
foreign policy in the Middle East today, however, displays the U.S. government’s lack of
experience in the big business relationships with the Saudis and has removed itself intentionally
from conflicts that are currently plaguing the region in order to allow a natural form of
globalization to become established. U.S. foreign policy under the Obama Administration could
be viewed as substantially similar to previous foreign policies under the Carter and Kennedy
Administrations. The weakening of U.S. support for Israel’s and Saudi Arabia’s national
inspirations could be regarded as the United States becoming the international frontrunner in
bringing the region into a new era free of traditional religious values and extremist thought via
moderate noninvolvement. Moreover, future world powers, like China and Russia, would have
to allocate their opinions, strategies, and their overall concerns regarding the subject of
globalization and its outlook in the Middle East. Whether or not the Obama Administration’s

40

Walt, “Balancing Act,” 10.

29
strategy for carrying out Middle Eastern policy is an effective and efficient strategy is yet to be
determined. Nonetheless, their foreign policy in the Middle East presents a strategy that has
been transformed to accommodate their exclusive diplomatic goals of globalization and
democratization – although these diplomatic goals might be in slight or large contrast to the
goals of Russia, China, and other powerful nations that also coordinate international policy.
Stephen Walt has even considered that it would prove beneficial for Washington and Beijing to
consolidate their globalization tasks in the Middle East and South Asia. If the United States
allowed China to take the principal position in guiding globalization policy in Asia, then it would
“make it easier for Washington to maintain strong Asian partnerships, while the persistent
exercise of Chinese soft power could convince some Asian states the Beijing was the wave of the
future and that Chinese hegemony would not be all that onerous.”41
The Obama Administration seems very reluctant to stray from their pioneering and
resurrected foreign policy of cooperation among various peoples residing in the Middle East.
New developments and various transformations in Middle Eastern society have been taking place
at a tremendous pace. Moreover, the appearance of the Arab Spring in North Africa, beginning
in 2011, has raised further concerns that advocates of globalization need to consider. A rise of a
new Muslim middle class and a rebirth of Muslim intellectualism within the growing pattern of
global capitalism, an increase in Islamic fundamentalism and extremism, developments in the
global petroleum industry and market, the BRIC nations’ (Brazil, Russia, India, and China)
global search for resources like oil and their specific quest toward a globalized world has
presented issues and circumstances that U.S. policymakers need to reckon with. An re-tooled
U.S. foreign policy that focuses on improving relations with Iran, and in effect, weakening
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relations with Saudi Arabia, are other factors needed to considered by policymakers as the world
enters into a new age. Furthermore, Western Europe, including the European Union (EU), has
presented an altered model of globalization – one that is more environmentally friendly and
which presents more of a state-controlled economy than that of U.S. policy. Globalization will
continue to be the underlying objective of United States’ foreign policy around the world; but the
U.S. must come to a solution for either driving, or encouraging, Middle Eastern society into the
structure of globalization.
The question is how long it will take, if it ever does materialize, -- considering the
various Middle Eastern nations, different sects of Muslim peoples, and various secular and
religious leaders – for globalization to become a replacement of traditional and fundamentalist
norms of Middle Eastern society? Moreover, will the United States be the lone power, or will
there be an international coalition or power, that guides globalization’s direction? Perhaps the
rise of capitalism, an Islamic middle class, and Arab intellectualism will play a pivotal role in
evolving the region into the trends of modernity and out of fundamentalism. The world is not
bipolar as it was during the Cold War today, and diplomacy will continue to become more
complex as time persists. U.S. leadership will be constantly challenged by its own public,
private business interests, global organizations, and other nations and their people as they seek to
bring stability, then change, to the developing world. The BRIC nations are becoming
increasingly powerful and have assumed roles as actors on the global stage of political and
economic affairs. These nations however, such as Brazil, India, China, and Russia, are becoming
powerful in pushing their own geopolitical concerns. Globalization efforts will have to
incorporate the interests of these nations, along with other powerful and developed nations such
as Britain and others incorporated with the European Union (EU) and the UN. With the United
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States leading the charge toward globalization as witnessed by the actions carried out through its
foreign policy, only time and the willingness by the peoples from the Middle East to conform to
a new governing system is yet to be seen.
Chapter Two will focus on the history of United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East
since the beginning of the Cold War until the end of the first Gulf War in 1991. The material
that will be analyzed in the following chapter includes primary and secondary historical
evidence. Much of the history on United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East since the end
of the Second World War has been thoroughly analyzed, yet must be once again reviewed to
provide the reader with a historical context and basic understanding of the underlying notion that
this thesis offers. United States’ foreign policy surrounded the containment of the spread of
Soviet influence initially that involved important factors still in existence in the current age of
globalization.
Chapter Three will include the bulk of the thesis. It will pertain to the current trends of
United States’ foreign policy, dating back to the time of the end of the first Gulf War in 1991.
Understanding the origins of the current trend of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East will aid
in understanding the complex matter of globalization in its entirety. The international oil trade of
yesterday has transformed the direction of the domestic energy needs of the United States today.
Furthermore, the world stage has become much more diverse regarding the players involved in
the globalization’s destiny and the ongoing events and global episodes have shaped and altered
our diplomacy to meet the needs as seen best fit by the U.S. government. In the conclusion of
the thesis, options will be presented to the reader concerning globalization and its implications
and legacy on the Middle East.
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Chapter 2
………………………….
A History of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East Following WWII

One of the biggest concerns in the American political atmosphere today has been the
United States’ entanglement with Middle Eastern society. American military and various
occupational personnel, resources, as well as money have been channeled to and from that region
of the world for decades. Many Americans want to withdraw its diplomatic presence from the
region, as well as abandon former United States’ interests and intentions within Middle Eastern
society. On the other hand, others tend to agree that the United States should remain in the
Middle East due to the social and political instability of Muslim culture, and the threat it poses
on the rest of the world and globalization. The United States will, in fact, remain a pivotal player
in the progression of Middle Eastern society for several various reasons. President Obama was
elected by the American public in 2009, in part, because he stated on numerous occasions during
his campaign that he would convene with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and formulate a “phased and
orderly” plan to withdraw American troops from the Middle East as soon as he was elected.42
Only parts of his promise have come to fruition. Although efforts were, and have, been made to
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withdraw U.S. military forces from the Middle East since he and his staff took office, U.S.
policymakers continue to construct and pursue a foreign policy that has allowed the United
States to remain entrenched and involved in the Middle Eastern social landscape, in its economic
structure, and in its political matters.
The fact that the Middle East remains an integral player in United States’ foreign policymaking presents nothing unfamiliar to U.S. history. U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East can
be traced back to the discovery of oil in Persia (modern-day Iran) during the early-1910s. As the
years progressed into an era of two disastrous world wars and a global economic depression, the
Middle East eventually became a region pivotal for fueling the wartime economies of Europe,
Russia, and the U.S. in the form of petroleum. In addition, Third-World regions -- such as the
Middle East – by the mid-twentieth century, “was abundant in land, labor, and natural resource
potential, but what it desperately lacked was capital.”43 In 1944, one year before Japanese
surrender, the World Bank was created to coordinate postwar reconstruction in Europe, and
expanded its role to “investing in the infrastructure of developing countries.”44 The reasons
behind the creation of Middle Eastern diplomacy in the mid-twentieth century could be traced
back to important factors surrounding American imperialist interests and motives in the region.
U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East has involved a very complex and complicated series of
factors, including: diplomatic and business relationships, international activities on a politicaleconomic global scale, cultural conflicts, and the global demand for energy resources and the
access to those resources. Another factor involved in this historic episode is the
misunderstanding and misconceptions surrounding the socio-economic and cultural objectives
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between the various nations and peoples of Western and Middle Eastern society -- spanning the
majority of the twentieth century and beyond.
To conceptualize United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East, one must first
understand the United States’ global and domestic missions, as well as realize the permanent
foundations of American expansionist thought. American Expansionism, as described by
historian Frederick Merk, contained, “[a] sense of mission to redeem the Old World by high
example… generated in pioneers of idealistic spirit on their arrival in the New World….
[G]enerated by the potentialities of a new earth for building a new heaven.”45 Also known as the
idea of Manifest Destiny, the birth of the American expansionist rationale could be traced back
to the foundations of British-colonial America of the seventeenth century. As soon as European
settlers landed on the east coast of the present-day United States, the notion of manifest destiny
preoccupied the rationale of these settlers from England. Religious motives in the form of
Christian Protestantism and motives of cultural superiority over the Native Americans, and
eventually, over British occupation as the American Revolution drew near, helped propel the
ideal of Manifest Destiny into the future of American philosophy. By the time around Thomas
Jefferson’s presidency of the 1790s – the expansion of U.S. land and peoples westward became
an inevitable event as the newly liberalized Americans attempted to seek new opportunities and
prosperity elsewhere.
The dawn of the nineteenth century witnessed the United States’ claim of a newfound
sense of entitlement to its renowned ideals of freedom and liberty. This notion became
manifested in the domestic policies and the mindset of the American public, as they began to
migrate away from the east coast no more than two decades following the Revolutionary War of
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1776. In the aftermath of the Louisiana Purchase from Napoleon’s France in 1803, and
expanding into the Jacksonian Era and the related federal Indian removal programs, government
land sales west of the Appalachian Mountains, and later, west of the Mississippi River,
consequently pioneered the Westward expansion era and instilled the ideals of a seemingly
endless American expansion. The fertile lands of the Midwest proved an ideal location for
planting crops such as corn. The vast and untapped western land also provided Americans with
an abundance of natural and raw material, thus, a surplus of American crops were raised, farmed,
and harvested. Once the American marketplace became saturated with agricultural production,
farmers began to seek government assistance to coordinate with overseas markets regarding
trading. New economic opportunities for Americans became abundant. Therefore, the
opportunity arose for farmers and urban investors to trade America’s crops and other various
products to European markets and elsewhere in order to generate profits for themselves, which
consequently supplemented the success of the United States’ economy at home.
Historian William Appleman Williams, who trail blazed in the study of the United States’
expansionist rationale, which has provided an academic basis for the American expansionist
theory, suggested that the seeds of globalization were planted more than a century and a half ago.
Following the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln at the end of the Civil War in 1864,
Williams documented the American-collective mindset of the time, in that “[m]ost of the people
believed in the principle of self-determination. [Americans] did not begin as imperialists. Their
evolution into advocates of empire is not a story of the triumph of Evil, but rather a tale of
tragedy caused by the fear of the Future.”46 Therefore, Americans anticipated and assessed their
own trials and tribulations and viewed them as synonymous to everyone else’s all around the
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world. Economic unease and social uncertainty gave way to a unique brand of collective
American psychology. Williams added, in criticism of the psychology imposed on Americans
by the marketplace, that:
[Americans] increasingly demanded that others exercise the right of selfdetermination in ways that furthered the economic expansion of America that they
deemed essential for their own self-determination. Their compromise was made
easier because the great majority of them also believed in their souls that America
had evolved the best ideas and institutions of freedom.47

Later events such as the U.S. annexation of Texas in 1845 and the Spanish-American
War of 1898 proved to be a result of the United States’ expansionist motives as well. By the turn
of the twentieth century the United States was in the final process of securing and extracting
resources from within their borders; working the land, time, and effort that was available to its
fullest potential. Officially the United States had become a dominant global power by the
closing years of the nineteenth century. The United States sought out foreign territories to
imperialize and implement their unique doctrine of manifest destiny in an attempt to advance
foreign societies and peoples’ way of thinking to their own. Territories in the Pacific, South
America, the Caribbean, and Central America proved to be valuable locations for American
imperialism. The American economy would benefit from the cheaper raw materials and labor of
these lands, as well as an ideal location for the spread of American interests, culture, and society
into these so-called primitive societies. Although the United States had no intention of becoming
malevolent imperialists, it did so subtly in an attempt to civilize foreign and non-modern
cultures. President Woodrow Wilson’s biographer, Arthur Link, noted in 1915 that the President
did not allow for the Mexicans to follow their own course in civil history following their civil
war in 1910. Rather, President Wilson “was determined… to teach the South American
47
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republics to elect good men!”48 Latin America, the Middle East, and the Pacific Island countries
that the U.S. had once imperialized, by 1945, became ideal regions in further expanding the
American Manifest Destiny doctrine to battle a relatively new and foreign threat. “Global
developments, [such as the Cold War] rather than specific regional interests were decisive in
shaping American policy….”49
In the previous chapter, pioneering researchers such as C. Wright Mills and Kim
McQuaid explained how the players who constructed our nation’s foreign and domestic policies
were part of a unique group of individuals, who included the likes of elite politicians and
powerful businessmen. Primary and secondary research indicated that the upper-echelons of
American Industry and high-ranked federal government officials within America’s power
structure seemed to be the two major groups who have formulated and carried out the directions
and objectives in formally implementing American expansionism through a legitimate foreign
policy. This elitist desire transcended into U.S. foreign policymaking for the bulk of the
twentieth century – even during the two World Wars and the two intermediate decades of the
1920s and 1930s, which was the era that the U.S. federal government favored national
isolationism and the bureaucratization of the U.S. political-economic sphere.
Yet during the isolationist period of the 1920s and 1930s, the United States remained
active in economic trading with international markets, especially in the Middle Eastern oil
business. New innovations in the energy and automobile industry in the United States brought
about a great need for petroleum imports and supplies. The United States and Middle East
remained adequate trading partners until 1938, when the oil trade and business activity
substantially sped up due to the Allied war effort against the Axis Powers of the Second World
48
49

Ibid., 146.
Ninkovich, The United States and Imperialism, 145.

38
War. Once the United Kingdom acquired mining rights in Iran by the early 1920s, and mining
and refining techniques became more technologically advanced, world powers such as the
United States, were able to “reinforce their power over oil wells in the Middle East.”50 Even
though the United States was in the midst of a political isolationist policy during the Roaring
Twenties and the Great Depression, American opportunists had looked outside the nation in an
effort to make money elsewhere and expand the American economic machine. Once World War
Two arrived and passed, and the United States found itself in a diplomatic war with the Soviet
Union, the Middle East and its oil-based relationship with the West became important aspects to
the United States’ containment policy. Political partnerships were forged between the United
States and Middle Eastern governments, such as the shah in Iran, to achieve a strategic position
against Soviet expansion.
Today, the notion of Manifest Destiny within our foreign policy-making remains evident;
however there now exists a more dynamic global landscape. The ever-changing and evolving
historic episodes, combined with turbulent political and economic climates have caused the
United States to evolve, adapt, and change its policy in order to reach its overall objective of
expansionism - and eventually, the goal of globalization. Globalization, according to U.S.
historical trends, is a continuation of its former policy of Manifest Destiny. However, to a
greater extent and with the same objective of American expansionist theory, globalization
proponents suggest transforming regions around the globe in an exclusive American system,
which will bring about positive growth for global society and the planet as a whole. The United
States has remained the world’s strongest nation with a dynamic and powerful capitalistic system
in place. Previous political and economic leaders of the United States’ have played a gigantic
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role in policymaking regarding the direction and path toward globalization. This will persist, and
has, in affecting both those who live within America’s borders, and foreign peoples as well.
The historical evidence gathered seemed to reveal a logical course, or pattern, that the
United States has followed since the end of the Second World War regarding foreign policy in
the Middle East. To be more specific, foreign policy in the Middle East has witnessed two major
trends since that time, with the transitional phase occurring around the time of the first Gulf War
(1990-91).
The dawn of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union following the
Axis Powers’ formal surrender in 1945, and the international circumstances surrounding the
creation of a Jewish homeland of Israel within the existing land of Palestine three years later,
brought about the first trend of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. This initial trend in
foreign policy (1945-1991) revolved around the notion of national security and protecting
American interests abroad – the Cold War Trend. With the official collapse of the Soviet Union
in 1991 and, simultaneously, Saddam Hussein’s defeat at the hands of the U.S. led coalition, the
United States welcomed its second trend in its foreign policy agenda with open arms. The
Globalization Trend (1991-present), has presented the United States’ economic, social, and
political elite with the fragile opportunity to usher in a new global order in the image of
American society. Although the global marketplace has existed for centuries and foreign peoples
and nations might have their own visions of a global society, the undertakings by American
policymakers to establish an official new world order had begun – which involved the political,
social, cultural, and economic fabrics of Western society -- once their Soviet adversaries were
defeated.
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Three main factors dictated the direction of this initial trend in the United States’ foreign
policy in the Middle East, with a fourth factor becoming relevant in the closing decades of the
Cold War - once it became evident to the West that the Soviet Union would not survive long
with its communist principles at the helm. The three early factors included the overwhelming
American support for a Jewish homeland in Israel, U.S. and Western access to Middle Eastern
oil alongside its position in the global marketplace established in the late 1920s, containment
against the spread of Soviet-driven communism, and finally, the initial seeds for the evolving
goal of U.S.-led globalization during the Carter Administration era. All factors contributed to
the overall goal and purpose by United States’ foreign policymaking regarding a containment
policy (the most important factor of the four according to United States’ diplomacy during the
bulk of the latter half of the twentieth century) which fought against the spread of communism
and upheld the protection of the Free World. The need by the United States and the West for
Middle Eastern oil, developing those international business relationships, and maintaining the
support and alliance with the State of Israel were the three factors that played into the overall
containment directive scheme early on as well.
In its global battle versus communism, the United States and its Western allies relied
heavily on the capitalist systems their nations had long fostered, as well as the resources that had
long powered the West’s economic growth and reach. The one resource the United States
needed that the Middle East possessed a lot of was petroleum. Business relationships between
Middle Eastern nations like Saudi Arabia and the United States dated back to the first couple
decades of the twentieth century. It became imperative to U.S. policymaking that the United
States expanded on and pursued business interests in the Middle East, which only improved upon
their expansionist visions and deter the Soviet influence further. Although the benign
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relationships that the United States had shared with various Muslim governments in the Middle
East has seemed rather unusual, these relationships materialized, and endured, depending on the
circumstances surrounding the vital trade of petroleum.
Oil was first discovered in the Middle East in 1908 underneath the desert land of modernday Iran by the Anglo-Persian Company’s Managing Director Charles Greenway.51 Around the
time preceding the First World War, petroleum resources became the means of measuring global
power and status. The United States entered the global oil scene once Charles Teagle’s Standard
Oil Company begun drilling for oil in the Middle East in 1919, since the U.S. national oil supply
shortages following World War One became an imperative concern by government officials.52
But it was not until 1928, when American companies such as Exxon (Standard Oil of New
Jersey) and Mobil (Standard Oil of New York), were admitted into Iraq to conduct their business
ventures.53 Exxon and Mobil, two member companies of the Seven Sisters, possessed ultimate
economic control of the international petroleum market until the emergence of OPEC in 1960,
and the economic recession of the early 1970s. From 1928 moving forward, American
businessmen and politicians viewed the Middle East as a region that proved beneficial to the
growing need in the U.S. for natural energy in the form of petroleum. Saudi Arabia would later
prove to be the most important Arab State regarding the oil trade with the United States.
The fourth factor in this first trend of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East was the
pioneering principles toward a globalized society spearheaded by the United States, once it
became clear during the Bush Senior Administration that the United States had a solid influence
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in the Middle East and the Soviet threat was just about diminished. Globalization, as stated
previously, is the principal doctrine that still reigns as the precedence in U.S. foreign policy
today. The United States, once engaged in conflict with the Soviet Union which held opposing
viewpoints regarding the notion of globalization and/or expansionism, is presently and
diplomatically more comfortable than it has ever been – yet nations like China are becoming a
greater presence on the international stage with the capabilities to do so as well. But the United
States’ comfort in directing its globalist doctrine will change very soon. Other nations are
gaining more international power as well as time persists, and the natural advancements in
economic, social, and technological means are contributing to the evolution toward globalization.

The Cold War Trend in U.S. Foreign Policy

The emphasis of globalization did not take center stage until the defeat of Saddam’s
military offensive in Kuwait at the conclusion of the first Gulf War, and more importantly, the
collapse of the Soviet Union. For the purpose of upholding a historical narrative from 1945
onward, containment against the Eastern, Soviet ideology of government and economy was
America’s first and most important aspect of its foreign policy entering the conflict between the
world’s two global superpowers by the mid-late 1940s. To protect the United States and its
invested global interests, foreign policymakers had a twofold solution: They needed to develop
an ideology against communism and socialism, as well as protect pro-capitalist regimes in the
Third World – such as the prior shah of Iran and the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia. These
regimes, often merciless toward their own populations and suppressing in their own
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methodologies of governing, were supported by the United States nevertheless, since they
rejected the ideologies of socialism and communism.
In a global sense, the United States followed a policy of containment throughout the early
stages of the Cold War. Discussed by President Truman in The Truman Doctrine, the policy of
containment was designed by U.S. policymakers to “support free peoples who are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,” and, “assist free peoples to
work out their own destinies in their own way….”54 In hindsight, as well as ironically, U.S.
interference in international dilemmas would have its related consequences and backlash by
peoples of other countries who collectively viewed U.S. presence within their own lands as
outside pressure and as a foreign invasion.
Containment and American expansionism, working synonymously within the structure
of U.S. diplomacy, proved to be a tedious and conflicting course of action in terms of bringing
about a peaceful resolution to the Cold War conflict and Middle Eastern society. This policy
was designed to contain the spread of communism and keep the Soviet influence away from the
surrounding, weaker nations of the Third World, as well as provide diplomatic security for
nations teetering on the brink of social and political revolt. This meant that the United States, in
contrast to its global symbolic mission of holding the moral high ground, supported corrupt and
suppressing foreign dictatorships and regimes at times – such as Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of
Iran, Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, and Ngo Dinh Diem of Vietnam to name a few – as long as they
opposed Soviet and communist doctrine. The majority of time spent during this war of political
ideologies by the United States was directed toward the Third-World countries of Latin America,
South America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. These regions primarily contained the
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countries who were politically and economically unstable, and possessed vast resources that
were of great importance to the First World, and geographically close to Soviet Russia and its
satellite nations. Amidst the concern of the Soviet Union’s goals, China was the other
communist giant with which the United States had to contend with. But due to its own
nationalistic nature, China was not as much of a global threat, in regards to containing the spread
of communism, as the Soviet Union was.
The United States, alongside its Western allies, attempted to align themselves with many
of, if not all, the governments and rulers they could in the Middle East in order to prevent the
Soviets from advancing their influence southward. However and unfortunately for the United
States, it was during this time – from the mid-1940s onward – in which the Middle East was in
the midst of a revival of Arab nationalism and Islamic faith. This episode of nationalism, was
brought about in part, by a sound Arab rejection of earlier European motives of imperialism and
former military episodes during and before the First World War in the majority of Arab Middle
Eastern countries. In general, Arab nationalism and Islamic ideologies opposed the West’s
accepted trends of society, culture, and religion. This trend swept across many of the nations
within the Middle East and proved to be another obstruction concerning the diplomatic goals of
U.S. foreign policy by 1945. When he proclaimed an Islamic State of Egypt in 1949, Hasan alBanna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, advocated that, “[l]uxuries only annihilate nations,
and her comforts and coveted possessions have only convulsed [the West].”55 It appeared evident
from an American standpoint that in order to establish a functional presence in the Middle East
and befriend the leaders and people within these Muslim lands, the United States had an uphill
battle to fight against -- the renewed and heated animosities toward Western society.
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These social upheavals, which spanned across national boundaries of the Middle East,
created preliminary problems for the United States when attempting to implement their presence
in the region. In a 1951 congressional hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs (CFA),
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian and African Affairs, George C. McGhee, was
convinced that Soviet Russia was stimulating internal divisions and revolt within many of the
Middle Eastern countries, specifically in the Arab community and the peoples within Iran and
Turkey, based on feelings of “insecurity” and “nationalism in the light of the cold war
struggle.”56 Therefore, he added that:
[Uprisings] will go on and increase until the imbalance of power is redirected,
until [the United States] gets stronger and Western Europe gets stronger, and
[Middle Eastern nations] get some idea that Russia will be afraid to declare war
because of [U.S.] strength, or that we might help them in the event of war and
help defend them, or that we can assume a leadership in the world which we have
not either because of our weakness or because we’re not willing to do so.57
Mr. McGhee’s comments were of the fundamental and common belief held by the United
States’ government officials concerning the Middle East that had affected their foreign
policymaking decisions of the time. He reflected the subtle, yet central, notion within U.S.
foreign policy that without American intervention in Middle Eastern affairs, the Soviet Union
was believed by U.S. officials to invade the region and inflict their communist doctrine upon it.
The Soviet plan was to position itself as a barrier between the Western world and the Third
World in order to restrict and deny the flow of resources, such as oil, to and from the West. In
order to remain one step ahead of the Soviet undertaking, U.S. officials attempted to befriend as
many Third-world nations as they could, emphasizing U.S. economic and social aid as selling
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points for their agenda. Chester Bowles, U.S. ambassador to India, advised President Truman to
implement Western-style community programs within Nehru’s India. Bowles believed that if
India fell to communism and Soviet influence, U.S. strategic positions from “Cairo to Tokyo”
would be in “grave danger,” and the flow of resources and commerce in and out of the region
would be jeopardized.58 Countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, Syria, and Afghanistan proved to be
buffers to Soviet expansion as long as the United States supported and funded the ruling regimes
of the abovementioned nations. Moreover, these countries remained a valuable asset to the
United States throughout the entirety of the Cold War
With a diplomatic double-edged sword to confront between Arab nationalism, Islamic
idealism, and Soviet containment, the United States had to form and plan their foreign policy
very carefully and strategically throughout the 1940s and 1950s. When the U.S. Congress
convened in the spring of 1954, the legislative body passed the Mutual Security Act. Essentially
this legislation provided foreign governments, especially those located in the Middle East, with
U.S. military personnel and public works contracts that were considered necessary to United
States’ national security interests. Upon approval of this act, Secretary of State John Dulles
stated that the U.S. aid and money given to Turkey and Pakistan brought about, “a greater return
to the United States in terms of its own security than if it were spent in some other way or if it
were not spent at all.”59 In order to protect its own policy intentions, the United States had to
persuade the governments of various Middle Eastern nations with money and assistance through
the implementations of American personnel and planning to dissuade any Soviet advancements
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into the area. This legislation could be seen as a policy similar to the Marshall Plan, which
provided the powers of Western Europe with American aid in order to deter Soviet advancement
into the region as well.
During the ongoing heightened Cold War tensions in its earliest years, U.S. support for
the creation of a State of Israel in Palestine only intensified problems with the surrounding
Islamic nations of the Middle East who were key in preventing Soviet expansion. The United
States found itself in a cautious and complicated predicament. Not only did the United States
have to battle the forces of Arab nationalism and Soviet communism, but they also had to ease
the tensions of a cultural and religious war between the Jewish Zionists of Israel and the
surrounding pro-Arab and other Muslim rulers, sentiments, and people. American support for a
Jewish homeland in the middle of an Islamic-dominated region struck a discord with the
surrounding Middle Eastern nations, likewise, in solidifying U.S. attempts to create alliances
with many of those nations of the Middle East. It is important to understand that U.S. support
for Israel played a gigantic role in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East concerning
containment, and subsequently, forming alliances with the surrounding Arab, Palestinian, and
other Muslim peoples who opposed the creation of a Jewish state. A Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) report on the Arab States in 1947 laid out the dilemma which the U.S. was
entangled in perfectly:
Arab determination to resist the partition of Palestine is such that any attempt to
enforce that solution would lead to armed conflict, presenting an opportunity for
the extension of Soviet influence. Any firm establishment of Soviet influence in
the Arab states would not only be dangerous in itself, but would also tend to
isolate Turkey and Iran. Furthermore, irrespective of the possibility of Soviet
penetration of this area, U.S. support of the partition of Palestine might lead the
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Arab states, on their own, to take steps which would adversely affect U.S.
economic and strategic interests in their territories.60
Foreign policy in the Middle East became a policy that the United States had to
consistently develop, which quickly evolved into a tedious and cumbersome endeavor for U.S.
policymakers. On the domestic front, the majority of the United States’ population supported the
idea of a strong bond with the newly-founded Israel. The United States contained an influential
Jewish minority within its borders, as well as the fact that the American public had just
witnessed the inhumane acts committed by the Nazis and their treatment of European Jews
during the Holocaust several years earlier. Those factors created a collective national feeling of
sympathy toward all Jewish people within the U.S. In May, 1942, resolutions of the Biltmore
Conference in New York City strongly supported American and British political support for the
creation of a Jewish homeland within Palestine. In the fall of 1946, President Harry Truman
released a statement that indicated American support for Jewish immigration into Palestine. In a
letter to the British Prime Minister, Clement Atlee, Truman essentially asked that the British
government -- which had previously colonized Palestine and were in the process of abandoning
their control there – to lift its restrictions on Jewish immigration. In addition, Truman stated that
his administration would do “everything it could to the end” in an ill-fated attempt to create an
international agreement amongst various nations to “liberalize” all their immigration laws “with
a view to the admission of displaced persons.”61
For the United States, it took careful planning, much direct and diplomatic interaction
between leaders from the United States and Middle East, support from American and Western
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business entities in the Middle East, as well as maintaining the standing alliances with Islamic
nations, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, in order to prevent the Soviets from expanding
their mission southward. Yet there remained an apparent understanding between the United
States and nations like Saudi Arabia, where the U.S. would not push for freedoms of commoners
as long as the powerful sheikhs and Royal monarchy had continued to foster an American
alliance. Thus, this served to protect the United States’ bipolar vision of Western expansionism
and an effective policy of Containment. President Eisenhower’s State of the Union address in
January, 1957, more commonly referred to as the Eisenhower Doctrine, declared that:
There is general recognition in the Middle East, as elsewhere, that the United
States does not seek either political or economic domination over any other
people. Our desire is a world environment of freedom, not servitude. On the other
hand many, if not all, of the nations of the Middle East are aware of the danger
that stems from International Communism and welcome closer cooperation with
the United States to realize for themselves the United Nations’ goals of
independence, economic well-being and spiritual growth.62
Disregarding any element of Western propaganda, Eisenhower’s message seemed to
reflect that of a containment policy above all else. Eisenhower’s doctrine, constructed
immediately following the Suez Canal crisis of 1956, appeared unnerved or uninformed of
Israel’s militant actions in Palestinian territory during the crisis. Furthermore, Eisenhower’s
vision of a “world environment of freedom” seemed to contradict actions taken by U.S. officials
and forces. Shortly after being elected president in 1952, Eisenhower approved a plan for the
CIA to implement a propaganda campaign in Iran to foment protest against the Socialist reformer
Mohammed Mossadegh. In consolidating their efforts with Great Britain’s MI6 Intelligence
Agency, their goal was to dispose of any potential communist threat. Dubbed “Operation Ajax”
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(MI6 called this same mission: Operation Boot), the CIA did “all the heavy lifting for the coup”
that removed Mossadegh from power and reinstating the Shah under control of General Fazlullah
Zahedi.63 Although the U.S. goal to remove the socialist ruler from power was achieved, the
United States did so in the name of force, manipulation, and persuasion. In the wake of this
nationalist movement, it was monumental that the United States used this type of elusive
diplomacy in order to obtain its directive in American expansionist thought and denying Soviet
expansion from occurring. American diplomacy had been implemented and pursued in the
Middle East by the 1950s as a plan to discern any socialist expansion first and foremost before
any plan for true freedom and liberty of Middle Eastern peoples was to be achieved.
The Western Powers, pertaining to Middle Eastern foreign policy, were in a tedious
position by the late 1950s. The U.S. attempted to ally themselves with as many Middle Eastern
governments, forces, and entities possible as long as Middle Eastern governments sponsored and
supported the West’s global vision – all while rejecting the Soviet sphere of influence. Gamal
Abdel Nasser’s Soviet-backed nationalist regime in Egypt, and its control over the Suez Canal,
served as a reminder to the West that making alliances with any Third-World leader was
plausible and, in fact, necessary in protecting their own interests in the region and throughout the
world. Western politicians, as well as big business leaders, would do whatever they could to
make alliances with Middle Eastern governments even if it meant evading or squashing Arab and
Islamic nationalist movements in the process.
The rise of social and political unrest in the Middle East in places like Pakistan, Iran, and
Turkey irked the United States, as it found itself in a costly predicament years later against
collective Muslim extremism and the intensified hatred by the Middle Eastern peoples toward
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Israel and Western society. Despite its failure at Arab unity however, Arab nationalism had
“succeeded in implanting the desire for inter-Arab cooperation and condominium, and it is not
unlikely that this will become articulated in the form of increasing bureaucratization and
institutionalization of inter-Arab economic, technological, and cultural relations.”64 This increase
in Arab communication and the transnational network of information sharing among various
nations of the Middle East led to the rise of trade and diplomatic talks between countries rich in
oil resources and the resource-hungry developed nations like the United States.
Following World War Two, seven Western dominant oil companies had complete control
in directing and driving the international market prices of Middle Eastern oil. Moreover, these
oil companies had held onto the control of the oil market in the Middle East since the 1920s.
These companies were known as the Seven Sisters, and included the likes of Shell, Standard Oil
of California, Mobil, Texaco, British Petroleum, Exxon, and Gulf. Decades prior to 1973, the
Seven Sisters completely controlled basically every business aspect on the development and
distribution of crude oil found in the Middle East. But by the late 1960s and into the 1970s, the
monopoly held onto by the companies that composed the Seven Sisters became decimated. With
British Petroleum losing its access to petroleum in Iran in January of 1971, the Seven Sisters
began to gradually lose their control over directing international oil prices. By the fall of 1973,
Egypt and Syria invaded Israel to initiate the Yom Kippur War. OPEC (Organization of
Petroleum-Exporting Countries) eventually took charge of controlling the energy market in 1973,
as they wielded their control of the market forces along with oil prices, which sent panic
throughout the international oil industry and the global market.
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Middle Eastern nations who spearheaded the formation of OPEC in 1960 included Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, UAE, and Qatar. Other member nations included Ecuador,
Venezuela, Algiers, Indonesia, Libya, Angola, Nigeria, and Gabon. The reason for OPEC’s
formation and existence was, according to their organization’s PR statement, was “to co-ordinate
and unify petroleum policies among Member Countries, in order to secure fair and stable prices
for petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming
nations; and a fair return on capital to those investing in the industry.”65 OPEC was formed at a
four-day conference held in Baghdad in September, 1960. Moreover, OPEC’s underlying
mission was, and continues to, emphasize “the inalienable right of all countries to exercise
permanent sovereignty over their natural resources in the interest of their national
development.”66
The United States had lost a considerable degree of influence and power in dictating oil
prices and its market value on a global scale once OPEC gained international recognition.
According to economic expert Philip Verleger, Arab states had lost control of their oil reserves in
the 1960s, but once consumer demand from the West “suddenly caught up with productive
capacity… producing nations were able to achieve success in their efforts to regain control over
their reserves.”67 It appeared that the First-World was now at the mercy of Middle Eastern oilproducing countries. In their first ten years of existence, OPEC and their related Middle Eastern
petroleum industrial firms failed to maintain any meaningful bargaining power, or have their
independent firms compete alongside firms of First-World consuming nations. And to make
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matters worse for the international marketplace, consuming governments like the United States
cut off negotiations with OPEC in October, 1973. This occurrence was due to the West’s
“virtually unanimous answer in the negative” over OPEC’s sharp increase in the price of crude
oil and to the unanimous objection over the Arab-Israeli conflict of the same year.68
Beginning in 1938 and for the remainder of the twentieth century, the United States had
to form a policy that would allow the United States to continue drilling for oil in Arab countries
like Saudi Arabia. It was not until 1988 that the Saudi government took full control of the oil
company’s operations, officially entitled Saudi Aramco, once the company was nationalized.
Today, Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabian Oil Company), originally a subsidiary of Standard Oil
Company which formally operated in protecting American interests, earns just over an estimated
$1 billion a day in oil revenue.69 The U.S. government, initially, had to resort to giving gifts to,
and be granted permission by, the Kingdom’s monarch and the appropriate prince of whose land
they were drilling for oil on. For the United States government, this task in negotiating matters
surrounding Saudi oil reserves eventually evolved into the complex diplomatic relationship that
the U.S. currently shares with Saudi Arabia.
Aramco was established in January, 1944 when oil was discovered on the Island of
Bahrain by a subsidiary company of Standard Oil of California. A 1948 CIA report on Saudi
Arabia sent to Washington indicated that, although there was a “loss of cordiality following the
recognition of Israel,” relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia remained peaceful,
affirmed by Ibn Saud’s foreign minister.70 From 1948 onward, the survival and growth of the
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relationship between Aramco and the United States was at the forefront of American concern
during the Cold War. The importance of Aramco’s business with the United States was
demonstrated during altercations between Aramco and the Saudi Government in the late 1940s.
The United States obliged King Ibn Saud’s demand for “gold sovereigns and nothing else” in
order to bring peace to the development of hostility between the state and the business entity in
1948.71 The U.S. could not afford to lose its position in the turbulent social landscape of the
Middle East.
For years to come, oil producing nations such as Saudi Arabia viewed Aramco and other
various petroleum corporations as the appropriate intermediaries through which to communicate
their views and desires to Washington and to other various Western countries.72 Not only did the
oil trade between Saudi Arabia and the United States prove beneficial to U.S. diplomacy, but this
capitalist relationship helped continue to solidify a defense against the spread of communism
throughout the Middle East. The Saudi sheikhs and the Saudis who were in positions of power
benefited immensely from the oil revenues brought in from the United States. The wealth Saudi
Arabia has accumulated over the decades from U.S. purchases of their petroleum exports has
overshadowed Saudi resentment toward Israel. As long as Saudi Arabia was growing in wealth
transferred from the West, its diplomacy would remain U.S.-friendly, depending on whether the
House of Saud remained entrenched in power.73 The anti-Israeli radicalism held by the majority
of Islamic Arabs within Saudi Arabia had been silenced, to a degree. Through social welfare
programs and holding onto supreme power of the state, the House of Saud was able to suppress
many major and violent altercations against the State of Israel that have risen in the past.
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Another benefit the United States enjoyed in forming an alliance with Saudi Arabia during the
Cold War was that both governments suppressed the spread of communism within their national
populations, which was detrimental to their survival and their clamp on political power.
The first three decades of the Cold War proved burdensome to American foreign
policymakers. Establishing a foreign policy agenda of Americanization and providing aid in the
form of money, investment, personnel, and supplies for the underdeveloped nations of the
Middle East, allowed the United States to become a regional force in protecting the Islamic
countries from the influence of Soviet Russia. In addition, the alliance between Israel and the
United States helped strengthen the United States’ position of intermingling and entrenching
itself in Middle Eastern affairs. However, this development proved troublesome when the
United States attempted to implement peace and cooperation among the various Islamic nations
of the Middle East. The rise in Arab nationalism and the rise of Muslim hostility due to the
placement of Israel had become an increasing determent to America’s overall objective of
containment.
Yet America was willing to take the risk of supporting Israel. Throughout the 1950s,
1960s, and into the 1970s, Soviet influence in the Middle East was kept to a minimal degree
from an American standpoint due to its containment policy. While American expansionism was
presented in the form of social, economic, and political aid to Middle Eastern governments who
assimilated with American goals of containment, American expansionism in the image of
globalization did not take center stage in United States’ foreign policymaking until the early
1990s following the end of the Gulf War. The various recorded rhetoric and documentation of
government officials and personnel related to United States’ foreign policy throughout the past
several decades has proved this notion. The overall objective of American foreign policy from
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the end of the Second World War through the early 1990s was two-fold. U.S. foreign policy in
the Middle East adapted with the intention to capitalize on the United States’ need for oil, and
the formation of a substantial diplomatic relationship with Israel and the surrounding Muslim
populations. The Western crusade against the expansion of communism into the region
succeeded for the time being, however, Western resentment by Middle Eastern Muslims had
increased.

The Power of the Oil Economy during the Later Stages of the Cold War

From the 1960s onward, familiar and new developments to United States’ foreign policy
in the Middle East had occurred at a rapid pace that consistently changed the complexity of the
U.S. mission. Vietnam and Southeast Asia became the dominant concerns in containment and
the protection of American interests elsewhere heading into the 1970s. While the Middle East
continued to be monitored and managed closely, it was a less menacing concern for the United
States than it was a decade earlier pertaining to the Arab nationalist movements. Middle Eastern
oil sources and OPEC persisted, however, in remaining the United States’ primary source for
imported petroleum imports from 1961 onward – no matter what global economic or political
condition was rendered.
The 1960s and 1970s brought about a new and drastically increased demand for oil by the
U.S. population. George Parkhurst, former Vice President of Standard Oil of California,
reported that oil imports, primarily from Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, increased from a
little more than five million barrels a day in 1960 to about fourteen million barrels a day by
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1970.74 This increased demand for oil brought about a critical change to the international market.
The formation of OPEC in 1960, and the rise in the global demand for oil brought about a new
dynamic to international business and the geopolitical community. The oil producing nations of
OPEC nationalized their oil drilling and refinery companies by the dawn of the 1960s in an
attempt to hold a degree of influence and power in global politics and the international economy.
Parkhurst added that from the evidence gathered, oil producing companies in the Arab states,
such as Aramco, were earning substantially less than their governments were on sales per barrel
of oil by 1974.75 According to economic expert John Blair, OPEC and its Arab leaders had
developed a “casual indifference to belligerent hostility” toward the United States, as Saudi King
Faisal forwarded a message to Frank Jungers, then the President of Aramco, urging for “a simple
disavowal of Israeli policies and actions by the U.S. Government.”76 In short, there was no oil
shortage in 1974. In fact, in the period of the oil embargo – the fourth quarter of 1973 – “output
turned out to be virtually the same” as in previous quarters, in which OPEC and other major oil
companies in the region “had shifted to a potential surplus.”77 It appeared that the Western
powers had lost considerable control over oil and its impact in the global economy by the early
1970s. Moreover, OPEC officials knew that and took advantage of the situation to stimulate
their own national economies.
Shortly after OPEC took considerable control of the international oil market in 1973, an
energy crisis plagued the First World beginning in the mid-1970s. The Federal Government,
under the direction of the Richard Nixon Administration, proposed numerous economic controls
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that the nation had not witnessed since FDR’s New Deal programs. From 1969 to 1973, Nixon’s
first term in Office included numerous economic controls, as well as withdrawal of U.S. military
personnel from Vietnam, détente with the Soviet Union, and education reforms, which
contributed to his success in winning a second term as president. However, Nixon’s second term
was haunted by an energy crisis centered on the international petroleum market. The energy
crises, beginning in 1973, was not solely the result of spiteful Arab states versus the United
States due to its support Israel during the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict. Rather the energy crisis
was also stimulated by the launching of affirmative action and the establishment of the
Environmental Protection Agency in 1970, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in
1972, and the prolongation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; these programs
furthered the liberal regulations of the economy that materialized under Nixon’s presidency.78
The abovementioned government initiatives contributed to the evolving global economic
patterns. Economic expert, Philip Verleger, explained to the United States Senate a decade later
that:
Intervention by governments of consuming nations also contributed to the price
increases of the 1970’s[sic] and the artificial shortages. Imposition of more
stringent environmental controls at a time of rapid economic growth contributed
to an unexpected increase in demand. At the same time, price controls, allocation
regulations and other programs prevented producers from finding and developing
needed supplies in the United States and other producing countries. As a result,
consumers were forced to turn to a limited number of suppliers, suppliers who
then exercised their newly found monopoly power to boost prices.79

A combination of animosities held by the Arab-dominated OPEC toward the United
States for their support of Israel during the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973, as well as economic
trends of the American economy played considerable roles in the oil embargo and energy crises
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of the 1970s. In a letter to Saudi King Khalid in December, 1976, President Ford demonstrated
his personal “admiration” for Saudi Arabia’s government in their ability to keep oil prices
generally reasonable, and increasing oil production in order to have made an, “important
contribution to the cause of international cooperation” for both nations, alongside a central goal
of a lasting peace in the Middle East and cooperation in solving the global economic issues.80
Ford’s wording seemed to indicate that although OPEC’s rise in the oil prices hurt the world
economy, many other factors domestically and internationally also played an integral role in
hurting the world economy. Historian Daniel Yergin described the 1970s as a decade of, “poor
economic performance” by the United States.81 As with many episodes that have occurred over
the course of history, there were several factors involved in the transfer of power from the West
to the Middle Eastern powers regarding the control of oil during this era. The United States’
mission of containment in the Middle East became a foreign policy in which the United States
lost a lot of power in steering the direction of the world economy. The early 1970s witnessed
Arab leaders, including OPEC, take advantage of the opportunities the global economy and U.S.
government actions presented them with. The West’s influence over Middle Eastern oil’s role in
the global economy was diminished.
Part of the reason that Saudi Arabia and the other Arab nations involved with OPEC
raised oil prices tremendously, indeed, was due to the United States’ support for Israel during its
1973 Yom Kippur War against Egyptian and Syrian forces. Six years earlier, the fourth Arab
summit was held in the city of Khartoum, where Arab leaders dictated that there would be no
definite peace between Israel and its Muslim neighbors. Former Secretary of State, Henry
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Kissinger, described this summit as another new and strong wave of Arab extremism against
Western practices and policies.82 Furthermore, Kissinger advised the National Security Council
upon Israel’s request for U.S. aid on the onset of their war. He advocated that if, “[T]he Arabs
[could] swallow military aid decisions, but if [The United States executed] military aid to Israel
decisions in the context of a stalemate in negotiations,” there would have been a larger political
and economic consequence regarding the United States’ position in the Middle East.83
It was inevitable that the United States needed to display its support for Israel. It had
been doing so since Israel’s birth. Likewise, the United States understood that the Arab states,
specifically those nations that controlled the oil market as OPEC members, would be angered by
the U.S. motives and aid to Israel during the Israeli-Arab war. By the mid-1970s the United
States had to make the all-important decision to implement solutions that would satisfy both the
Israelis and Arabs to a degree without upsetting the diplomatic balance too much. The direct
U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War was in its second decade, and the United States needed all
the oil resources it could get from the Middle East in order to benefit the American cause.
Around 89 percent of the oil used by the American forces in Southeast Asia by the 1970s had
been exported from the Persian Gulf.84
The United States had attempted somewhat tediously, to coordinate their foreign policy
in a bipolar effort to satisfy demands, concerns, and desires from both the Israelis and the Arabs.
And although the tensions were eased between the United States and the Soviet Union, important
U.S. foreign policymakers such as Kissinger, according to U.S. diplomat Cyrus Vance, “brought
home the need to look at Third World problems on their own terms and not through the prism of
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East-West competition.”85 This course of action the United States took would prove more than
costly in the coming years. While the U.S. sought for peace in the Middle East between hostile
parties in the name of Soviet containment, Israelis, Arabs, and Palestinians continued their acts
of warfare, terrorism, and aggression toward each other. The altercation in Israel between the
Jewish and Palestinians has been in existence since Israel’s creation in 1948. Even today, the
conflict rages until some peaceful resolution is agreed upon by both Palestinians and Jews. On
the eve of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Arab coalition of Egyptian and Syrian forces
crossed over ceasefire lines and invaded Israeli territory on the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, and Suez
Canal. Meanwhile, Syrian forces invaded Golan Heights. The war lasted only nineteen days and
ended in a stalemate. U.N. ceasefire agreements that were brokered during the war unraveled,
yet both sides eventually agreed to end the altercation. In the aftermath of the war, Egypt lost its
Soviet alliance, suffered many casualties, and was unable to recapture the Sinai Peninsula.
Egypt, in theory, had suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Israel even though the war
possessed no winner.
In the 1970s these tensions were at a high level, and to a point where it did not seem the
violence would stop between Israel and its Muslim neighbors. Additionally, the American
alliance with the State of Israel resurrected a heightened sense of Arab bitterness toward the
United States and the West in general. Countries such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and
Pakistan would continue to receive U.S. aid as long as they defended against the Soviet threat
from the north, provided the American economy with petroleum, and held no serious
antagonistic endeavors toward Israel. In a 1979 letter to President Carter, Illinois Senator Paul
Findley observed that if the United States failed to force Israel to stop using, “indiscriminate
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violence,” against their Palestinian occupants, then the United States could be subjected to
violence from the Palestinians and their Arab supporters as well.86 Findley concluded that, “[i]f
that tragic time comes, the blood will be upon the hands - and the conscience – of all those who
have the ability to prevent it.”87 Unfortunately, that hypothesis has stood correct. Indeed, Arab
and Muslim animosity toward the United States and the West had survived as a real threat to
U.S. national security and foreign policy for the past thirty-five years.
Throughout this time period, the influence of Jewish lobbyism within America’s political
landscape was significant. Propaganda campaigns, political rhetoric, public support -- especially
from the Jewish-American minority and Christian political-right -- and the agenda of various
interest groups in support for Israel’s survival and expansion within the Middle East was very
strong. Years after his retirement, Illinois Senator and apparent political mainstream opponent
Paul Findley documented this fact in his book, They Dare to Speak Out. Several years after the
fact, Findley declared that his government colleague and former U.S. diplomat, George W. Ball,
was rejected from a Secretary of State position by President Carter upon taking the Presidential
Office. Furthermore, Ball had his advice on foreign policy constantly discarded by other
presidents such as Lyndon B. Johnson, because of his oppositional views regarding U.S. support
for Israel. The Israeli lobby also played a major role in selecting public officials pertaining to
policymaking in the Middle East.88 Historian Paul Charles Merkley advocated in his 2001 book,
Christian Attitudes Towards the State of Israel, that since the birth of Israel in 1948, the
American Friends of the Middle East (AFME) has remained an active anti-Israel lobby.
However by the 1970s, the AFME lost much credibility with U.S. politicians because the group
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“accept[ed] subsides from Aramco.”89 Moreover, Palestinians and “Arabs lost the contest for
public opinion because of their unwillingness to compromise,” and, “their refusal even to talk to
Israelis” over matters pertaining to lasting Middle Eastern peace.90
The Jewish lobby within the United States has had the tremendous privilege over the
years of influencing public officials and policymakers to overwhelmingly support Israel. While
the majority of American people are sympathetic to Israel, they would be willing to withdraw
American aid if Israel’s actions seem “to be contrary to U.S. interests.”91 Yet many experts on
U.S. diplomacy, including Stephen Walt, have regarded the special relationship that the United
States and Israel share as harmful to both nations’ security. The most influential pro-Israel lobby
organization since the Cold War era has been the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC), founded in 1963. Throughout the Cold War, this organization was seen as a strategic
asset, and liaison, between Israeli and the U.S. officials and policymakers. Once the Soviet
Union collapsed however, AIPAC used successful public relations and propaganda campaigns
against common enemies of both nations, especially targeting Islamic extremism in the form of
terrorism by the time the millennium approached.92
Since the early days of the Cold War, there has been a tremendous support for Israel
across various sects of the American population. In 1993, support for Israel by investors and the
business community in New York City was enough reason for Arab extremists in the first
bombing of the World Trade Center. Grassroots support for the Israeli cause included the rightwing of the Republican Party, individuals who fund academic and media institutions for the
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Jewish cause, the Kibbutz parties, as well as fundamentalist Christian and Judaic religious
groups and individuals. For example, Christian Zionism, which has resided in the theology of
dispensationalism,93 has caused evangelical Christians in the United States to view the special
diplomatic alliance between the United States and Israel as being on the “right side [of] the
Bible’s blueprint for the end times….”94 Moreover, these Christian fundamentalists dangerously
“support the settler movement and oppose a two-state solution,” with the Palestinians.95
Influential Jewish lobby groups, especially AIPAC, have had the sole say in the
abovementioned affairs until 1980, when Senator James AbouRezk established the National
Association of Arab Americans (NAAA) in an attempt to give the Arab minority of the United
States a voice in foreign policymaking.96 However, the Jewish lobby has remained entrenched as
the dominant lobby in persuading American officials in their foreign policy-making process.
The Jewish lobby has infiltrated foreign policymaking through donations, personal connections,
and business relationships between lobbyist members and U.S. government officials. In a
Cabinet meeting between President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Pennsylvania Senator Hugh
Scott, Kissinger explained Scott’s question on Jewish Americans’ knowledge of Israel’s
troubling affairs, while describing the United States’ position on Israel’s security to him as well.
Kissinger explained that the President was the “best friend” Israel and the Jews had, and added

93

Dispensationalism is the evangelical, Biblical interpretation of Christianity that understands
God as having relayed varied messages to human beings at various times in human history.
Currently, dispensationalists view the U.S.-Israeli alliance as a God-given prophecy.
94
Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby, 133.
95
Ibid., 134.
96
Terry, U.S. Foreign Policy, 61.

65
that the American government would be working with the American Jews directly and
exclusively on issues involved in Middle Eastern diplomacy.97
There were, and remain, critics to the unique relationship between the American
government and pro-Jewish-American lobby and interest groups. Former Illinois Senator
Findley remained a critic of the Israeli-United States diplomatic relationship. He stated in a
speech in 1989, that he was, “ashamed” that the American government supported an Israeli
government which forced harsh laws and hardened civil conditions for Palestinians living within
Israeli’s borders. Findley, alongside renowned Sheikh Ahmed Deedat, ultimately compared the
Jewish government in Israel and their harsh treatment of Palestinians within Israel, with Nazi
treatment of European Jews in the early 1930s.98 U.S. foreign policy experts, including John
Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, have declared that not only has the Jewish lobby hurt America’s
overall goals of globalization in Middle Eastern diplomacy, but it has also hurt Israel’s national
security and potential as well.99 Jewish settlements in the West Bank and in Gaza, along with an
“endless” supply of American money and resources into Israel to fund their wars and expansion,
has aided the Arab’s overall hatred toward the United States and its Jewish ally.100
Israel continues to remain a strong ally of the United States today. According to a recent
news article, the United States has provided Israel with approximately $3 billion annually since
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the millennium.101 According to recent patterns in foreign aid, Israel will continue to be
tremendously aided due to the heavy support it receives from within the American population –
where pro-Jewish special interest groups have considerable reach and influence with members of
the U.S. federal government. As mentioned earlier, the special relationship between the United
States and Israel will only hurt both countries as time unfolds. The United States has attempted
to orchestrate a foreign policy of globalization in the Middle East in recent years and will
continue to evolve and mold this policy moving forward as they see it best fit. Since the Obama
Administration took control of foreign policy in 2009, the favoritism the U.S. formerly shared
with its Israeli ally in previous administrations has decreased to a degree. If the Middle East is to
be included within the wave of globalization, peace and/or cooperation must be demonstrated
and exhibited by Arabs, Palestinians, Jews, and Americans alike. This peace must be sought
with no great animosities held toward each other’s religious, cultural, social, and political
backgrounds and identities. Moreover, each group’s exclusive vision of self-determination and
promotion of their respected traditional and cultural goals must be adaptable or replaceable if
globalization is to become a reality. These factors, which can be placed within the context of
contemporary Middle Eastern policy, will be analyzed further and in greater detail in the
following chapter.
In the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, President Nixon addressed Congress and
the rest of the nation on the United States’ energy policy. In doing this, Nixon conceptualized
the main goals of American foreign policy of the day, which survived throughout the 1970s and
into the following decade. These goals focused primarily on global economic issues surrounding
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energy resources in the Middle East. He indicated that “the strength of self-sufficiency” should
have been the United States’ only concern moving forward. Moreover, Nixon addressed the
energy crisis and economic recession by stating that, “[America’s] ability to meet [its] own
energy needs is directly limited to [its] continued ability to act decisively and independently at
home and abroad in the service of peace, not only for America but for all nations in the
world.”102
The 1970s were a decade of turbulent economic discourse for the United States. It was
also an era that witnessed a resurrection of Muslim resentment of the Jews within Israel. These
two issues proved to be of primary importance to the U.S. cause – especially to those who
dictated the direction of foreign policy. The Soviet Union and the related containment of the
spread of communism remained an American concern. The 1970s were an era, as indicated by
President Nixon’s address to the nation, when the United States sought to achieve peace and/or
cooperation diplomatically by any means necessary. The Vietnam War was nearing its
conclusion and the United States and the Soviet Union were in the midst of a policy of détente.
The SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) treaty between high-ranking political officials of
the United States and Soviet Union was ratified in 1971. These long and tedious negotiations of
SALT I between President Ford and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev resulted in the reduction of
nuclear weapons by both superpowers. SALT II and the continuation of this program would
abruptly end in 1979 due to the Soviet offensive in Afghanistan, causing the United States’
Congress to vote against ratifying the treaty in the following year.103
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As the 1970s reached its final years and the Carter Administration gained control of the
federal government, the U.S. diplomatic climate focused on the global economic and social
condition of Third-World peoples. It was during the 1970s, as correctly stated by former
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, that the United States, in light of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the
Arab oil embargo, and rising prices of OPEC oil products, “became acutely aware of the perilous
dependence of the West on Middle East oil.”104 Furthermore, the 1979 Iranian Revolution and
overthrow of the shah, including the ensuing hostage situation at the American embassy in
Tehran, proved to display a whole new set of problems for U.S. policymakers. As the White
House Chief of Staff, Hamilton Jordan, related to Carter that, “[i]n many respects, this would
appear to be the worst of times;” the United States was in the midst of another Middle Eastern oil
crisis, a lasting legacy of public bitterness toward the government following withdrawal from
Vietnam, the rigidity of foreign markets, more inflation, and a new wave of Islamic
fundamentalism raging across the social landscape of the Middle East.105 If the people of the
United States could find a means to solve the crises that plagued them by the late 1970s, they had
to alter their foreign policy dramatically, as it appeared the Soviet Union was becoming more
aggressive toward the West. The 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan rekindled a new United
States’ concern toward containment of Soviet influence and forces. The events of the 1970s
planted the seeds for globalization, which were beginning to take form, as a new set of
circumstances, occurrences, and problems surfaced regarding the United States’ foreign policy in
the Middle East. But globalization efforts by U.S. policymakers were placed on hold as an
increase in aggression toward the West by new and familiar enemies had taken form.
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The United States eagerly sought international support toward economic understanding
and prosperity in an attempt to fix the global market. In the frenzy to establish worldwide peace,
especially in the Middle East, the Carter Administration was about to face a diplomatic
nightmare. This primarily centered on an Islamic-fueled revolution in Iran, and the trade of
Middle Eastern oil resources and formulating an international agreement on prices. The United
States appeared to be working itself out of economic hardship by the end of the decade. But the
high hopes did not last long. With the lingering conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians,
and the economic problems surrounding the global oil market, the United States would have to
implement quick and effective solutions within their diplomacy to offset these serious problems.

The Final Years of the Cold War and its Effect on Middle Eastern Society

From the time around Carter’s presidential victory in 1976 to 1980, the United States
found itself in a diplomatic and an economic crisis. By the end of his first and only term in
office, the economy remained in a recession and United States’ foreign policymakers had to face
a series of new and regenerated animosities aimed at the U.S. and its Western allies. Not only
were the issues surrounding the oil trade and Muslim animosity toward Israel and its Western
alliance a redundant episode in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, but a resurrected
confrontation with the Soviets and a new enemy in Islamic fundamentalism became more
problems that the United States had to solve. A treaty signed between Egypt’s Anwar Sadat and
Israel’s Manachem Begin at Camp David in March, 1979, softened the bitterness and altercations
between Israel and its Arab neighbor to the south for the time being. This event became known
as the Camp David Accords. This agreement temporarily solved Israel’s national security and
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sustainability in the hostile region to a degree. Unfortunately for the United States however, ElSadat was assassinated a year later by members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. If it was not
apparent already, there remained an increase in animosity within the Islamic populations across
the Middle East toward Israel and its Western ally. Arab hatred and rejection of the agreement
was widespread, to an extent in which the Palestinian Liberalization Organization’s (PLO) leader
Yasser Arafat, called the treaty a “false peace” and claimed that their organization would
eliminate any peace and sympathizers to Israel’s cause.106 Thus, the assassination of Egypt’s
leader showed the world that Islam and the Arab world would not settle, side, nor negotiate
peace with the West or Israel, as this conflict would persist.
Throughout the period of détente in the 1970s, the relationship between the Soviet Union
and the United States was manageable, somewhat cordial, and not as tense as the diplomatic
relationship was in previous Cold War decades. Other than weapon sales that occurred between
the Soviet Union and a couple of the Arab states, the United States enjoyed relatively open
negotiations and no threat of military conflict with the communist antagonist. Even during the
Israeli-Arab conflict, both superpowers were in diplomatic discussions in order to construct a
resolution of lasting Middle Eastern peace. Eventually however, the lingering global economic
disparity and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 sent the region and the rest of the world into another
period of diplomatic strife and heightened tensions.
The 1979 Iranian Revolution ended the warm diplomacy the former Shah’s government
shared with the United States. In the days preceding the overthrow, several actions committed
by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi had contributed to the transformation to an Islamic Republic,
in which the revolutionaries resented the West – especially the United States. “Political
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repression, the presence of the SAVAK (the shah’s secret police force),” censorship of the press,
failed agricultural policies led to the displacement of the rural poor and their migration into the
cities, were all contributing factors that led to the Iranian revolution.107 In addition, the Shah’s
“perceived dependence on America and the favoring of American interests,” especially in the
months of inflation and recession due to the 1973 oil crisis, raised concerns over social justice
and increased the disingenuous image of the United States in the minds of revolting Iranians.108
About two months before Khomeini’s succession to power, the U.S. diplomat in Tehran, Victor
Tomseth, sent a telegram to the State Department. In his correspondence, Tomseth observed the
evolving political and social atmosphere of Iranians alike, as well as the surge of Islamic
fundamentalism. He declared that, “[Islam] is the only institution familiar to them in their new
surroundings, and they are thus highly susceptible to the religious emotionalism that surrounds
the cause such as Khomeini’s.”109 The people of Iran began to view their shah and his ties to
Western governments and companies as the source of all their civil, social, and economic
problems. The United States, alongside its Western allies, became viewed by Iranian
revolutionaries as enemies to their Islamic and national aspirations.
The Iranian hostage situation was another dark moment in U.S. foreign policy in the
Middle East. A mob of young Iranian revolutionaries seized the American embassy in Tehran
and took around sixty Americans hostage in November, 1979. This event left a haunting legacy
for the Carter Administration. By the end of his term in office, the final hostage was released
minutes after Reagan entered the Oval Office, which added a final element to Carter’s
humiliation. Retired foreign service official and former Iranian hostage, Donald Cooke,
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explained years later that the hostage situation could have been avoided if the United States’
government realized the dangers they were facing in Iran with the spread of Islamic
fundamentalism, rather than trying to, “regularize [the] relationship” the U.S. formerly had with
the shah.110 Whether or not the United States could have avoided the hostage situation, the
Iranian overthrow of the shah marked an era where the United States had to begin to monitor
extremist activities more effectively - such as those committed by the Shia111 Muslims in Iran
and around the Middle East, as this occurrence proved to add a new dimension to the American
foreign policy problem.
Within the overall policy of Cold War containment, the United States had to contend with
the threat of a resurrection of social and political unrest across the Middle Eastern landscape.
The international, internal, and economic power of the Soviet Union had decreased considerably
by 1980. Although the Soviets were still a force to be reckoned with, they were in dire need of
oil from the Middle East and were about to encounter their own diplomatic, as well as internal,
problems with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East and Soviet republics. In the
midst of economic strife, centered on the search for petroleum resources and problems of
disunity within their empire, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December, 1979. This dilemma
would be one of the several series of conflicts spanning the length of the 1980s between the
United States and various international forces that would consequently and negatively effect the
U.S. position in the Middle East years following the Cold War.
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The long and gruesome Afghan-Soviet War lasted from the time Russian paratroopers
landed in the Afghani capital of Kabul in December, 1979, to Gorbachev’s withdrawal from the
conflict in 1989 due to the war’s crippling effects on Russia’s stagnant economy. Like in Iran
months earlier, Afghanistan was in the midst of their own Islamic-fueled revolution. The rebel
forces within Afghanistan, the Mujahdeen, sought to overthrow the Soviet-backed communist
government of Hazifullah Amin amidst an ongoing civil war. By 1989, after years of bloody and
tedious guerilla warfare in the mountainous regions around Afghanistan, Gorbachev withdrew
the Soviet military, which were unable to defeat the Mujahdeen forces. Much like America’s
prior experience during its invasion of Vietnam and its military campaign against Ho Chi Minh’s
Vietcong forces, fighting on Third-World soil and confronting unfamiliar battle styles proved too
challenging for the military forces of the Soviet Union. The war became too expensive to fund
and too unpopular to continue. What remained, however, were the guerilla militants, including
members of the Taliban, who eventually would use the U.S. weaponry sold to them by the U.S.
government to battle Soviet forces, against the West when the United States waged war in
Afghanistan in late 2001.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution had altered the diplomatic
course of the United States. The U.S., alongside its Western European alliances, provided
financial and military aid to nations such as India, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, in a consolidated
attempt to “deter further [Soviet and Arab] aggression,” as well as, “finding a solution to the
Palestinian problem.”112 U.S. political leaders understood that these foreign conflicts would
prolong and increase problems associated with the oil trade out of the region – creating a
cautious sense of urgency for the West to resolve these foreign issues efficiently.
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The days of survival for the Soviet Union had become numbered. The United States
became aware of that fact and attempted to stimulate reform, peace, and stability throughout the
region. The rise in trade between the U.S. and its Middle Eastern allies and the increase in
global economic activity helped the U.S. cause in defeating Ronald Reagan’s Evil Empire. It
was during the 1980s, under the Reagan Administration, that the United States increased their
economic and trade activity with Middle Eastern allies such as Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia
contained a majority population of Sunni Muslims, who were statist above all else, and despised
the Shia Muslims for their views on pan-Arabism. Moreover, a majority of Sunni Muslims
within Saudi Arabia helped maintain and secure the monarchy’s rule. Yet, there remained a
minority of Shia Muslims within Saudi Arabia. Events like the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and
the terrorist attacks on Mecca’s Grand Mosque that same year by Islamic extremists frightened
the Saudi regime and national stability.
Shia Islam jeopardized the Sunni’s powerful hold on their nation’s people, and threatened
their healthy political and business disposition with the West. Several years earlier in 1975,
King Faisal was assassinated by a disgruntled nephew, and Faisal’s successor, King Khalid,
became the nation’s leader who by a few years into his newly accepted role as king, had to deal
with the issue of social disorder and unrest within Saudi Arabia. Although King Khalid died a
few years later in 1982 due to illness, he initiated domestic social reforms from the oil wealth
Saudi Arabia accumulated during the oil embargo. The Saudi monarchy knew that in order to
calm the tensions of their own minority Shia population and protect their position of power, they
needed to improve their people’s standard of living. Most of the reforms initiated by Khalid
were improvements made to Saudi Arabia’s infrastructure. The infrastructure improvements that
were made during the 1970s included the development of a paved highway system, construction
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of schools, power plants, airports, and hotels. A decade later, the government spent money on
social services, education, and on an improved healthcare system.113
Moreover, the Saudi government improved upon their international relationships via a
cooperative foreign policy. In 1981, Saudi Arabia, along with other Gulf States, including
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), formed the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC). This council coordinated political and economic policy regarding
the modern Gulf-Arab society. This group was formed in response, as well, to the growing
influence and aggression of Shia Islam and its threat toward Middle Eastern established
governments – especially those governments endorsed by the West. Member states of the GCC,
especially Saudi Arabia, “sought to sympathize their military forces while providing millions of
dollars in aid to the Iraqi war effort,” against Iran during the viscous Iraq-Iran War of the 1980s,
all while, “continuing to invest in modern weapons.”114
The threat of Iran and its Shia rulers and population horrified Middle Eastern political
stability and security in the surrounding Middle Eastern nations. The Saudi government,
alongside the American government, both pursued to protect their national and diplomatic
security in the early 1980s. Since 1979, the United States had earned more than $50 billion off
of Saudi purchases of modern weaponry and the newest military technology.115 During the 1980s
however, this arms trade between the United States and Saudi Arabia had been rejected and
detested by many within the U.S. Congress and by supporters of Israel. In 1985, Congress
declined a sales proposal designed by Reagan that included F-15 jet fighters, antiaircraft guns,
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missiles, and Blackhawk helicopters, in fear that one day these weapons could be used against
Israel.116 In fact, there was much congressional opposition regarding the arms sales to Saudi
Arabia since 1979, because it jeopardized Israel’s national security. Yet, Saudi Arabia’s reason
for the purchase of American weaponry was directed at Iran and its emergence as a threat to the
Sunni kingdom, as well as to the entire region.117
However, the White House, State Department, and Pentagon were not opposed to the idea
of arms sales to Saudi Arabia. When Ronald Reagan entered the presidency in 1980, he met
with the former Saudi ambassador to the U.S., Prince Bandar bin Sultan, regarding a trade
arrangement involving the purchase of American weaponry. Reagan stated that he did not
oppose the notion as long as the Saudi government was in total disfavor of the Soviet Union and
communism.118 Additionally, the major oil companies favored this exchange since it secured
their role in the geopolitical economy.119 Eventually by the late 1980s, Saudi Arabia favored
arms negotiations with Britain to purchase U.S. arms more so since the Arabs found it extremely
burdensome and “bruising,” when confronting much opposition from members of Congress and
the pro-Jewish lobby within the United States.120 Nevertheless, Congress’s rejection of arms
sales to Saudi Arabia had its valid argument. Senator Carl Levin from Michigan argued in the
mid-1980s that if the Saudis needed American, “antiaircraft and antiship missiles in order to
deter an Iranian threat,” then why were the sales of those specific weapons not scheduled until
1989? In addition, why did, “[Saudi Arabia] refuse to even use their [sic] influence to work
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toward the cessation of terrorist activities in the Middle East[?]”121 Federal government officials
argued, however, that weapons were sold to Saudi Arabia and “other moderate states” in an
attempt to, “augment [American] military power in the region and strengthen [American]
security ties” with those pro-Western Arab nations.122
Alongside the arms sales to Saudi Arabia, oil production increased in the Gulf that
transformed the Middle East into a more pivotal global region than ever before with the greater
demand for energy within a rapidly expanding and technologically advanced world. By the end
of the 1980s, the United States had witnessed the bloody and exhausted conflict between Iraq
and Iran come to its conclusion, and Iraq had become a closer trade and diplomatic partner to the
United States once former Soviet-Iraqi ties began to weaken. But the newly-formed benevolent
relationship between the United States and Iraq would not last long. Iraq earned around $13
billion dollars from oil revenues, but its postwar debt accumulated to $20 billion by 1989.123
Saddam Hussein, the dictator of Iraq, demanded that the surrounding Arab Gulf governments aid
Iraq in the form of financial reparations for defending them against the hostility of Iran. The
Iraqi dictator quickly became an enemy of the U.S. and the West when he invaded Kuwait in
1990, once Kuwait refused to share its oil revenue with Iraq. The GCC, “had few viable options
for dealing with Iraq in 1990 other than working with Washington.”124
By the time the Gulf War was underway in late 1990, the United States was interacting
with Middle Eastern governments on a constant and consistent basis. A new series of relations
began between Saudi Arabia and the United States, as Saudi Arabia allowed U.S. and U.N.
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forces to establish numerous military bases and command centers on Saudi soil. The presence of
U.S. military forces on the Islamic Holy Land stimulated even more resentment by Shia peoples
who resided on the Arabian Peninsula toward the West. Approximately fifteen percent of Saudi
Arabia’s total population practices Shia faith – a threatening minority to the Sunni leadership of
the Saudi Kingdom.125 In part, Shia resentment of the Western presence on the Holy Land would
eventually lead to the terrorist attacks on the United States and its Western allies several years
later. Surrounding Gulf States who disfavored Hussein’s regime followed suite in aiding the
West in their best interest. With personal encounters, interaction, and open communication with
the United States on all levels, Saudi Arabia’s economic and cultural landscape was becoming
more sophisticated and modern – for example, ARABSAT (Arab Satellite Communications
Organization) merged with CNN (Cable News Network) to revolutionize global television;
which broadcasted the war and provided viewers all over the globe around the clock news
coverage and footage.126 As the years progressed toward the end of the millennium, a much
larger and diverse number of business and political relationships formed between various parties
from the United States and various parties from Saudi Arabia. United States’ diplomacy with
Iran, on the other hand, has remained stagnant since the revolution in 1979.
Other than oil imports received from Iran over the last several decades, it remains to be
seen whether or not diplomacy will ever return to favorable conditions as it was prior to
Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution. However, as Vali Nasr pointed out -- a current member on the
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and native Iranian:
[f]undamentalism has gained footholds – and won in Iran – due to the failures of
authoritarian leaders to execute on promises of economic progress for the masses,
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and crucially, due to the abdication by the state-sponsored middle class of a
leadership role in bringing about robust economic growth and political
liberalization.127
As emphasized, the Iranian theocracy has failed economically on a global scale. Iran’s
economic instability, brought about by its corruptly managed public policy, will be
discussed further in the following chapter.
In December, 1991 the Soviet Union officially collapsed. Furthermore, the Americanreinforced offensive against Saddam Hussein’s forces during the Gulf War proved victorious
earlier in February of that year. Ultimately, the United States remained the only global
superpower to emerge a Cold War champion. The containment policies America held onto
throughout the decades were no longer relevant, especially in the Middle East. What remained
in the Middle East, however, were nations that had succumbed to Islamic extremism toward the
West and its ‘evil’ mechanisms of modernity, as well as its godless nature. This Arab-based
Islamic extremism would manifest itself in various Islamic terrorist organizations that would
haunt the United States and the West for years to come. The United States needed to remain in
the Middle East, however, if it wished to bring about the political, social, economic, and cultural
reforms needed for its version of globalization to work. The region was socially and culturally
diverse, filled with Western and religious animosities, and was politically turbulent. In its nature
of harboring expansionist thought, the United States had to modernize and democratize Middle
Eastern society as well as protect one its biggest investments and assets regarding geopolitics and
global economics – support for Israel and Gulf oil.
In order for foreign policy to work effectively, The United States needed to transform its
outdated Cold War foreign policy into a more adaptable and modern policy by 1991. The Soviet
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threat was dismissed by the early 1990s, and although Israel continued to receive aid from the
United States, it consistently sought for foreign protection from its hostile Arab neighbors and
Palestinian nationals within its borders. Israel has appeared to be the one nation in the world that
the United States has shared a special diplomatic relationship with – more so than the
relationship the United States enjoyed with Western Europe, Canada, and Japan. Jewish
Americans have, according to researcher Janice Terry, “a single issue orientation that enjoys
support from all levels of government from the White House and Congress down to city and state
levels.”128 Christian Zionists, who make up a large portion of the base of the U.S. Republican
Party, have made the debate over support for Israel as a central focus to their decision making in
the American voting system. Moreover, small voter turn outs in American elections and the
“influence of Jewish Americans far exceeds their proportion of the general population.”129 For
example, only 56.5 percent of the total American population eligible to vote turned out to the
polls in the Presidential Election of 2012.130 As long as U.S. policymakers and certain
instrumental sectors of the American public continue to tremendously support Israel, then the
U.S. will remain an enemy of the Islamic extremists who viciously attack the West because of
that reason. The United States had to continue to support and defend Israel from hostile Islamic
extremist groups and terrorist cells from various sections around the Middle East as it entered
into a new era of diplomacy. The United States’ determination to put an end to Islamic
fundamentalist activities at home and abroad further aligned with Israel’s diplomacy as well.
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As globalization became the central doctrine of United States’ foreign policy in the
Middle East, the decision had to be made whether or not to include Israel in the overall goal of
global assimilation into a new world order. Muslim nations, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and
Egypt, continued to remain allies with the United States, and have appeared to embrace the idea
of globalization, which can be seen through their modernizing motives and reforms pushed onto
their national populations. Those aforementioned Islamic states seem willing to accept the
American model of modernity as they believe a global community will eventually be achieved.
Yet, the legacy of states dominated by a strong Shia presence, such as Iran, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan, have remained developmentally stagnant and will continue to oppose any notion of
globalization unless initiated by a foreign entity like the United Nations, or by a revolutionary
occurrence within their own national borders.
As the world headed toward the millennium, the United States understood that something
had to be done regarding the chaotic and complicated nature of the Middle Eastern society.
Globalization seemed like a viable prospect as early as 1991 due to the fall of the Soviet Union
and its communist system. American elitists, including businessmen and politicians, began
speaking ever so eagerly of taking on the incredible task of transforming the Middle East into a
functional representation of Western society – the blueprint for the prospective global society
constructed by a nation whose historical track record seemed to indicate an eerily similar trend
via expansionism. But a region, so deeply rooted in its religious and cultural foundations, would
not cooperate or agree to assimilate to an American-made globalist agenda. The next chapter
will ultimately address this concern. Furthermore, there arose a new combination of factors,
players, aspects, and a new set of circumstances unique to history, which provided a series of
new complex and dynamic obstacles that U.S. policymakers had to confront. The globalization
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mission, spearheaded by the United States, would ultimately fail or succeed in the Middle East
depending on the simple fact of whether or not Middle Eastern society wanted to be assimilated
into a global system.
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Chapter 3
…………………………………………
Establishing a New Precedence

Globalization is a broad term that is frequently used in the political arena today.
Traditional globalization, like trading goods and services between peoples from different nations
or cultures, has occurred over the course of many centuries, and as early as 1200 BC, when
Mycenaean Greece was trading with populations on the Baltic coasts.131 An official international
and organized system of globalization, however, has been conversed about frequently by various
academics, politicians, media outlets, and multinational business people globally. So what is
globalization specifically? It has a broad definition, especially when defined by various nations,
leaders, and cultures – each one defining globalization according to a basic understanding of
one’s own culture, ethnicity, national identity, social norms, and traditional norms. In 2000, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) defined globalization as “the increasing integration of
economies around the world, particularly through trade and financial flows… the movement of
people (labor) and knowledge (technology) across international borders.”132 Other aspects not
covered by the IMF publication included the cultural, political, and environmental dimensions of
globalization. Another aspect, which is especially important for the poor living within
developing nations, is the establishment of an effective human rights policy. Basically, as the
world becomes more interconnected through advanced forms of technology, electronic media,
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communications, and transportation, the prospects for a unipolar world will become clearer. The
flow of resources, in which a capitalist world economy would provide the mechanisms to do so,
is what many globalists want to happen sooner than later. But where globalization seems to be a
probable reality in the developed nations of the world, it is yet to be established in the developing
nations around the world – including the majority of the nations that make up the Middle East.
With globalization on the future’s horizon, many people worldwide will benefit from this
major development. There are others, however, who do not see globalization as beneficial to
their own individual cause, and to the development of their own society. Proponents for
globalization, such as Western political leaders and multinational capitalists, view it as a system
that will increase the standard of living for all under its umbrella. Globalists advocate that with
an effective system in place, globalization will increase trading within a world economy,
therefore, stimulating social reforms, increasing economic progress, increase universal civil and
human rights, and generating wealth in the poorest and underdeveloped regions of the planet.
Individuals, including religious fundamentalists, nationalists, and hardline conservatives view
globalization as a threat to their way of life and to the society in which they live in. They fear
that a unified global community will eliminate their cultural, religious, national, and ethnic
identities. Moreover, opponents of globalization “regard it with hostility, even fear, believing
that it increases inequality within and between nations, threatens employment and living
standards and thwarts social progress.”133
Yet one cannot deny that human progress does not exist, no matter what the future holds.
Therefore, it appears a natural human condition that with the increase in communications
between peoples of different ethnicities, religions, and nations and a rise in the technological
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ability to do so, globalization may be an inevitable and permanent episode. According to
historians Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, the contemporary form of globalization began
once the Soviet Union weakened beyond the point of no return (1989-91). It was on the eve of
the 1990s that the world had witnessed “the failure of the closed economies and their
reintegration into the global market economy.”134 Developing countries felt the urge to embrace
global trade, establish capital markets, and welcomed foreign investment and corporations in
order to generate global prestige, power, and wealth. More importantly, these developments,
which occurred during the demise of the Soviet Union, exemplified that these poorer nations
longed to be admitted into the universal system of globalization. Many who resided in these
developing nations, like Islamic fundamentalists in the Middle East for example, came to see this
incidence as one which harbored Western imperialistic motives on foreign people’s social,
cultural, ethnic, and religious norms and identity. With opposing opinions on the consequences
or rewards of globalization -- many of these viewpoints are based on ignorance, fear, and past
occurrences of international strife and conflict, with some points justifiable than others based on
historic evidence -- there began a resistance against the changing world landscape.
On September 11, 1990, President George H.W. Bush addressed a joint session of
Congress and the nation on matters concerning the Federal Budget deficit and the Persian Gulf
crisis, which involved the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In his speech, the President condemned
Saddam Hussein’s attack on Kuwait in August, 1990, and regarded the incident as one that was
opposed to America’s diplomatic goals. In his speech, President Bush established a new doctrine
of globalization, one based on the American tradition, to implant within the overall objective of
United States’ foreign policy.
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The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to
move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our
fifth objective -- a new world order -- can emerge: a new era – [sic] freer from the
threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for
peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South,
can prosper and live in harmony…. Today that new world is struggling to be born,
a world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law
supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared
responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights
of the weak. This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki.
He and other leaders from Europe, the Gulf, and around the world understand that
how we manage this crisis today could shape the future for generations to
come.135

Among other national interests in his State of the Union Address, President George H.W.
Bush appeared to prioritize a national concern toward foreign policy. His remarks appeared to
suggest a unipolar world, led by the U.S., acting to bring about globalization through its
diplomatic and other foreign actions. During the latter half of 1990, it appeared evident Soviet
Russia would succumb to Western influence. Once the Soviet Empire officially fell one year
later, the United States was left as the lone world power with the ability to transform its foreign
policy into one that could potentially affect everyone around the globe. This allowed the United
States to orchestrate and spread its doctrine of a unipolar world system to the remainder of the
globe, without interference from Eastern society. Containment of Soviet forces in the Middle
East became irrelevant by the early 1990s, although new and familiar enemies to U.S. policy
would soon yield their strategies to combat globalization. The United States’ novel purpose was
to eliminate the threat of any dictator or foreign leader, or force -- such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq
and the threat of Islamic fundamentalism -- standing in the way. The directive was globalization,
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which seemed to evolve from the centuries’ old notion of the American Manifest Destiny. It
appeared that a hopeful idea had become a U.S. duty. Instead of sharing its interest and
responsibility with other nations, the U.S. intended to lead the rest of the world into its version of
a better future.
Globalization, with its U.S.-centered origins, was a notion widely-accepted by political
leaders of the First World and many other developing nations in Asia, Eastern Europe, South
America, Central America, and Africa. It also gained powerful momentum within the highest
echelons of the Soviet political realm. Just fourteen months before President Bush’s speech on
the prospects of an American mission of globalization, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev
echoed similar sentiments. Yet, Gorbachev’s remarks seemed to indicate a system of
globalization that focused on shared international interests and human rights. In a December 7,
1988 speech before the United Nations General Assembly, Gorbachev remarked on the prospects
of a globalized world:
We are witnessing most profound social change. Whether in the East or the South,
the West or the North, hundreds of millions of people, new nations and states,
new public movements and ideologies have moved to the forefront of history….
The idea of democratizing the entire world order has become a powerful sociopolitical force. At the same time, the scientific and technological revolution has
turned many economic, food, energy, environmental, information and population
problems, which only recently we treated as national or regional ones, into global
problems. Thanks to the advances in mass media and means of transportation, the
world seems to have become more visible and tangible.136

As the Soviet Union breathed its final breath and Gorbachev made his speech before the U.N.,
the foundation for globalization was established. Yet, the actual blueprints for one global system
remained a topic of debate. The dawn of a new age had seemingly come. However,
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implementing globalization effectively to the rest of the world would prove to be a much more
difficult endeavor, especially when its promoters had slightly varied implementations alongside
different desired outcomes.
The idea of American expansionism remained prevalent in the dying days of the Cold
War. The United States was more than willing to expand upon this reoccurring central doctrine
behind the mask of globalization. The U.S.-traditional emphasis on human rights, individualism,
individual freedom, and less government regulations became key issues, which transpired onto
the world stage. Moreover, the United States had support from the U.N., its former rival in
Russia, and other developed nations around the globe to defend “common interests,” whereby
President George H.W. Bush heralded that, “[i]n the pursuit of these goals America will not be
intimidated.”137 From this point forward, the United States government, its foreign and domestic
alliances, along with other proponents of globalization, had begun to take on the responsibility of
developing a policy that would bring about a new world order. This new world order would send
shockwaves throughout a Middle Eastern society that was divided between the acceptance of a
global doctrine and the rigid boundaries and differences between Muslim ethnicities, national
aspirations, and Islamic fundamentalism.
United States foreign policy in the Middle East had altered its course around the time of
the Gulf War into one that sought to transform, or evolve, the region in the name of modernity
and liberalization. A new trend in foreign policy was brought about with the goal to eventually
instill a technologically advanced society and evolve the culture in developing nations around the
globe – especially in the Middle East. The Globalization Trend (1991-current) took priority.
This trend in United States’ foreign policy has had to change its directive at numerous stages in
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time due to international conflict, while simultaneously retaining its former international
relationships. The United States’ special alliance with Israel and U.S. big business relationships
linked to the Middle Eastern petroleum trade remained relevant factors within American
diplomacy. Moreover, Islamic fundamentalism, with its crusade against Western culture and its
lasting presence in varying regions around the Middle East, had evolved and presented itself as a
monumental challenge for American foreign policymakers.
With globalization as the goal for most United States policymakers, foreign policy in the
Middle East had retained its familiar historical themes. In recent years, new concerns arose that
U.S. officials had to encounter or accept. Four factors stand out as integral parts of the dilemma
involved in United States’ foreign policy in the region. The first factor for analysis is the special
diplomatic relationship that existed between the United States and Israel (1). John Mearsheimer
and Stephen Walt have argued that the special interests that the United States had possessed for
Israeli national security and for its overall wellbeing had to change if the course of globalization
were to be successful. According to this view, the generous treatment Israel had received over
the decades by the United States had to cease if the United States was to move forward with a
more progressive, bold, and unilateral policy. This does not mean that the United States had to
break off its alliance with Israel, however, the treatment of Israel as a normal international state
by the U.S. seemed to be the most logical course of action by advocates of Israeli-Palestinian
peace. In addition, “no longer pretending that Israel’s and America’s interests are identical, or
acting as if Israel deserves steadfast U.S. support no matter what it does,” had to stop
immediately if globalization in the Middle East was to materialize.138
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A second factor to contemporary U.S. policy in the Middle East was that petroleum
continues to play a major role even as the world becomes more globalized (2). Big business
entities and U.S. political leaders understood that Middle Eastern oil reserves and exports
affected the global market considerably. For decades, relationships and special interests between
U.S. and Gulf oil parties involved in the petroleum trade and other big business activities have
grown into a complex and wealthy network, which has generated much wealth and consists of
powerful and influential global figures. These American and Muslim individuals involved in the
oil business also happened to play an important role in U.S. diplomatic policymaking throughout
the decades. For example, upon becoming Vice President under Ronald Reagan in 1981, George
H.W. Bush possessed about two decades’ worth of experience in the Arab-oil business, in part,
by efforts made by his business-savvy father, Prescott Bush. The formation of these business
acquaintances and relationships between his offshore oil-drilling business, Zapata Offshore, and
“friends along the Gulf Coast” proved to be a monumental strategic advantage for President
Bush during his position in the federal government during the 1980s.139 Today, innovations in
the oil industry, such as the hydro-fracking, willingness by the federal government to approve of
modern fracking techniques, and the proposed construction of the Keystone Pipeline in the
United States have decreased the dependency the United States has had on Middle Eastern oil
exports. This development will be talked about in further detail later in this chapter.
Yet, big business relationships between the Persian Gulf states -- Saudi Arabia being a
major player -- and the United States still remains strong and consistent. In addition, capitalist
activities such as the world trade for Gulf oil could present the positive global change the U.S.
seeks out in globalization. Capitalism and a growth of a modern Arab middle class can serve to
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decrease fundamentalist social and political ferment as well. Therefore, globalization and the
growth of the Middle Eastern peoples’ standard of living promises social change and “telling
measures of success” to developing nations of the region, which includes clean drinking water,
electricity, and reliable transportation.140 The push by the West for globalization in the Middle
East has met very strong resistance. Islamic fundamentalists have long centered their animosities
on Western capitalist activities, mainstream Western culture, and Western social behavior, which
has fueled their damnations of capitalism and its exploitations of the Middle Eastern labor and its
coveted resource. The big business relationships between the Middle East and the West are
tangible and will continue to exist. Time will tell if this factor will either aid or hurt the United
States’ diplomatic mission in the Middle East.
The third factor vital to globalization in the Middle East and the United States’ foreign
policy in that region is the rising intellectualism and Islamic fundamentalism of the Muslim
people (3). The larger the effort the United States has made in democratizing the Middle East,
the more resistance the United States has received by acts of terrorism committed by Islamic
fundamentalists-turned-extremists. A Western political leader could forecast that if globalization
is to be eventually achieved in the Middle East and the overall living conditions for the bulk of
the Muslim population improves, Islamic fundamentalism will lose its mass appeal and become a
backwards element of the Muslim peoples’ past. For example, in 1995 general secretary of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Willem Claes, declared in defense of globalization
that, “Islamic fundamentalism [was] at least as dangerous as communism was.”141 Forcefully
instilling a fast-track plan of globalization in the Middle East through the vehicle of United
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States’ diplomacy, however, would prove not be a wise initiative conducted by U.S.
policymakers. The Muslim peoples must accept and desire the modes of modernity that
globalization is destined to bring. According to the Iranian intellectual, Vali Nasr:
The prospect of launching… one’s society out into the competitive, globalized
economy has increased rather than decreased interest in tradition…. In time, the
embrace of tradition may give way to a broader and more vigorous movement for
reform, but Western efforts to promote reformism are unlikely to be the impetus.
Indeed, they may be even counterproductive, feeding fears that the West wants to
subvert Islam.142
If the United States wishes to implement globalization motives within their foreign policy
in the Middle East, then U.S. policymakers must become aware of the parameters, impact, and
complex nature in attempting to alter another people’s cultural and social identity. Curbing
Islamic extremism and terrorism should be of upmost priority today. Moreover, ending the
religious tensions and the violence caused by varying ideals of a righteous lifestyle by Muslims
will give way to advancements in intellectualism and modernity of their own culture. Yet, the
Middle East’s path toward globalization must be accepted naturally by the region’s population,
rather than instilled upon it by foreign entities and unfamiliar institutions of Western society.
Additionally, the United States must make a concerted effort to eliminate any element of their
Middle Eastern diplomacy that would be viewed as undesirable by the Muslim peoples.
Other developed and developing nations would have to promote and accept the
responsibility of globalization as well, since it is to be effectively manifested within the arena of
a unified international community (4). This element presents the fourth factor within U.S.
foreign policy if it seeks to bring about globalization. Nations with the capabilities to promote
and work to bring about modernity and peace in the Middle East -- such as the nations of
Western Europe, Japan, Australia, the BRIC countries, and the other developed nations around
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the world – must align themselves on a certain path and work to aid developing the nations of the
Middle East into a global system. The United States cannot lead the path toward globalization
alone. Desired change will not come to fruition if the United States acts as the sole provider of
this global doctrine. “America has still to give a meaningful definition to its role in the world,
one that transcends the conflicting pulls of globalization, democracy, and preponderant
power.”143 The United States will be faced with a challenge in the days ahead. The U.S. must
decide whether or not to follow its own engineered course of globalization evolved from
American expansionism, or to unite in an international coalition (Perhaps allying themselves
with other U.N. member nations) to establish globalization initiatives in the developing Middle
Eastern countries.

U.S. Globalization Policy before 9/11

As the United States entered the decade of the 1990s, the federal government began to
alter its course in its implementation of foreign policy in the Middle East. It seemed apparent
that the Soviet Union would soon crumble and the U.S.-U.N. coalition against Saddam Hussein’s
invasion of Kuwait would more than likely end in Iraqi withdrawal or surrender. It was during
these sequences of events and in this timeframe that the George H.W. Bush Administration and
its international alliances formulated a plan of action in carrying out a foreign policy that
fostered globalization. A policy that was heralded by the developed nations of the West would
be met with great resistance from theocratic and secular leaders of the developing Middle
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Eastern nations however. Fundamentalist Muslims from varied regions around the Middle East
would greet globalization with animosity as well.
Although many intellectuals and secularists from the Middle East welcomed the Western
initiative with open arms, many of them were either silenced, fled their home country in exile, or
were assassinated. For the most part, their viewpoints of condemning Islamic fundamentalism
and its crippling effects on Muslim social advancement was more than enough reason for rigid
political and religious leaders to rid these individuals from Middle Eastern society. An
outspoken Egyptian critic and editorialist, Farag Foda, was assassinated in 1992 by al-Jihad for
his criticisms against Islamic fundamentalism and his support for globalization’s promises of
bringing about positive change. For example, Foda claimed that Islamic fundamentalist political
movements in Egypt during the early 1990s, “compelled the young and inexperienced to drop
out of university because its modern sciences [were] secular,” yet, according to Foda, Islam had
always been, “a religion of knowledge and wisdom.”144 Likewise, Iranian reformer Abdul-Karim
Soroush advocated a “Protestant version of Islam” in his native country, free from the confines
of strict fundamentalist leadership. He used modern technology and rationalism to his advantage
in pioneering a trend of Islam that would submit to democracy, universal social norms, and
pluralism during the 1990s. However by end of the decade, Soroush fled in exile to the United
States once he came under siege by the Iranian theocratic government and Ansar-e-Hizbullah
vigilante groups who supported the Ayatollah.145
Throughout the decade of the 1990s, there were many other Islamic reformers throughout
the Middle East who supported a more secularist form of government alongside a progressive
version of Islam. Simultaneously, Islamic fundamentalism remained strong and had gained
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momentum within the Middle Eastern populations because of the settlement of Western
influence in the region. Muslim populations across the Middle East viewed U.S. foreign policy
in the region as a threat to their way of life due to ignorance and the condemnation of Western
society as claimed by influential religious clerics. The United States continued to channel
military personnel and resources into the Middle East before, during, and after the First Gulf
War. In fact, the U.S. flow of armaments into the region since the early 1970s, which was
“menaced by religious and resource conflicts,” only created more hardship for the U.S. in
dealing with its attempt to globalize the Middle East.146 Moreover, the U.S. presence in the
Muslim Holy Land around Mecca and Medina during the First Cold War stirred tempers even
more. This dilemma would manifest into a hatred aimed at the U.S. that was harbored by Islamic
fundamentalists and ultra-conservative sects of Islam. The hatred exhibited by these Muslims
patented itself into acts of terror and violence against Americans at home and abroad by
fundamentalists-turned extremists in the coming days and years.
Animosities between the United States and Middle Eastern Islamic fundamentalists
increased following the First Gulf War’s conclusion in 1991. U.S. foreign policymakers began
to adapt security measures against the growing number of Muslim extremists. Moreover, Israel
was under similar circumstances as it began to witness a newfound and resurrected hatred by its
surrounding and internal Muslim populations. According to Connecticut Senator Joseph
Lieberman, just a few months following Saddam Hussein’s defeat, Baghdad reportedly became a
sanctuary and home for Islamic terrorist organizations, including “members of Abu Abbas’, the
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Palestine Liberation Front and the Arab Liberation front.”147 The United States’ government,
alongside the Israeli government, developed a grave concern toward national security interests in
the Middle East by defending themselves against Islamic radicals. In light of the supposed
Iranian-backed terrorist attack on Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988, the United States government had
a newfound sense of awareness in managing, battling, and “preventing loss of [American] life
and limb” due to Islamic terrorist actions against the United States, Israel, and its Western
allies.148 By 1994, under the direction of the Clinton Administration, the U.S. federal government
had provided approximately $5.2 billion in economic and military aid to Middle Eastern nations
– the top three recipients of this aid money included Israel, Egypt, and Jordan in that order -- in
an attempt to bring about social peace, economic reform, and to curtail Islamic extremist
activities.149 Additionally in 1994, Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel, which in recognition
to the benign gesture by Jordan’s government, President Clinton asked Congress to forgive
Jordan’s $702.3 million debt to the United States.150
The Israeli government had taken similar actions to deter terrorism. But Israel’s
government had received tremendous help from the American government in doing so. Dating
back to the 1979 Camp David Accords, where a peace treaty was founded between U.S.
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President Carter, Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem
Begin, Israel and Egypt both initially received $7.3 billion in economic and military grants.
Those two nations have been steady, and the two pinnacle recipients for that matter, of U.S. aid
money channeled into the Middle East since the Camp David Peace Treaty.151 In 1994 alone, the
United States granted Israel an estimated $3 billion dollars in military and economic aid in,
“reaffirming solid United States’ support for Israel’s security and for Israel’s qualitative edge,”
as indicated by Neal Sher, executive director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC).152 U.S. policymakers viewed Israel’s national security and U.S. national security
against the threat of Islamic-fueled terrorism as one in the same. Yet since the days following
Israel’s birth -- amplified following the wars of the late 1970s -- U.S. support for, and aid to,
Israel has steadily increased over the years. The U.S. backing of Israel has, indeed, done more
harm than benefit to both nations’ security interests and has only stunted the development of
globalization in the Middle East. The U.S. foreign aid policy to Israel has, consequently, led to
radicalization among the Palestinians and increased Palestinian resentment toward Israeli and
U.S. efforts to keep Palestine’s national aspirations at bay.153 This fact had presented itself since
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, where Egypt, Palestine, and Syria attempted to capture territories
believed to be theirs. Overwhelming United States’ support for Israel over the span of decades
has adversely affected the globalization process, especially once the Cold War came to its
conclusion. The current of bitterness held by the Muslim world and Muslim extremists persisted
and manifested itself into tangible terrorist activities with an eye toward Western targets.
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Alongside the supposed Iranian involvement in the Pan Am Flight 103 tragedy, the
United States witnessed Islamic-spawned terrorism on its own soil. On February 26, 1993,
Ramzi Yousef and fellow members of al-Qaeda planted and detonated a truck bomb underneath
the northern tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. Although the ultimate plan in
collapsing the tower failed, the bomb killed six people and injured thousands of others, and
would later prove to be a “deadly dress rehearsal” to the more catastrophic attacks at the same
location on September 11, 2001.154 The United States appeared to have an enemy that was not
afraid to attack U.S. targets at home or abroad. Moreover, terrorism in the name of Islamic
extremist motives continued to haunt and stall the United States’ attempts at waging a globalist
agenda. It became apparent to U.S. policymakers that this enemy needed to be eliminated
completely, or substantially, if globalization was to be established in the Middle East. Every
time an American person or object became a victim of Islamic terrorism, the United States
encountered a setback in their diplomatic aspirations. Policymakers became reactionary instead
of proactive in attempting to destroy anti-American extremism in order to accomplish its goal of
globalization. The constant targeting of American passenger airlines abroad, combined with the
first World Trade Center attack in the early 1990s, ignited an uphill battle that needed to be won
against the waves of Islamic fundamentalism if globalization in the Middle East was to succeed.
National security became an issue of primary concern for the United States government.
Developed nations’ pathway to instill democracy in the Middle East encountered a major
obstacle that needed to be removed.
The United States persistently took measures to implant democracy in the Middle East
during the 1990s. Democratic values were viewed synonymous with globalization by globalists
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around the globe who pushed for human rights and individual freedom. In pursuing these
reforms, a strong resistance formed from within the region’s conservative population sects and
areas inhabited by Islamic fundamentalists. In a constant battle against traditional Muslims who
were uneager to cut ties with their cultural and religious foundations, U.S. officials knew that it
needed to retain their presence in the Middle East. The lasting petroleum relationship between
business and political parties from the U.S. and various Middle Eastern entities seemed to exhibit
itself as an advantage to U.S. foreign policy goals. U.S. foreign policymakers believed that as
long as oil flowed in and out of the Middle East, mainly from Saudi Arabia, Israel remained
healthy and protected, the United States government maintained its other Middle Eastern
alliances, continued to import an ever so important energy resource, and upheld civil reform,
globalization would eventually materialize. Religious fundamentalism, as U.S. officials began to
view it, could not stand in the way of the waves of universal big business activities and global
order.
But religious freedom was not tolerated by many Middle Eastern leaders, including
friends of the United States. In the early-mid 1990s, the Mutawwa’in (the Monarchy’s secret
religious police in Saudi Arabia) sought out anti-Sunni activities. Hidden church services were
discovered and dismantled, and its members were arrested, and some even executed, for
practices of religious extremism among the millions of Filipinos, Korean, and other foreign
workers in Saudi Arabia. This was done by the Saudi government in order to discourage others
from taking up other unwanted activities, and prevent these individuals from abandoning their
position as foreign contractors employed in the Saudi oil industry.155 The abuse of civil and
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human rights by the Saudi government has only recently, under the Obama Administration, taken
a position of importance in the layout of U.S.-Saudi relations.
For the developed world to enter the age of globalization, the economy and economic
resources needed to become vast and evolved; a world where international business relationships
were encouraged and necessary for the advancement of a global marketplace. If an increase in
universal free trade occurred more frequently, perhaps vast economic development would prove
to escalate globalization’s culmination sooner than later. Therefore, according to U.S. officials
and policymakers, the encouragement of business activities with Islamic entities in the Middle
East was seen as a benefactor to globalization’s cause. As George H.W. Bush exited the Oval
Office in 1993 and William Clinton entered as the next American president, he too supported an
international business community. Unlike the Bush families’ lasting business venture with Gulf
petroleum and relationship with foreign oil companies, Clinton promoted “free markets” and
“strategic trade” as an essential objective to American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.156
The Bush connection to Gulf oil was originally pursued for strictly monetary reasons first, which
became a political matter once the Bush family grew prominent on the American political stage.
President Clinton, on the other hand, used this relationship as a political strategy to promote
globalization. Worldwide trade and the international business community working in accord was
necessary if the globalization system was to emerge. The continuing petroleum trade with Gulf
nations like Saudi Arabia was an encouraging sign for globalization as seen by U.S.
policymakers. Also, working to compliment Israel’s best interests in the name of democracy was
seen as a benefactor to globalization.
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However, in order for globalization to work, and for the free flow of goods and services
across national boundaries to become established practice, peace and cordial communication
needed to exist between different cultures and societies. The Arab League boycott of American
and Israeli products, which had officially existed since the aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli
War, posed as an obstacle against globalization and Western efforts to implement free trade in
the region. Throughout the Cold War, the Middle Eastern Muslim community, especially the
Palestinians, kept its stance of not doing business with Israel in an attempt to isolate Israel
economically; Palestinians and Arab alliances also discouraged other nations around the world
from adding to Israel’s economic and military strength. Once globalization came to the forefront
of American diplomacy in the 1990s, U.S. foreign policymakers made a serious push to end this
boycott.
The economic relationship between the Muslim Middle Eastern states and the United
States became even more fragile once the Saudi oil giant, Aramco, absorbed the state marketing
and refining company Samerac, which became the world's largest fully integrated oil company at
the time.157 U.S. officials understood that if they wished to hold onto a degree of influence in
Middle Eastern economic matters, they needed to persuade Middle Eastern political and
economic leaders that distancing itself from international business was detrimental to
globalization and disadvantageous to the Palestinian and Arab communities engaged in the
boycott. By the mid-1990s, government officials in Washington understood that a positive
resolution to end the Arab League boycott needed to come to fruition. In November, 1994, a
resolution was introduced by New Jersey Senator Frank Lautenberg in Congress, along with
seven other U.S. senators, to urge President Clinton and his Secretary of State, Warren
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Christopher, to find a “forceful” end to the boycott and demanded that the, “Arab League… put
the diplomatic chess board away, take a confidence-building step, and support the peace process
by dismantling the boycott.”158 Although Lautenberg’s tone had suggested that the United States
would remain strong alongside its longtime ally in Israel, the United States seemingly
encouraged the positive flow of international, capitalist trade within and outside of the Middle
East.
Capitalism, as it appeared to U.S. policymakers, was a vital tool that the United States
used in order to bring about globalization to the developing world. Following victory against
Iraq in 1991, and later following the 2003 campaign, America eliminated one of the hostile and
major military powers of the Gulf region (Iran being another major military threat) at the time.
The U.S. victory “firmly established the United States as the sole external arbiter in the area.”159
It was to nobody’s surprise that U.S. power globally, and its stationary placement with Middle
Eastern affairs, proved too much for Muslim leadership to contend against. The boycott, which
had existed for about five decades prior, finally ended following the Oslo Peace Accords where
Arab states within the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council)160 withdrew their participation from the
boycott. The boycott not only failed at dissolving Israel’s economic strength and cohesion with
outside markets, but it negatively impacted the Arab states’ economy by limiting trade activities
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and the diversity of products and competition within their own markets.161 The end of the boycott
signaled a positive step toward globalization in the Middle East for U.S. officials. Lebanon and
Syria remained decisive in prolonging their economic crusade against Israel however. As for the
GCC nations, the end of the boycott manifested softening tensions against its Jewish neighbor
and an increase in economic activity across national borders.
Ethnic tensions between Muslims and the Jewish inhabitants of Israel played out in the
background regarding U.S. foreign policy and its quest for international peace and cooperation
during the bulk of the twentieth century’s final decade. Hundreds of miles northwest of the
eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea, a serious military crisis unfolded. From 1992 until
1999, the Balkan states of southeastern Europe encountered violent political and ethic turmoil
that the U.S. and its NATO and UN allies intervened in. Following the fall of the Soviet Union
and its control over the Eastern Bloc in 1991, Balkan society faced numerous issues over how to
govern its own ethnic populations while silencing its political dissidents. When Macedonian,
Croatian, Bosnian, and Slovenians attempted to declare independence from Yugoslavia, which
was controlled by communist and Serbian nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic, a civil stet
ignited. The “ethnic cleansing” committed by Milosevic’s Serbian forces on the Muslim
populations in Bosnia drew in American, U.N., and NATO forces to the conflict in an attempt to
settle a peace arrangement five months after the war began. UN and NATO intervention,
initially, was weak until much later in the conflict. In 1996, it was revealed that a Croatian
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soldier pled guilty in an International Criminal Tribunal to executing more than 1,000 Muslim
civilians in Bosnia.162
However, these acts of genocide, and the Serbian individuals who committed these
atrocities, went unpunished by the international community. Slobodan Milosevic was eventually
arrested by Yugoslavian authorities in March, 2001, on charges of embezzlement, political
corruption, and abuse of power. He was then tried by the International War Crimes Tribunal in
The Hague on charges of genocide and other various war crimes.163 He died in a prison cell in
The Hague during his five year-long trial, which ended with no verdict given. The United States
and 40 other nations pledged, at a special summit conference in July, 1999, to work for stability
and prosperity in the Balkans after a decade marked by unrelenting war.164 The accounts of
Muslim genocide committed by Yugoslavian soldiers, though, have yet to be confirmed by the
United Nations and the United States alongside much controversy. This occurrence, along with
other historical events that involved violence against Muslim peoples in the Middle East, has
added to the amplified Islamic resentment toward the West in recent years. It seemed that if
Muslims, in general, came under attack and became victims of war and violence, the United
States and the West became the suspects of blame.
Middle Eastern Muslims are no strangers to acts of violence, and have been victims of
war and genocide in previous decades. But whether the violence is instigated and acted out by
other Muslim sects and their secular leaders, or by infidels foreign to the Middle East has been
an ongoing debate; one which has presented numerous accounts of misinformation and biased
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accounts of these atrocities. What is reality and what is perception has become the ongoing
question of this issue. Phillip Crowley, former spokesperson for ex-Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton, stated that since the 1980s, “more and more casualties [have been] inflicted by Muslims
against Muslims,” but the prevailing narrative held by the Islamic extremists today has been the
“faithful waging war against crusaders.”165 It seemed evident that throughout the 1990s,
unfortunate undertakings like the genocide of Muslims in Bosnia by non-Muslims were
perceived by Islamic fundamentalists as conspired attacks by non-Muslims on Muslims in whole.
This notion was not taken lightly by Islamic fundamentalists, and caused more harm to the
perception of the West. In fact, it spurred future terrorist attacks on Western targets. Since
1980, it is a presumed belief held by the West and the U.N. that a little more than four-million
Muslims have been killed by non-Muslims, including the Soviet forces who murdered millions
of Muslims during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980. However, Western forces have
done very little, in reality, in contributing to the large number of Muslims killed by nonMuslims.166 Whether this fact is based on real evidence or it is based on speculation, the reality is
that millions of Muslims have fallen victim to conflicts imposed on them by forces distant from
Muslim society. Steven Simon, the former head of the Middle East Desk on the National
Security Council, stated: “Nonetheless, the perception that non-Muslim global powers are
targeting Islam has become so widely accepted in the Arab world and beyond that it is now a
consideration in U.S. foreign policy.”167
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In the closing years of the twentieth century, the United States and the United Nations
sustained a policy that encouraged economic growth and activity within the Middle Eastern
social landscape where Islamic fundamentalism ran amuck, opposing the Western modes of
change. Islamic fundamentalism and the juxtaposed religious rift between itself and Judaism,
however, have remained obstacles for overall economic, social, and political progress. As long
as popular conceptions existed that framed the United States and its global alliances as
perpetrators and enemies of Islam who were more than willing to murder Muslims, the hatred
would persist toward America and its globalization mission. Non-Muslims worldwide became
the potential targets of Islamic radicals – especially those affiliated with the West in some way or
another. Prominent Islamic clerics today, such as Egyptian Islamic theologian Yusuf alQaradawi, have consistently preached against Israel, encouraging suicide bombings against
Israelis, and regularly upholding his fatwas, “urging Muslims to avoid contact with Israel.”168
The persistent and staunch attitudes of religious fundamentalism will remain an absolute
deterrent to globalization’s formulation and growth. The United States has worked tediously to
end these misconceptions held onto by the fundamentalist Muslim populations of the Middle
East through the valid media campaigns in the Middle East. However, these flawed ideas remain
vibrant in the minds of Islamic fundamentalists. U.S. policymakers have come to recognize that
constructing a policy to battle this mislead logic has become a vital component of U.S. foreign
policy.
Hope in ending Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East came into existence during
the final decade of the twentieth century. This hope came in the form of an emerging Muslim
middle class, a rise of capitalism, and an increase in global trade within the Middle Eastern
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marketplace. Advocates who believe that capitalism and a free market could bring the Middle
East out of a fundamentalist mind frame include prominent political officials and academic
theorists, like former President William Clinton, CFR member and academic Vali Nasr,
economic historian Daniel Yergin, and Edward Djerejian, formerly a key official in the U.S.
Department of State.169 This encouraging development has grown more prominent upon the
stage of Middle Eastern affairs today. But in order for this development to give way to
globalization and modernity, the founding doctrine of theological authority and secular power
must be analyzed to determine if secular rulers and Islamic clerics are open to the idea and
promises of a globalized world brought together by a global marketplace. Beside the point,
many Muslim extremists who resided in the poorest regions of the Middle East never
encountered or experienced these encouraging economic activities. Islamic fundamentalism
remained a force to be reckoned with as terrorist cells began to form and conspire raids against
the West.
As the year 2000 approached, Islamic fundamentalism remained alive amongst Arab,
Chechen, Palestinian, Afghan, and Bosnian populations. The Middle East, as a whole, had a
small middle class, conflicts within the interpretation of Islam and conflicts between Shia
Muslims and their secular rulers, which included the conflict between the Saudi royalty and its
Shia subjects, proved to be factors that fueled Islamic extremist activity. Only small pockets
around the Middle East have experienced the waves of globalization. The city of Dubai, by 2010
for example, increased its GDP 267 percent since 1995, and has rivaled the splendor of other

169

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Poverty and Defeating Militant Islam,” Gatestone Institute:
International Policy Council, December 6, 2010, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/1713/
poverty-militant-islam.

108
major world cities such as Shanghai and New York City.170 This encouraging sign could be
viewed today as a positive sign of globalization and its appearance and expansion into Middle
Eastern society. Yet, if one travelled just several miles across the Arab deserts or the Persian
Gulf waters, one could witness the poverty and social disparity of many within the region who
view Islam as a staple of existence. Islamic fundamentalists, especially the Shia Muslims,
viewed, and continue to view globalization as a deep-rooted enemy to their political, social,
cultural, and religious values. Moreover, Islamic fundamentalists, and consequently the terrorist
organizations tied to this brand of religious fundamentalism, would come to interpret
globalization as an American invasion of Muslim life – a redundant theme pioneered by Iranian
revolutionaries of the late 1970s who dubbed the United States and its former imperialistic
motives with Iranian oil as the “Great Satan.”171 It was believed by Islamic fundamentalists,
such as Osama bin Laden in 1998, that the United States had, “spearheaded the crusade against
the Islamic nation…. [And offered] support to the Jews in Palestine who are in need of their
Christian brothers to achieve full control over the Arabian Peninsula.”172 The leader of the
terrorist organization, al-Qaeda, and eventual mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks on the United
States, Osama bin Laden and his fellow Shia brethren truly convinced themselves that they were
fighting a jihad against the evil mechanisms of the West. They turned to guerilla warfare tactics
against Western forces and targets to defend Islamic life in the name of Allah.173 Globalization
filled these Islamic extremists with feelings of paranoia over the future survival of their own
culture, and spurred them to greet this liberal development with much hostility. The United
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States’ government and its foreign policymakers had a revitalized foreign enemy that was
determined to wage an all-out holy war against the West by the late 1990s.
The United States suddenly became aware that the global terrorism front was a very
serious concern regarding national security. A June, 2000 National Commission on Terrorism174
report advised members of Congress on combating and countering the changing threat Islamic
radicals posed on the United States at home and abroad. Following the arrest by a Customs
Agent at the U.S.-Canadian border of Ahmed Ressam, an Islamic radical who had conspired to
perform a terrorist bombing of a millennial celebration in the United States, the commission
created a report to advise U.S. government officials on the evolutionary motives, techniques,
ideologies, and adaptions used by international terrorists.175 With al-Qaeda highlighted as the
prominent threat to U.S. national security, members of the commission evaluated and warned
U.S. officials that terrorism had become more dynamic at home and abroad. Terrorists had
adapted to the modern times, and had become, “less dependent on state sponsors, were harder to
disrupt with economic sanctions, objectives more deadly,” and made effective “use of widely
available technologies to communicate quickly and securely.”176
What appeared evident was that the United States had a gigantic problem that needed to
be confronted immediately. As long as leaders of the United States were committed to carrying
on their agenda of globalization, terrorism by Islamic fundamentalists needed to be silenced and
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destroyed in the process. But how were U.S. leaders going to carry out their plan to combat this
evasive and covert enemy? Efforts by U.S. intelligence agencies to combat international terrorist
organizations begun immediately in 2000, but it was too little, too late for government officials
once September 11, 2001 approached, arrived, and passed. The massive terrorist attacks
spearheaded by Osama bin Laden and his group of jihad extremists, al-Qaeda, wreaked havoc on
United States’ society. It became quickly clear to newly elected President George W. Bush, his
administration, and other government officials of the day that 9/11 was a game-changer to
foreign policy in the Middle East. Al-Qaeda, its Islamic jihad against the West, and Osama bin
Laden became a household name in the United States. Foreign policy was altered to fight a
foreign enemy, rather than encourage globalization’s growth in the Middle East.
Al-Qaeda’s origins could be traced back to a meeting between the wealthy Arab bin
Laden, Egyptian militant Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Cairo intellectual Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif,
held in Peshawar, Pakistan.177 Al-Qaeda’s history, however, could be traced back to the Carter
Administration’s anti-Soviet policies in the Middle East during the late 1970s. Once the first
Gulf War begun, bin Laden offered his Mujahideen forces to the Saudi monarchy to help defend
the kingdom against Saddam Hussein’s potentially dangerous military forces. However, the
House of Saud declined bin Laden’s offer, and invited U.S. forces, instead, on the Muslim Holy
Land, which deeply angered the al-Qaeda founder.178 From that point forward, al-Qaeda began to
attack Western targets and any target that was Sunni or secular for example, which affiliated or
befriended itself with the West.
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Once 9/11 became a reality, al-Qaeda appeared to have upped the ante by taking the
battle to the American homeland. The collapse of the World Trade Center, the attack on the
Pentagon, and the scores of Americans killed on domestic soil, had altered the course of foreign
policy in the Middle East which the United States had abided by since 1991. In response to this
tragedy, President Bush would wage a war against the terrorists and any Middle Eastern nation
that harbored members of al-Qaeda, weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, or any
other related terrorist organizations for that matter. Americans at home would experience a
trade-off between their personal freedoms for security, and the Middle Eastern landscape would
come to experience drastic violence, warfare, and social and political upheaval.
The direction of U.S. foreign policy altered its course, initiated by the George W. Bush
Administration, following 9/11 to a resurgence of American interest, military forces, resources,
and aid into and with the Middle East. A pro-Israeli policy surfaced once again between the
United States and Israel – begrudgingly by George W. Bush who came under attack by pro-Israel
lobbyists, the mainstream media, and other government officials initially for his withdrawal of
foreign investment and minimal support for America’s longtime ally. In the aftermath of the
2001 tragedy, the U.S.-Israeli diplomatic relationship became very erratic, as President George
W. Bush and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon either totally disagreed or strongly agreed with each
other on issues concerning the “Arab-Islamic world” -- in spite of the fact that the United States
had longed “adopted many of Israel’s justifications for these [anti-Palestinian, anti-Iranian, antiArab, and anti-Shia] policies.”179 The Sunni and secular governments of the Middle East, such as
Saudi Arabia and Turkey, once again became an important ally to the United States beginning in
2001 as they had been during the First Gulf War. The United States, involved in a military
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conflict following the catastrophic terrorist attack on their own soil, renewed its view that the
petroleum resources and political assistance of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states were vital in
fighting Islamic terrorism in the Middle East. Surely, the Bush family found its oil-based
relationship with the Royal al-Saud family helpful to U.S. diplomatic objectives, uniting to
defeat the extremist Muslim populations of the region.
As mentioned previously, the rise of the Islamic middle class, Arab intellectualism, and
the increase in capitalism within Middle Eastern society held the key to defeating Islamic
extremism. Once the Muslim world came to view economic progress as an improvement to their
own selves, culture, and society, they would come to view Islamic fundamentalists as backwards
and corrupt element of their society. Globalization, and the prospects of its regional reforms on
Muslim society, promised to cement a legacy of global harmony through an integrated
marketplace and bring an end to the ultra-conservative and outdated customs and beliefs that
Islamic fundamentalism encompassed. However, “[r]eform is more likely to come when
Muslims by and large begin to believe that it would play a role in solving the problems they want
solved.”180

Globalization Policy Following the September 11th Attacks: Old Habits in a
New Era

The infamy of the September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda attacks on the United States proved to
alter the entire dynamic of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. With thousands of American
citizens killed in the terrorist attacks that wreaked havoc in New York City, Washington D.C.,
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and rural Pennsylvania, perceptions of Arab Muslims would forever be altered by the millions of
people who lived outside of the Middle East. Not only had the United States underestimated
their vulnerability to the serious violence and disorder caused by Islamic extremists, but the
economic and political elite of the United States were forced to revise their strategy of
engagement and diplomacy with entities from the Islamic society as well. The Bush
Administration’s globalization policy, as it would come to be following the 9/11 catastrophe,
contained elements of an exclusively American-Christian crusade against Islamic
fundamentalism, while undermining the natural social growth of Middle Eastern society. If
many Middle Eastern peoples viewed the U.S. in an unfavorable light before September 11th, this
perception was only magnified through the measures of a revised U.S. policy. The United States
embarked on a mission against the malevolent Islamic radicals and the regimes that fostered
these terrorist organizations responsible for 9/11. In later months, the U.S. would confront any
Middle Eastern entity that opposed U.S. policy – including Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the PLO.
Just two months following the 9/11 attacks, the World Trade Organization (WTO) held a
summit in Doha, the capital city of Qatar. The World Trade Organization “is the international
organization whose primary purpose is to open trade for the benefit of all.”181 This organization’s
member body, made up mostly of political leaders and economists, includes 159 nations, in
which “117 are developing countries or separate customs territories.”182 With tight security
measures and protestors running amuck in the streets of Doha - condemning the trade ministers,
their delegation, and representatives of various international organizations of the WTO of selling
out individual freedoms and liberties of people around the world – the socio-economic aspect of
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globalization became the primary topic of debate at the conference.183 In light of the newfound
anxiety over international terrorism, the members of the WTO agreed that if globalization was to
proceed as originally planned, failure in implementing its security and survival measures was not
an option. The delegates of the WTO summit in Doha, moreover, needed to rebuild the
confidence of the global marketplace during the final quarter of 2001, when it “was essential to
heading off a deep and protracted global recession.”184
For the United States, it was necessary for the political and economic elite to consider an
innovative and updated foreign policy to deal with the abrupt changes it faced. The special U.S.
alliance with Israel, the economic investment the United States had with the Middle East –
specifically regarding the Gulf States’ petroleum resources - were important aspects considered
in the ever-changing dynamic of the world’s political climate and U.S. diplomacy in the Middle
East. The rapid current of Islamic fundamentalism, and relatedly, extremism – as well as the
Islamic extremists’ agenda to halt efforts of globalization - were obstacles that U.S.
policymakers had to manage in their revision of foreign policy. The end of the Cold War
brought about the mission to involve the Middle East within the structure of globalization.
Efforts were made throughout the 1990s and up through the millennium and beyond to
implement a system of global assimilation. However, 9/11 had caused a serious setback to U.S.
foreign policy goals. It became quickly apparent that United States’ foreign policy in the Middle
East was about to undergo some minor and major adjustments to its longtime and existing
relationships, and to its overall objective of globalization in the Middle East.
The September 11th attacks by Islamic radicals did little overall in changing the special
relationship shared by Israel and the United States. In fact, once the United States declared war
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against Afghanistan and global terrorism in late 2001, the U.S.-Israel bond became much
stronger because of an increased and synchronized need to diminish Islamic extremist forces in
the name of national security. If the alliance between the two nations was ever so strong before
the tragedy, it became even more solidified soon thereafter. Israel had always been a strategic
asset to the U.S. in the Middle East since its birth in 1948. In the age of globalization, the United
States could not afford to favor one ethnic group or culture over another – which included the
contrast between Jewish and Arab cultures – especially in the socially turbulent Middle East.
Zbgigniew Brzezinski, the former U.S. National Security Advisor, advocated that as time
progresses toward global hegemony, “the American mosaic could become a contest among
groups, each of which will claim (and try to assert) its special expertise, as well as its right, to
define policy in a universe of conflicting foreign interests.”185 Globalization will, in fact, break
down cultural favoritism and ethnic barriers in return for global hegemony. If globalization is to
breach Middle Eastern society, containing a variety of Muslim and Jewish ethnicities, the United
States cannot favor Israeli interests over the interests of, per se, Sunni Arabs. Globalization not
only tested the United States’ ability to develop a policy that is bilateral and universal, but one
that was fair and balanced across national boundaries as well.
However, numerous sources and primary evidence indicated that the United States
heavily favored the Israeli position on political matters in the Middle East following 9/11. Even
when policy was directed toward an issue involving the Arab world, Israel remained an integral
player in determining solutions and outcomes of those Middle Eastern diplomatic issues.
Tremendous support for Israel’s prominence by large portions of the American domestic
population and special interest groups continued to play a major role in persuading policymaking
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and decisions directed toward Middle Eastern diplomacy. This development remained a
prominent and deciding factor in recent years during the George W. Bush and Barrack Obama
presidencies regarding Middle Eastern policy. It could be argued that since Israel’s creation
following the Second World War, the United States always aligned itself with Israel’s goals and
purpose, no matter at what diplomatic cost or price. The question moving forward was to decide
on what stance the United States took toward Israel’s national interests in the ongoing efforts for
Middle Eastern peace and globalization.
Upon oil’s discovery in the earliest years of the twentieth century by imperialist nations
and companies from those nations – including the United States, the Middle East had quickly
developed into a region of utmost economic importance to global society. The petroleum trade
between the producing Arab states and consumer markets, such as the United States, had been a
pivotal episode in global affairs ever since. As recently as 2013, 13 percent of U.S. total gross
oil imports came from Saudi Arabia. In addition, “net imports from OPEC countries accounted
for 55% of U.S. total net imports” that year.186 After 9/11, this oil trade, in order to meet global
demands, had to remain in existence between the U.S. and the Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia.
Big business and the political elite had a major stake in this economic development, and Islamic
extremism was certainly not going to pose a threat to this decades-old relationship. Plus, Saudi
assistance and help from the surrounding Gulf states became essential for the United States in
managing its war effort in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In the light of globalization, the petroleum trade remained a vital topic of debate. The
extraction of resources from the sands of countries like Saudi Arabia, and the injection of those
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resources into the global marketplace, fueled the Islamic fundamentalist anger toward the West.
Yet, Gulf oil was so vital to the livelihood of all developed and developing nations of the Gulf
and other parts of the globe, as well as to the overall well-being of the global capitalist system.
For example, in 2009, Chinese imports of Saudi Arabian petroleum exceeded those of the United
States for the first time in history.187 Globalization had forced Middle Eastern nations, “to
address aspects of their past that had long been ignored or hidden…. Such problems will
continue to vex scholars for years to come as the Gulf diversifies economically and becomes a
region in which oil will play a significant but less vital role over time.”188 Saudi Arabia, more
specifically, will have to consider its own national security measures in the midst of the flexing
of Iranian power and the momentous Arab Spring revolutions which have now found a place in
plunging Syria into civil chaos. Will Middle Eastern society accept its new responsibilities
within the scheme of globalization in return for modernity and democratic values, or will the
animosities held by Islamic peoples toward the West’s petroleum needs plunge the region further
into an arena of conflict and chaos?

George W. Bush’s Policy Surrounding Gulf Oil and Israel

Just a few months following George W. Bush’s ascent to the Oval Office, newly
appointed Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee (AIPAC). In his speech, he detailed the new administration’s foreign policy in the
Middle East and its dedication to globalization. Powell was adamant about reducing the hostility
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exerted by regimes in places like Iraq and Iran – the reinstatement of a dual-containment policy,
and additionally, weakening Russia’s aggressive push on the region’s political structure. The
central goal of the administration’s foreign policy in the Middle East was, “the need to consult
and work closely with friends and allies…” such as Israel.189 Furthermore, the ties between the
Bush Administration and Gulf Oil became a central and viable factor of U.S. foreign policy in
the Middle East in the aftermath of 9/11, as well as before and during the American crusade
against the Islamic jihadists.
It appeared that the foreign policy agenda of the early Bush Administration centered on
existing diplomatic relationships, while attempting to seek out new and broader alliances with
other nations and international organizations. Yet, the alliance between Israel and the United
States remained a complicating factor for the West’s globalization effort. Because Israel and the
United States shared a common interest for democratic values as well as “vital economic and
strategic interests at stake in the region,” Powell, as stated in his March, 2001 speech, believed
that, “these interests and concerns will be served best by a peace that both Israelis and
Palestinians can embrace.”190 With a new sense of urgency in curbing Islamic extremism in the
Muslim world following 9/11, Washington and the American business elite relied heavily on
their former relationships with entities in the Middle East to assist the U.S. in the crusade against
terrorism. The Bush Administration came to the conclusion early on that in order to bring about
the fruits of globalization and offer peace to the peoples of the Middle East, the special alliance
with Israel was absolutely essential. Also essential was the continuation of big business in
regards to the oil trade between the West and Middle East.

189

Colin Powell, “Address of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee,” Congressional Record 147 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), 442.
190
Ibid., 443.

119
The Bush Administration attempted to persuade the Israeli leader Ariel Sharon to “show
restraint in the occupied [Palestinian] territories” and dissuade the Palestinian population via
political policy of committing further acts of terror against the West in the months following
9/11. In response to Washington’s desires, Sharon became angered with Washington, and
claimed that the U.S. wished to “sell out” the Jewish state in order to win favor with the Muslims
in late 2001.191 After Israel’s leaders refused to work with PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, while
engaged in constant communication with the United States, alongside tremendous attempts by
the Jewish Lobby to win favor in the eyes of U.S. citizens and officials in Washington, the Israeli
position won its case.192 They had pressured the United States’ government enough to reverse its
post-9/11 policy from one that sought reconciliation with the Muslim world, to one that remained
more favorable to Israel’s position toward Muslims. Although Bush initially attempted to
normalize the U.S.-Israel alliance after 9/11, propaganda campaigns and public pressure
persuaded the American president to regress back to the internationally unpopular special
alliance with Israel.
President Bush and his administration would fail to reconcile with the Muslim
populations and nations within the Middle East from 9/11 moving forward. Years later in 2005,
Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud al-Faisal voiced his complaints to the [Council on Foreign
Relations] (CFR), – an American non-profit, nonpartisan membership organization that
specializes in U.S. foreign policy and international affairs – and declared that the Arab-Israeli
conflict was the root cause of Middle Eastern extremism and terrorism, as well as the “chief
factor dividing the Muslim world from the United States.”193 Failing to gain support from Israel
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in creating a unipolar policy in the Middle East between Israel and its Muslim neighbors, the
Bush Administration had to follow through with its intentions alone. U.S. officials had no choice
but to flex its diplomatic muscle and to lead a crusade against al-Qaeda and other perpetrators
and threats to U.S. national security. Thus, Bush’s global War on Terror began on September
20, 2001. By December, 2001, Yasser Arafat had bowed to pressure from the U.S. and Israel to
arrest and dismember Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Meanwhile,
Ariel Sharon and his government took a hard-lined militaristic stance against Palestinians
residing in Gaza and West Bank.194 The United States, remaining true to its traditional
diplomatic tendencies in the Middle East, began a series of military campaigns against Islamic
terrorists and antagonistic Middle Eastern regimes: Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq in 2003, and intervening in the affairs of the decade long NATO-American
intervention in the war between Israel and Palestinian forces within Israel. Although no weapons
of mass destruction were ever found, nor was Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, the ongoing
damage to American reputation, its global image, and the battle lines between the West and
Middle East had been established.
It is not a secret that the Bush family had decades-long personal connections with Middle
Eastern petroleum. Although the Bush family had developed strong connections with the Gulf
States, George W. Bush now balanced these alliances with a public campaign against hostile
Islamists. Since the Great Depression era of the 1930s, oil men like Prescott Bush worked
closely than ever before with the Roosevelt Administration through the Second World War, in
which Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia became “vital to the defense of the United States.”195 By
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the turn of the millennium, the Bush family maintained their affluence in the economic sphere
and in the American upper-political sphere as well. Their involvement in the global energy
industry for decades prior to the terrorist attacks of 2001, and inclusion into the realm of the
American political elite allowed the Bush’s to direct foreign policy as they saw best fit once they
took positions in the executive branch. A CIA report published in 2000 indicated that
Washington had much at stake regarding Middle Eastern oil supplies. With the Bush
Administration’s sight on geopolitical power and overt concerns over U.S. imported oil supplies,
its ambitions became centered on U.S. hegemony in a globalizing world.196 Therefore, in gaining
major support from American Christian fundamentalists and evangelists, right-wing groups, and
the Jewish lobby, George W. Bush invaded the Middle East in an effort to defeat hostile
Islamists who threatened the American establishment. Nevertheless, Bush began to, unwittingly,
jeopardize his families’ history in the Middle Eastern oil trade while publically aligning himself
with the abovementioned domestic groups – unlike his father, who “tailor[ed] his war coalition
building to include many Islamic nations in addition to the oil sheikhdoms.”197
The outrage by the American people over their nation’s Arab alliance who supplied the
U.S. with oil over the decades seemed to manifest itself in an ill-fated legacy. The oil trade and
the diplomatic relationships between the United States and countries like Saudi Arabia continued
to live on. Yet, the Bush Administration’s ties to the Saudi royal family was a relationship that
the American public remained uneased about. Out of the 19 September 11 hijackers, 15 of them
were of Saudi descent, which was also the homeland to the 9/11 mastermind Osama bin Laden.
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia possessed a large minority of Shia Muslims hostile to U.S. influence.
As mentioned earlier, Arab society had actually benefited economically from an oil boom as
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partly resulting following the events of 9/11. During a 2007 Congressional testimony on U.S.
diplomacy in Saudi Arabia, University of Vermont professor F. Gregory Gause declared that,
“Washington still value[d] the relationship with the Saudis, for oil and security reasons.”198
Moreover, the diplomatic relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States, since its
origins, “operated most smoothly at the elite level.”199
George W. Bush had numerous connections with Middle Eastern petroleum. Not only
had he and his family done business with oil sheikhs and businessmen in the Gulf region for
decades, but much of his executive staff also had prior experience in this undertaking as well. In
addition, there was little doubt that much of the U.S. occupancy in the Middle East following
9/11 had much to do with the U.S.-Arab oil trade. A number of government officials have
stepped forward since in revealing a part of George W. Bush’s foreign policy agenda in the
Middle East. Former Federal Reserve Chairman during Bush’s presidency, Alan Greenspan,
General John Abizaid, former head of Military Operations in the 2003 war against Iraq, and
Defense Secretary Charles Hagel (who was a Senator from Nebraska during the bulk of the Bush
presidency), have all unanimously declared that the U.S. takeover in Iraq and occupancy in the
Middle East were largely attempts to control oil.200 During George W. Bush’s two terms as
president of the United States, he provided executive branch positions and appointments to elite
individuals heavily involved in the Middle Eastern oil business. Bush “brought a new set of
dominant corporations, power alignments, and overseas entanglements” to the aspect of
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policymaking.201 Vice President, Richard Cheney, alongside National Security Advisor,
Condaleeza Rice, were both heavily involved in executive roles of the Texas-based oil service
corporations, Haliburton and Enron, and more importantly to the task of foreign policymaking,
had “ties to Bahrain, Kuwait, and shadowy Saudi Arabian families.”202
The positive effects of globalization began to take shape in Middle Eastern society due to
the U.S. war effort against terrorism and aggressive Middle Eastern Islamic leaders. Once
American military forces arrived in the Middle East to battle the jihadists beginning in
Afghanistan in 2001, oil and American security became vital to U.S. interests and success in
carrying out its foreign policy and war effort. In effect, the American war effort in the Middle
East had fueled economic prosperity for the Gulf States as well. The GCC cooperated with the
U.S. military following its invasion, and later victory in Iraq in 2003, because “they recognized
that it would have enormous influence over the region’s politics and commerce after the fall of
Saddam Hussein’s government.”203 The tremendous impact oil had on the Arab economy in the
Middle East continued down a perplexed path during the George W. Bush years. Although
Saudi Arabia remained a “problematic ally” to the United States (in regards to combating alQaeda’s terrorist cells and Islamic radical intelligence networks and organizations in years
leading up to the 9/11 terrorist attacks), the 9/11 Commission204 warned that the U.S.
government should “build a relationship beyond oil” – one that fostered a policy of “shared
commitment to reform” and a relationship dedicated to a shared interest of their nations’
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peoples.205 Upon President Obama’s ascendance to the presidency, his administration would not
have the advantage of a personal and existing relationship regarding the oil industry. The Obama
Administration would lack the personnel involved in the business aspect of American powerpolitics, as well as prior involvement in the petroleum trade with the Gulf Arabs.
By the closing of Bush’s second term in office, it was ‘politics as usual’ in the Middle
East. Despite the Bush Administration’s somewhat successful efforts to globalize the Middle
East, the U.S. retained a pro-Israel policy and had failed at curbing the Islamic extremist
networks in the region. A decade-long military campaign to eliminate Islamic enemies of Israel
and the United States went unfinished. The objective of the United States during the Bush
presidency included democratizing the Middle East, which was also a “core goal of many groups
in the [Israel] lobby.”206 In the end of his two terms in Office, Bush amplified the animosities
that many Muslims retained toward the United States and the West. The war effort in the Middle
East became a doomed legacy, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda survived, and an economic
recession hit home by 2008.
It appeared evident to the American political elite that globalization would come sooner
than later to the Middle East. The Bush Administration had made a sufficient effort to revise
U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East to one that was less slanted toward Israel following 9/11.
But that attempt at removing the Israel bias ultimately failed. Following the administration’s
failure in effectively managing the 2006 Lebanon crisis, and Secretary of State Condoleeza
Rice’s statement on instilling democracy and support for Israel in the region as, “the birth pangs
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of the new Middle East,” the administration had lost more favor with their Arab alliances –
including Saudi Arabia, where foreign minister Faisal scoffed at the American viewpoint that
Saudi Arabia wanted “to go back to the old Middle East.”207 Political officials within the
American government, grassroots and professional support from fundamentalist Christians and
Jews within the United States, and the powerful Jewish Lobby had persuaded Bush and his
government to remain true to the decades’-old Israeli favoritism. Furthermore, the constant
American military presence in the Middle East had bolstered the anti-American animosities held
by Islamic radicals. The Gaza offensive, beginning in the summer of 2006 by Israeli militants,
had been considered and challenged by some in the U.N., including American diplomat Miguel
d'Escoto Brockmann, as an act of genocide against the Arab occupants in 2009. However, the
United States continued its tremendous support for Israel even in the wake of the Gaza crisis.208
Washington’s support for Israel continued on as the tragic events in Israel had lingered on.
Years later in 2011, support for Israel by U.S. officials remained substantial, as Massachusetts
Representative Edward Markey advocated that, “Israel… take decisive action in the Gaza Strip
to protect its population living under the daily threat of rocket attacks” and to finally defeat the
Palestinian nationalists and inhabitants.209
The Bush Administration’s popularity among Americans was at an historic low, with
much disfavor coming from the failed and costly Middle Eastern military conflict. Additionally,
oil prices were high in the midst of a national recession, while the Arab Gulf States had
experienced an economic boom at the same time. Once Illinois Senator Barrack Obama won the
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presidential election in November, 2008, his administration would adopt a foreign policy that
had continued to remain favorable to Israel to a degree, but would begin to mediate tensions
between all the peoples of the Middle East furthermore.

Obama’s Policy Surrounding Gulf Oil and Israel

Before President Obama took office, foreign policy experts from the CATO Institute
advised his administration that, “the better option would be to chart an entirely new course,” by:
“drawing down the American military presence in the Middle East, embrac[ing] a policy of
constructive disengagement… by deemphasizing U.S. alliances in the Middle East, especially
with… Israel” among other suggestions.210 Another emphasis important for globalization in the
Middle East was the economic development surrounding the global supply and demand for
petroleum. If progress toward globalization was going to be accomplished in the Middle East,
then the Obama Administration had to steer away from a conflicting foreign policy, one that had
fostered a sincere and long term predisposition toward Israel and one that relied heavily on Gulf
oil imports. In the final year of George W. Bush’s presidency, Israel had received around $2.38
billion in U.S. aid – which trumped any other Middle Eastern Arab state by more than $800
million (In comparison, Afghanistan had received $1.058 billion in U.S. aid that same year to
battle against jihadist terrorist sects within its nation’s mountainous lands).211
Rrelations with Israel gradually became overly-accepting, yet still remained favorable
toward that nation. Conservative segments of American society, alongside pressure by the
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Jewish lobby, had persuaded and “discouraged” the previous “Bush Administration from
exercising independent judgment and influence” regarding foreign policy in the Middle East.212
When the current administration rose to power in 2009, a foreign policy in the Middle East was
constructed that attempted to advance the mechanisms of globalization rather than one that
sought after public support. Key figures in Obama’s foreign policy team in 2009 included
former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Samantha Power, and
former National Security Advisor, Tom Donilon, They encouraged a Middle Eastern policy that
harbored a lesser military presence, and a more evenly-balanced diplomacy with every nation
within the region. Moreover, they advocated human rights and free trade on an international
scale.
In the continuous and fragile crusade toward globalization, the Obama Administration
had to revise its special relationship with Israel. Unlike the Bush Administration, which came
under heavy pressure by groups who favored pro-Israeli policy, foreign policy in Israel under
President Obama would seek an alternative path. On June 4, 2009, President Obama delivered a
speech on U.S.-Muslim relations, entitled A New Beginning, before hundreds of Muslim peoples
at Cairo University in Egypt. In support of globalization, Obama desired a foreign policy with
Muslims as one “not focused on oil and gas,” rather a new relationship that sought, “a broader
engagement” through the implementation of a policy that sponsored economic and social
development in the Middle East as a whole.213 This speech was labeled by the majority of the
American journalist and academic community as an attempt to modify a constructive path
toward globalization. The president sought out a “fresh relationship based on mutual interest and
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mutual respect…. [B]ased on the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be
in competition.”214
For many observers, this speech signaled a new hope for the future of U.S.-Muslim
relations and a lasting peace. However, many listeners came to view A New Beginning as a
diplomatic tool used to “brighten the image of the United States.”215 Moreover, Israel viewed
Obama’s new policy in the Middle East as threatening to their current position with the United
States and the surrounding Muslim world. An anonymous spokeswoman for Jewish settlers in
West Bank, in the midst of a war with the Palestinians, declared that the new American president
was, “out of touch with reality” and ignorant to the realities between Muslims and the Western
world.216
In comparison to former relationships between the United States’ government and Israel,
the usually comfortable diplomacy between the U.S. and Israel relationship had seen better days.
Uneased by the growing ideological rift between the two governments, Israel recently and openly
criticized the Obama Administration’s lack of support for its national security in the Middle East.
Groups such as AIPAC, peoples associated with the Jewish Lobby, Conservatives, and JudeoChristian fundamentalists have criticized the Obama Administration for its separation from the
former and the distancing from the special bond that the United States had shared with Israel for
past generations. Illinois Congressman, Randy Hultgren, attacked President Obama in front of
Congress for blaming Israel for stalemating the peace process in the Middle East during a speech
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at the U.N. General Assembly in 2011.217 As recently as February, 2014, a serious discord was
struck between the Israeli and U.S. government. Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu,
and his Minister of Strategic Affairs became outraged at Secretary of State, John Kerry, when it
was suggested by the American diplomat that Israel continue negotiations and cooperation
toward a frame-worked Middle Eastern peace plan – all while various pro-Arab groups
threatened a boycott of Israeli products because of Netanyahu’s policies toward the
Palestinians.218
In the fiscal year of 2013, the U.S. federal government granted Israel with approximately
$3.115 billion in aid toward the ongoing peace process.219 The prospects of international unity
have been skewed by the notion that the U.S. had supported Israel for decades. The Obama
Administration’s foreign policy goal in Israel currently is to establish a plan of permanent peace
and stability between the Palestinians and Jews by an April, 2014 deadline. Yet, violence and
destruction continues to thrive. President Obama and his administration aim toward
globalization through international cooperation, however, disapproval by international groups
and forces over U.S. involvement in Israel have carried on. The special interest groups and the
powerful individuals within the U.S. who devote their efforts in affirming the overwhelming
support and unique position with Israel must understand the consequences of their actions. The
overdue process of harboring a slanted policy in favor of Israeli national security over the
Palestinian cause for nationalism, and the overall violence between the two peoples must come
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to its 66-year halt. More pressing matters, such as the civil unrest in Egypt, nuclear development
in Iran, the Syrian Civil War, and the Arab Spring movement of 2011 are issues that the U.S. has
evaded but must be dealt with first and foremost in order to come to a rational solution. Instead,
the fact that Secretary of State John Kerry has primarily focused on the Arab and Palestinian
conflict suggests that the Obama Administration is focused on what the Clinton Administration
failed to do in the 1990s, which was to find a permanent peace between the Judaic and Muslim
peoples.
Peace, modernity, and democracy will not arrive to the Middle East if the West
consistently aligns itself with a pro-Israeli agenda – an agenda demonized by Israel’s Muslim
neighbors. “A country as rich and powerful as the United States can sustain flawed policies for
quite some time, but reality cannot be ignored…. Israel’s well-being is [an American] interest –
on moral grounds – but its continued presence in the Occupied Territories is not.”220 Today, a
two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become outdated. Globalization has
transformed the social landscape of Israel as of late though. The global economy has caused
many Israeli skilled workers and professionals to leave their homeland in search of better
occupational opportunity, while migrant and unskilled workers into Israel in search of
opportunity is increasing, “from which it is apparent that Israel is actually engaged in a process
of redefining its social boundaries.”221 The pluralization of Israel’s population, a change in
Israel’s demographic landscape, and the effects of a global economy could bring about changes
necessary for peace to become established in Israel.
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Throughout his two terms in office thus far, the Obama Administration has experienced
friction over the trade centered on Middle Eastern oil. Unlike the personnel and international
business relationships within the Bush Administration, government officials within the ranks of
the current administration lack the business expertise, experience, and knowledge in the oil
diplomacy with Middle Eastern nations such as Saudi Arabia. Moreover, hydro-fracking has
gained much attention and popularity within the United States as of late – which would allow the
United States to become less dependent on Gulf oil imports. This developing reality has, to a
minimal degree, damaged the lasting relationship with the Arab Gulf states and its ties to the
United States. For decades, the relationship between the U.S. and countries like Saudi Arabia
have focused primarily on petroleum. These newest developments within the global energy
industry and international socioeconomic network will change, as well as challenge, the dynamic
of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East moving forward.
Ever since the current president took office in 2009, Obama has not had similar personnel
in executive branch positions with prior knowledge and experience in dealing with the Middle
Eastern oil business that Bush had. The lack of experience and knowledge in diplomacy with the
Persian Gulf states by the foreign policymakers and officials under President Obama has been
evident. As recently as February, 2014, Deputy Secretary William Burns (also a former official
under Presidents George W. Bush and William Clinton) urged the Persian Gulf nations to
“overcome their differences with Washington.”222 He declared that the United States would offer
the greatest protection to the Gulf leaders who have feared an overthrow from the restless Shia
Muslims in the wake of the Arab Spring revolutions, which had begun in 2011 and have brought

222

Paul Richter, “U.S. Aims to Bolster Ties with Persian Gulf States,” Los Angeles Times,
February 20, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-us-gulf-states20140220,0,3257310.story#axzz2w48gZvxE.

132
about considerable turmoil to nations like Syria and Egypt. The administration’s efforts to soften
tensions with the theocratic government in Iran has not fared well with the Sunni Gulf
governments of the Middle East as well. Meanwhile, the Obama Administration, alongside the
U.N., has launched a major effort at sanctions against Iran, so much so that it squeezed Iran’s
population to elect a new leader, Hassan Rouhani, in 2013 to carry out negotiations with the
West and the United States.
Developments in the oil industry at home have had an important impact on U.S. energy
policy in the Middle East. Hydro-fracking is “the process of injecting liquid at high pressure into
subterranean rocks, boreholes, etc., so as to force open existing fissures and extract oil or gas.”223
This newly refined innovation that revolutionized ways of extracting oil from the earth has
proved to have major consequences on the existing relationship between the United States and
states like Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Canada and Mexico have been very active in hydro-fracking
for oil to bolster their own economies. Most of the world’s natural oil is in the form of tar sands,
and Alberta, Canada has contained the largest deposit of these tar sands.224 In 2012, Edward
Morse, a former U.S. official and current economic analyst, asserted that, “North America is
becoming the new Middle East,” regarding the prospect of becoming the world’s largest
producer of natural oil and gas.225 The prospect of the United States not remaining so dependent
on the Arab oil producers of the Middle East has created mixed emotions of nervousness and
frustration among various Arab Gulf state officials.
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Suppliers such as OPEC, which has included Saudi Arabia, have been left in a curious
position. Sunni Gulf nations, who depend on the generous revenue created by the oil trade in the
global marketplace, have remained skeptical and fearful about losing their positions of power
and influence over their nation, its economy, and political stability within the Middle Eastern
realm – especially in the wake of the widespread Arab uprisings. Fracking and the subsequent
increase in the global supply of oil, along with a smaller market, could leave OPEC producers
battling for market share and “pumping far more crude than expected.”226 Saudi Arabia and other
Gulf nations whose economy, civil stability, and political well-being depend on oil currently,
cannot take any chances on jeopardizing their own national security interests alongside the
revelations fracking has revealed to the United States’ economic potential. Technological
advances in the energy industry have not eased diplomatic tensions among Gulf governments,
however it has definitely not been the root source of angst toward U.S. foreign policy decisions
as of late. In fact, reopening diplomatic talks with Iran has been the main source of angst by
Saudi officials towards the U.S. government. The United States, however, view the willingness
to communicate with Iran necessary due to Iran’s determination in pursuing nuclear
development, while maintaining its feelings of angst toward Western society.
The Obama Administration, contrary to popular belief, has publically reinforced the
benefits of fracking. President Obama has claimed on numerous occasions that the oil boom
caused by fracking has “led to cleaner power and greater energy independence” for the United
States.227 Other members of his administration have reflected this notion as well, including EPA
Administrator, Gina McCarthy, and former Secretary of the Department of Energy, Stephen Chu,
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who argued that techniques currently used in fracking allowed for oil to be extracted from the
earth with minimal to no environmental consequences.228 Fracking remains in its infancy,
however, in weighing its environmental risks as well as implementing its full potential at home
and abroad may take more time and investigation.229 Environmental problems associated with
hydro-fracking, including the contamination of drinking water sources, release of trapped
methane into waterways and the atmosphere, and a rise in fracking-related earthquakes, have
been recently confirmed by numerous environmental scientists.230
The United States, in recent years, has been divided on the issue of environmental safety
and the positive economic impact fracking has proposed. This topic of debate found its way to
the forefront of the federal government’s overall agenda and policymaking moving forward –
domestically and internationally. In promotion of the passage of the American Energy Security
Act of 2013, several members of Congress, including Senator Michael Hastings (D-IL),
promoted fracking in the American Midwest and criticized the Obama Administration for,
“attempting to block new energy production, keeping energy prices high and hurting middle
class families.”231 Even though hydro-fracking has been used by major and independent oil
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companies in the U.S. effectively in the short term, which has helped stimulate some aspects of
the local and national economies, the Obama Administration must adopt a long term solution to
the impact fracking has imposed on the environment – which partly explains the delay by the
administration to delay the construction and implementation of the gigantic Keystone Pipeline
project.
If hydro-fracking eventually is to be encouraged by members of the U.S. government,
studied and supported by environmental analysts (If safety measures are implemented that reduce
fracking’s negative impact on areas surrounding wells and if environmental problems caused by
fracking are ever solved.), and continues to build support and gain momentum within certain
business and social arenas of American society, then the United States will eventually view
nations like Saudi Arabia as a less influential ally regarding their position in the international
market. The United States would become a major oil producer for its own expanding population
and could rely less on Middle Eastern oil imports. This possible scenario might give the U.S.
more leverage in Middle Eastern diplomacy, however, the U.S. would not want China and other
foreign powers to move into the region and claim the Middle Eastern oil market for themselves.
Moreover, the United States might come to view Gulf nations like Saudi Arabia as a lesser
strategic political asset if the Saudi government does not encourage domestic changes of their
own. Abuses of civil liberty, civil rights of all of its inhabitants, censorship, and promotion of
aspects related to globalization have been viewed with distaste by the international community
on the Arab monarchy. Saudi prince Alaweed bin Talal published a letter to OPEC in July,
2013, warning Saudi Arabia’s Oil Minister, Ali al Naimi, and other Gulf government officials
that the region’s reliance on oil revenue was in serious decline, and should implement “swift
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measures to diversify its economy.”232 Diversifying the Saudi economy, though, is an
undertaking that exhibits many impediments. According to researcher Matthew Simmons, Saudi
Arabia “has not built an economy that generates enough professional jobs for a rapidly growing
population.” Instead, the Saudi kingdom restricts the “freedom of women severely,” the
“Wahhabist233 clergy enforce strict Muslim law and impose criminal punishments considered
barbaric” by Western standards.234 The harsh enforcement of Sunni Islamic practice, strict social
regulations of its inhabitants, and “economic contradictions” have combined in Saudi Arabia that
encourages Muslim discontent and terrorism against the Saud family and its Western allies.235
Perhaps this could explain one of the factors surrounding the frustrations that have formed
recently in the diplomatic relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.
The discovery of oil in Canadian tar sands and innovations in hydro-fracking has allowed
for more of the world’s natural gas and oil supply beneath the water table to become extracted
from the earth. Therefore, it has increased the global supply and demand of this natural resource.
Although oil-business people have been apoplectic over Obama’s delay of a permit for the
Keystone Pipeline, supposedly his administration has “worked to craft regulations that keep
production going while also protecting the public.”236 Gulf governments, such as the Saudi
monarchy, will have to seek out a broader international market to sell their largest economic
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asset, or diversify its economy in order to hold onto power and survive. Furthermore, if
globalization is to be breached in the Middle East, the Gulf governments must accommodate
Arab social demands and diversify their own economies, which will allow them to continue
generating sustainable revenues for their national economies and provide stability for their
nations’ wellbeing moving forward. Sean Foley examined that these oil producing governments,
in light of the 2008 global recession, put an economic strain on the Gulf nations, yet, “there are
signs that [the recession] may accelerate social and technological trends that will reduce the
petroleum industry’s importance to the Gulf and the world economy in general.”237 The latest
technological innovations, including the Internet and the innovations relating to computer
technology, hybrid vehicles, solar and wind technology, and improvements to digital
communications by the Millennial generation has spawned a tide of change across the Arabian
Peninsula. The increase in demand for the region’s oil by China and other developed nations
worldwide is another factor that will heavily impact the Saudi economy in the near future.
As the Arab governments work meticulously to increase the global prestige of their
nations, which will place their societies into the scheme of globalization, they must fight off
heavy opposition in the meantime. This opposition includes Islamic extremism carried out by
Arab Shi’ites, the Arab Spring movement of 2011, other Sunni opposition within the ranks of
their own government, and foreign enemies like Iran – which has strongly opposed the Western
model of globalization. Under the cloak of Islamic fundamentalism, these abovementioned
problems and outcomes currently plague Middle Eastern secular leaders and are preventing
positive change from occurring in the region.
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In the era following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, foreign policy in the
Middle East witnessed episodes and events that have changed the entire dynamic of the
globalization process. Both administrations under Presidents George W. Bush and Barrack
Obama have fought for stability, modernization, and democratic values within Middle Eastern
society. Yet the Middle East continues to be a region of the world riddled in constant political
disarray, social upheaval, and violence at the hands of Islamic extremists and corrupt secular
governments. Former trends in U.S. foreign policy, however, have presented a problem to the
current trends and natural developments in the Middle East.
The United States has maintained its general diplomatic position, beginning in the late
1940s, toward international sponsorship of the State of Israel and maintaining the oil trade with
the Arab Gulf states. Following 9/11, President George W. Bush realized he needed to stray
away from the overwhelming support that the U.S. had displayed and offered Israeli national
security for decades. However, Bush faced strong opposition to his plan from members of his
own government, the Jewish Lobby in Washington, and certain and various sects of the
American public. U.S. foreign policy in Israel quickly returned to one which resurrected a
newfound Muslim rejection and nonalignment with U.S. policy, while displaying unusually
strong support for any endeavor Israel found itself in thereafter. The Obama Administration
continued to support Israel as its closest Middle Eastern ally, although recent attempts by the
administration to mediate and find common ground between the Muslim and Jewish peoples of
the Middle East has aroused immense frustration by supporters and government officials of
Israel. If globalization is to spread its reach throughout the region, the special alliance between
the United States and Israel must transform to a normal alliance – one similar to all other nations
and peoples of the Middle East harbored by the United States. Eliminating cultural bias from
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U.S. foreign policy toward Muslims, Jews, Arabs, non-Arabs, and other cultures native to the
Middle East alike must materialize if American-formed globalization is to take root.
The oil-based diplomacy between the United States and the Arab-Gulf states, especially
Saudi Arabia, has existed for decades as well. In fact, the somewhat benign relationship the U.S.
has shared with the al-Saud monarchy dates back to the earliest half of the twentieth century.
Furthermore, this relationship has centered on the petroleum resources found in the deserts
around the Arabian Peninsula and shipped off to consuming countries like the United States.
Petroleum is a very important resource regarding the global economy, and it has dramatic
implications for the globalization policy set forth by the U.S. and the West. The two Bush
Administrations’ personal ties with Saudi princes and sheikhs involved in the oil business was
perceived by the Arabian people as an act of imperialism carried out by the impure motives of
Western expansion on a society keen on defending its own. Moreover, George W. Bush’s
Second Gulf War in the aftermath of 9/11 harbored a legacy that could not be reversed. Fighting
a spirited war against Islamic terrorists who were enemies of the West, Saddam Hussein’s
irresponsible regime, and Middle Eastern groups who supposedly possessed weapons of mass
destruction, built up even more animosity toward the U.S. than ever before. These Middle
Eastern Muslims who held little political power and detested the Western forces alongside their
Sunni counterparts, opposed the American military occupation and were convinced that the
United States had moved into the Middle East to render its economic might selfishly. America’s
reliance on Middle Eastern oil was no mystery to the Arab Gulf regimes and companies who had
been so willing to reap the profits of the oil trade in the past. The damage done to American
trust and its perceived duty in heralding in an era of modernization, peace, and democracy to the
developing world was seen by many in the Middle East as an American-made charade. Instead,
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increasing America’s own political and military power, while retaining its global dominance
economically, was seen by many Middle Eastern Muslims as the primary motive of Western
policy in the region.
The Obama Administration continued to rely on Middle Eastern oil imports without the
closer ties with Gulf-Arab elites like the Bush Administration maintained following 9/11.
Recently, hydro-fracking and its innovated transformation of the petroleum industry has caused
the United States to tremendously increase its crude oil and gas supply, increase its exporting
capabilities, and in doing so, is on pace to becoming a top oil and natural gas-producing nation of
the world. These two factors have led the United States to decrease its dependency on Middle
Eastern oil imports, and begin to rely more heavily on its domestic supply. The United States is
the world’s leading producer and exporter of liquid natural gas currently. Natural gas asserts
only half of the carbon dioxide that coal does and is pushed by the Obama Administration for
that reason, as well as increasing U.S. fuel independence.
In May, 2013, the Obama Administration approved a $10 billion facility in Freeport,
Texas, named Freeport LNG, which serves as a major exporting facility of natural gas. Freeport
LNG’s Chief Executive, Michael Smith, stated in defense of world economic progress, that,
“[the United States] needs these exports for jobs, for balance of trade and for geopolitical
reasons….”238 Taking on the task in creating peace by diplomatically working as mediators in
developing a lasting peace between various groups within the Middle East, decreasing U.S.
military occupancy in the region, and relying less on special interests like Saudi oil, the Obama
Administration has altered the means by which globalization is achieved. This has forced
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Middle Eastern societies to change their economies in order to include themselves in a global
system, yet these Muslim societies have remained skeptical and paranoid over the rise of
hostility demonstrated by Iran, as well as the willingness by the U.S. to allow Iran to gain
“unparalleled influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories” since 2003.239
As the Gulf governments attempted to restructure their economies to fit within the structure of
globalization, one major problem continued to thrive as the U.S. took on a more neutral position
in confronting Middle Eastern altercations.

Islamic Fundamentalism and the Prospects for Globalization

It is extremely difficult to predict whether or not globalization will reach Middle Eastern
society given the chaotic and dividing nature of Islamic fundamentalism. Islamic
fundamentalism, like many other religious fundamentalist trends found worldwide, is deeply
rooted in an individual’s consciousness and psychology. It is not fundamental, nor original
Islamic doctrine as one may be led to believe, however, Islamic fundamentalism evolved from a
mixture of political, religious, and social philosophies prevalent during the initial stages of the
Cold War in the mid-twentieth century. The Middle East, in the years prior to the buildup of the
Iranian Revolution of 1979, had been a region of the world coveted by Western powers for its
natural resources and strategic location for carrying out a policy of containment versus the
Soviets. It did not take long for Muslim society to resent Western influence, interference, and
presence in their social, economic, and political systems. Vali Nasr described Islamic
fundamentalism as “seething with anger… anti-Americanism, and vulnerable to extremist ideas”
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that are different from traditional Muslim lifestyles.240 With a mixture of Western animosities
and pro-Soviet social sentiments, which were popular movements in developing nations during
the 1950s and 1960s, Islamic fundamentalism became a popular ideology for the disenfranchised
Middle Eastern Muslim populations. Soviet ideals of social empowerment of the poor and
abused, combined with an ultra-conservative translation of Islamic doctrine formed what is now
referred to as Islamic fundamentalism.
In the current Muslim world, there is a growing section of the population that have fallen
victim to this distorted religious and cultural rationale, which has too often resulted in violence,
destruction, death, and tragedy. Some Middle Eastern Muslims support the prospects of
globalization, however many oppose globalization out of the fear that it will dispose of their own
culture and traditions while indoctrinating Western political, economic, and social trends.
Meanwhile, U.S. leaders view their own agenda to bring about globalization as one that is
universally right, disregarding the Muslims’ claims of American imperialism and political
corruption within the historical context of Middle Eastern society.
As the 9/11 Commission orchestrated their official report on the outcomes and facts in
the months following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, one thing was clearly interpreted: the
enemy, Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, “use[d] cultural and religious allusions to the holy Qur’an
and some of its interpreters…. [Appealing] to people disoriented by cyclonic change as they
confront modernity and globalization.”241 The 9/11 Commission Report received much criticism
for not stating all necessary information surrounding warnings of a grand terrorist plot, although
a certainty was revealed in this report: The United States government had officially declared a
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war against the Islamic jihad and its religious doctrine that yearned to halt America’s
globalization project in the Middle East. Tragedy had hit home, yet the United States was more
than willing to continue its globalization agenda. To policymakers, Islamic extremism was not
going to pose as an obstacle for globalization efforts.
Following 9/11, eliminating Islamic fundamentalism became of upmost importance by
U.S. officials in order to protect American society from this threat while successfully
implementing their globalization policy. Iran, the nation built upon the foundations of Islamic
fundamentalism, has been a distant and hostile nation toward U.S. diplomacy in the region until
recent. The willingness by Washington to open up negotiations with Iran’s Islamic theocracy is
an initial step in working out some form of lasting peace and possibly assimilation of Iran into
the globalization system. However, Islamic fundamentalism has not been exclusive to just Iran.
Throughout the desert lands of the Middle East, pockets of Shia minorities exist within all of the
secular nations. Middle Eastern Shia populations, as of recent, have been more vocal and active
in expressing their religious and social desires, which contributed immensely to the appearance
of the Arab Spring in 2011.
The Arab Spring movement, which begun as civil protests in Tunisia in December, 2010,
has since resulted in social uprisings against the corrupt secular and Sunni regimes across the
Middle East. Egypt and Syria have been the nations to fall victim to this social uprising recently
– as Syria continues to be riddled with warfare and tragedy in the wake of the overthrow attempt
of Iranian-backed Bashar al-Asad’s regime. The Arab Spring today is a byproduct of the ArabMuslim peoples’ resentment toward Western occupation of their lands and oppression of their
lifestyle by corrupt elites and governments in recent years. The Islamic backlash against U.S.
and other Western foreign policies in the region for the previous several decades had gained
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momentum and manifested itself into the present civil unrest that the world is currently
witnessing. Even in the outcome of Obama’s 2009 speech at Cairo University – where he
promised a new and fruitful beginning with Arab Muslim culture – and the steady U.S. military
withdrawal from Iraq, over three-quarters of the Muslim population in Jordan, Egypt, Palestinian
territories, and even in its major Middle Eastern ally, Turkey, “held an unfavorable view of the
United States” by the time the Arab Spring commenced.242
It had become clear to U.S. policymakers in the Middle East that Islamic fundamentalism
was not solely isolated to terrorist organizations and certain sects of Shia radical Muslims. The
United States’ irreversible military actions in both Gulf Wars, the suspicious oil policy with
Saudi Arabia, and “America’s relationships with authoritarian regimes, and in particular their
intelligence services… used equally against political dissenters as [well as] against terrorist
suspects,” had culminated into a widespread hatred of U.S. policy among the Middle Eastern
peoples.243 Even after U.S. Special Forces had captured and killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan
in May of 2011, the U.S. government understood that they still had a powerful enemy in Islamic
extremism to defeat. The United States has persisted in backing corrupt and unpopular Middle
Eastern governments – Bashar al-Assad of Syria, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifah of Bahrain, and
Pakistan’s recently removed Prime Minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf just to mention a few – and
with that reality, Islamic fundamentalism remained alive and well in the Middle East. In
addition, bin Laden’s death was viewed as a symbol of martyrdom regarding Islam’s jihad
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against the Western Satan. This event further stimulated a sense by Islamic extremists to avenge
his death through more acts of terrorism against the U.S. and its Western alliances.
It should be of no surprise then that the majority of people residing in the Middle East
view the United States as a foreign foe. U.S. foreign policy, since oil’s discovery in the early
twentieth century, has centered on America’s self-interest, rather than on the general interest of
the Arab populous. This fact had been realized by officials of the United States’ government in
recent history. Even while occupying Iraq and other parts of the Middle East in the summer of
2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice admitted to an audience at the University of Cairo
that U.S. foreign policy in its target of globalization had failed. She declared that, “[f]or sixty
years….[T]he United States pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region… and
[the United States] achieved neither. Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting
the democratic aspirations of all people.”244 Globalization has, and will, continue to be a goal of
U.S. foreign policy in the region, but it will be extremely difficult to correct past mistakes and
change the mindset of an entire foreign culture. In the subsequent federal administration,
President Obama remarked with similar sentiments similar to Rice’s. In the aftermath of bin
Laden’s capture and death, within the undertow of the early stages of the Arab Spring, President
Obama offered a new course of direction in U.S. foreign policy due to the irreversible rise of
Islamic fundamentalism and the hostility it forced upon the United States. In a memorandum he
published for the State Department in May of 2011, President Obama advocated the need for
change in the way his nation directed foreign policy in the Middle East:
Yet we must acknowledge that a strategy based solely upon the narrow pursuit of
these interests will not fill an empty stomach or allow someone to speak their
mind. Moreover, failure to speak to the broader aspirations of ordinary people
will only feed the suspicion that has festered for years that the United States
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pursues our interests at their expense. Given that this mistrust runs both ways –as Americans have been seared by hostage-taking and violent rhetoric and
terrorist attacks that have killed thousands of our citizens -– a failure to change
our approach threatens a deepening spiral of division between the United States
and the Arab world.245
Indeed, foreign policymakers needed to meet a new demand by the Arab people who
would reject any attempt of globalization through political action. But when and how can
globalization be instilled in a region where this system is viewed synonymously with U.S.
corruption and imperialism? The solution may reside in a natural course through use of free
market principles, which capitalism enables.
Many experts on global policy agree that the mechanisms of social mobility, which
capitalism provides people with, may be the only way globalization plants itself in the Middle
East. Oppression of the Arab-Muslim masses by domestic and foreign forces for decades has
engineered the present episode of Islamic extremism. Additionally, “[t]he bulge in their
populations of unemployed and underemployed young men has proved a fertile ground for
extremism and terrorism and raises larger questions about the future of the region.”246 The
growth of a free market in the Muslim world could aid in solving this complex problem.
Removing the government restrictions and guidelines forced upon the Muslim business
community and middle class by various Arab regimes, per se, would provide more opportunity
for modernization and democracy to flourish throughout the Middle East. From 2005 onwards,
Iran’s business community, with its fruitful economic relationship with neighboring robust
business-savvy cities like Dubai and Abu Dhabi across the Persian Gulf, has begun to
demonstrate their discontent with Hassan Rouhani’s pro-nationalist government. Iran’s powerful
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theocracy have restricted the privatization of business activities since the 1980s. Although a
Shia Islamic state, Iranian entrepreneurs and other capitalists have come to disfavor their
government for its condemnation on Iran’s growing middle class and their “constraints
imposed… on the capitalist private sector.”247
Global economic powerhouses in the Middle East, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, have triumphed
in paving the way toward globalization in the Middle East. These two cities’ “capitalist
renaissance” and their mass growth of wealth have not been threatened by corrupted secular
leadership, but rather can attribute their economic success to “enlightened leadership” that has
allowed the natural forces of capitalism and its free market to dictate the UAE’s wealth and
prosperity.248 Oil wealth, however, has also contributed greatly to the UAE’s economic triumph.
Furthermore, “Dubai’s boom has been driven primarily by large conglomerates that are
government financed but not government run.”249 Perhaps if other Middle Eastern peoples come
to realize that they can freely partake in capitalist activities while remaining devout Muslims,
globalization may become a rampant force in the region that will replace fundamentalism in
years to come. Nations like Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia could also champion positive
economic reform like the UAE has since the early 1990s. If the Middle East’s secular leadership
allows for more social freedom or their people, as well as integrating their devout Muslim faith
with a modern economic-techno-political model, then globalization in the Middle East may take
form.
If globalization is to come to the Middle East, and for Islamic fundamentalism to be
defeated, it will have to occur naturally and self-imposed by Muslim society. The establishment
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of globalization cannot be imposed upon the Middle East by U.S. foreign policy nor any other
foreign policy for that matter. “Genuine and enduring democracy is nurtured best in conditions
that gradually foster spontaneous change and do not combine compulsion with haste.”250 U.S.
officials and proponents of globalization must let the natural forces of capitalism, civil reform,
and democratic-representative government take precedence, and not interfere with imposing its
desired will on Middle Eastern society. Following the al-Qaeda attacks on September 11th, the
9/11 Commission suggested that U.S. foreign policy should focus its primary concerns toward
the promotion of individual educational and economic opportunities. Instead of implementing
democratic values forcefully into the Middle East by U.S. officials and policymakers, the United
States should define its global role in “moral leadership,” abiding by the “rule of law” in
judgment of global outcomes and circumstances.251
Efforts to completely withdraw U.S. influence from the region, on a substantial level, is
yet to be seen. In 2005, Prince Saud al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister since 1975,
testified to the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations that he disagreed with President Bush’s
assumptions, that “tyrannical governments in the Middle East were the source of Muslim
extremism.” Rather, in the Saudi prince’s opinion, “the Arab-Israeli conflict was the root cause
of Middle Eastern extremism and terrorism.”252 A year later in 2006, a Gulf Arab intellectual,
Jamal al-Suwaidi, published a series of articles articulating the conflict globalization posed on
the Arab states. As a staunch nationalist living in the UAE, he lamented that, “Emirati culture
might soon vanish in a society comprising people who are neither Arabs nor Sunni Muslims.”253
The U.S. government must rely on trustworthy and factual evidence in creating an effective
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foreign policy that implements stability and peace in the Middle East. The government and its
policymakers cannot rely on personal and administrative assumptions and a strict American
perspective in formulating a foreign policy of globalization.
Iran remains one of the major opponents to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. This
nation, led by a Shia theocracy who manages the country as an Islamic republic, has openly
detested U.S. influence and society in general. In his controversial visit to Columbia University
in September of 2007, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad referred to U.S. foreign policy
in the Middle East numerously in his speech. In Ahmadinejad’s defense of Islamic
fundamentalism and the “God-given gift of science,” he condemned the “Big [global] powers,”
such as the United States, for its “monopoly over science” and knowledge, which does “not want
to see the progress of other nations.”254 The following day, he made similar remarks at the U.N.
General Assembly in New York City. His case for modern-day Iran was established for the
global powers. Basically, he condemned the most apparent factors in U.S. foreign policy in the
Middle East – for its continued support for the Israeli cause over the Palestinian cause, and
reinstatement of the American imperialist notion that, “In [the United States’] view, human
rights are tantamount to profits for [U.S.] companies and friends.”255
Today, the relationship between the United States and Iran remains in poor condition.
Nevertheless, there is a willingness by the U.S. government to initiate, at least, the beginning of
the diplomatic process needed to rebuild a friendly alliance with Iran. Islamic fundamentalism,
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which runs rampant throughout Iran’s society, will prevent modernization and U.S. interests to
do so in the foreseeable future. The State Department recently classified the Iranian theocracy as
a government that, “has not recognized Israel’s right to exist, has hindered the Middle East peace
process by arming militants, including Hamas, Hizballah, and [the] Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and
continues to play a disruptive role in sustaining violence in the region, particularly Syria.”256 If a
lasting peace is to be established between the United States and Iran, the underlying psychology
of Islamic fundamentalism must be eliminated from those who hold executive power and
influence in Iran.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has had, at least, a 35 year legacy in the Middle East, and
currently this nation is wealthy and large enough to develop nuclear technology, and possibly
weaponry. Unfortunately, Iran has long supported Shia populations and Islamic radicals in its
eastern neighboring countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan and Iran have had a
bitter relationship as of late, while the relationship between Iran and Pakistan has come into
conflict, too, as of late. The reason being is that there has been multiple reported national
security breaches between the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and sects of Islamic
terrorist groups throughout all three nations who are unified under the ideal of a jihad against
secular power and the West. In May, 2012, Afghan authorities arrested two suspected terrorists
who confessed that, “[Iran’s] Revolutionary Guards recruit young people for terrorist activities in
Afghanistan and try to revive the Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan led by… Taliban groups.”257
Meanwhile, “given Pakistan's cultural shifts and the financial lure of the Gulf Arabs, a return to
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the close relations of prior days [with Iran] is unlikely.”258 With the increasing hostility between
these three ruling governments, an alliance between Iran’s regime and Islamic extremist groups
residing within Pakistan or Afghanistan is a reality needed to be considered by the U.S. and the
international community. If Iran does engineer nuclear technology in the future, and if Iran
continues to back Islamic extremists, then the idea of Islamic radicals harboring nuclear weapons
could become a terrifying reality for the world community to endure. In order to ease the
tensions and differences held by the majority of Iranians - and the Shia population, in general,
around the Middle East - toward Western motives of globalization, U.S. policymakers must
make admirable efforts to stray away from its exclusive and nationalistic interests in the
unconditional support for Israel’s regional policy. Also, the United States must reconsider its
reliance on Middle Eastern oil supplies from governments who are viewed in an unfavorable
light by parts of their populations.
The United States will continue to push for globalization in the Middle East. Yet, the
directive of U.S. foreign policy in the region has varied considerably. Its former and present
entanglement with Gulf oil, its containment of Shia Islam and other Islamic fundamentalism
within the Middle East, and its overwhelming support for Israel has hurt the U.S. cause for
globalization. The current widespread Arab Spring movement and persistent Islamic terrorism,
moreover, has deterred the U.S. from interfering with Middle Eastern affairs in recent times.
The change of directive in policy in response to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, especially in
the aftermath of the Benghazi incident of 2012, has raised much concern over the legitimacy of a
policy of globalization exclusive to U.S. policymakers and prospectors. U.S. officials must take
the backseat, while leaders of the Arab world direct their own path toward globalization. Arab
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intellectual, George Tarabishi, argued the case for globalization during a roundtable discussion
for the Ministry of Affairs of Bahrain in October, 2000. In support of globalization, Tarabishi
advocated:
In the large global village that the world is on the verge of becoming, the Arab
world – which is more divided than ever – is in need of becoming first a regional
singular village…. At a time when Arab culture, like the other cultures of the
world, has no option but to engage with [globalization], then it would appear that
this engagement, in the Arab case, will be conflictual rather than cooperative.259
The reality for the Middle East is that in order to become participating members of a global
order, their internal religious conflicts must be first managed and then resolved. Middle Eastern
society could increase their standard of living, intellectualism, and peace if they decide to
relinquish their steadfast belief in Shariah Law.
The 9/11 tragedy created a distorted the U.S. public opinion of Middle Eastern culture
and society. More specifically, neoconservatives, religious fundamentalist groups, and various
right-wing groups “argue that America’s goal should be to reorder the Middle East, using
America’s power in the name of democracy to subordinate the Arab states to its will, to eliminate
Islamic radicalism, and to make the region safe for Israel.”260 The political Left, similarly, holds
onto similar beliefs, especially in regards to combating Islamic fundamentalism. However, the
Left is not as concerned with advancing global corporate capitalism as the Right is. The Obama
Administration has been adamant in defending its “firm belief that America’s interests are not
hostile to people’s hopes,” while supporting a “policy of the United States to promote reform
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across the region, and to support transitions to democracy.”261 Both, American conservative and
liberal ideologies in defeating Islamic fundamentalism, have major flaws in their foundations.
In order for Islamic fundamentalism to become a nonfactor involved in globalization
efforts, two major revisions to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East must take place: First, U.S.
policymakers must withdraw national self-interests from its mission in the Arab Middle East.
American interests in big business, especially around the oil trade, and their special treatment of
Israel must discontinue if globalization is to become established as a viable system. Arab,
Persian, and Palestinian resentment toward the American-Israeli relationship and America’s
interests in Gulf oil have resulted in much of the anti-American attitudes held by Middle Eastern
Muslims for decades. Eliminating these two factors from U.S. policy might reverse the negative
attitudes against the United States over time. More importantly, the proposition that
globalization will replace the popularity of Islamic fundamentalism may become a possibility.
The United States must allow for free-market capitalism to naturally replace the
popularity of Islamic fundamentalism in a Middle Eastern context. Economic freedom, which
allow for social mobility, the economic abundance of goods and services, and free trade, are a
few examples of the pros that globalization has to offer. The inclusion of U.S. social customs
and norms in Middle Eastern globalization, however, might not be as welcomed. For example, a
sexualized and romanticized consumer culture, equality for women, and the dominance of a
wealthy international business elite are factors that will encounter strong opposition by Middle
Eastern Muslims. With a rebellious climate growing across the Middle East – especially in the
wake of the latest Arab Spring – an Islamic form of organic capitalism provides the means to
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revising the distorted logic behind Islamic fundamentalism. A Lebanese journalist recently
compared the causes surrounding the Arab Spring of 2011 and the European revolutions of 1848
as very similar. He indicated that alongside political corruption committed by Arab secular
regimes, “poverty, rising food prices, inflation, human rights violation, and high unemployment”
were key issues and problems that many young Arabs wanted resolved, just as many Europeans
desired in the mid-nineteenth century.262
In the case of Iran - which holds much political, religious, and military clout throughout
the region – capitalism holds the key in changing the attitudes of all Arab Muslims concerning
globalization. According to Vali Nasr, “Iran is today a tired [government] with a failing
economy, and under pressure from a restless population. The ruling clerics may opt to continue
down the path of confrontation with the West, but they also have incentives to improve relations,
and that is especially so due to economic realities.”263 Arab Muslims across the entire Middle
East must first come to embrace capitalism and formulate a method to synchronize it within the
framework of Islam. Recently, this transition has taken place and has increased Muslims’ social
mobility by increasing their standard of living within their nations’ often corrupt power structure.
Economic freedom could then give way to social freedom. “Gradually… the Muslim countries
one by one will likely make their individual adaptations of the precepts of Islam to increasingly
modern politics based on more participatory social mobilization.”264 Once Arab Muslims come
to realize, as individuals, that capitalism can provide for a better life, perhaps globalization will
work effectively in the Middle East.
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There are other factors to consider as well that bring Middle Eastern globalization into
debate. First, Islamic intellectualism, like Islamic fundamentalism, is on the rise in the Middle
East. Young adult Muslims have taken to the streets to protest the norm of traditional Muslim
culture. “Institutions like Al-Azhar University in Cairo, which is the oldest university in the
world, the Muslim World League in Mecca, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference
headquartered in Jeddah are the examples of the contemporary, intellectual, educational, and
diplomatic forces in the resurgence of Islam.”265 These institutions have been increasing in
popularity and interest by the Middle Eastern youth and young adults looking for placement
within a rapidly growing and global socioeconomic landscape. Moreover, the rise of Islamic
academia and intellectualism has sought to teach the true and peaceful nature of Islam, “free
from extremism and violence.”266 Former state-sponsored Islamic schools across the Middle East
have been replaced by “trailblazing” schools funded by “market-driven, private sector
initiatives.”267
Many young adults and teenagers across the Middle East have grown restless over their
stagnant society. In a region where there is limited social mobility, and an isolated, statecontrolled economy to work in, scores of Muslims have become aware of their circumstance and
have openly voiced the need for change. The 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States
triggered a debate within the U.N. over why Arab-Muslims resented the West. A 2002 United
Nation’s Human Development Program (UNDP) report underscored that the origins of Western
resentment were identified by corrupted Arab “authoritarian rule and its perpetrators.” Moreover,
the study indicated that, “authoritarian rulers know only too well that their survival depends on
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the continued backwardness and acute economic underdevelopment of their societies,” while the
rest of the world became “enlightened with the spread of the information revolution.”268 The
younger members of Islamic society have come to see an Islamic-explicit policy of globalization
as opportunity and hope for their nations’ future and cause. Furthermore, the Internet and the
recent advances in digital technology and social networking has opened the way for writers, such
as Rajaa al-Sanea, “to express their views freely without fear of government retribution.”269 The
opportunity in today’s world for ideas and communication to operate at a much faster and
abundant rate has aided the rise of Islamic intellectualism. Moreover, these young Muslims have
been able to adapt to a peaceful and progressive version of Islam, compatible to the modes
globalization could bring to the Middle East.
Another encouraging prospect for globalization to become implemented in Middle
Eastern society is the increasing power of the international community, which has accepted
globalization as a possible vehicle for peace, equality, and modernization. Countries such as
China, with its increasing interest in Saudi petroleum, have become rising players in Middle
Eastern affairs. Since the early 1990s, there were “only a handful of countries that explicitly
rejected participation” in world trade. By the end of the decade, the value of world trade doubled
to about $8 trillion – a $3.5 trillion increase from the international trade activities of the 1980s.270
Today, as nations such as Brazil, India, China and Russia continue to make strides toward global
prominence and prestige, the Middle East will have to decide whether or not it collectively
wishes to reform its society and take the path toward globalization.
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It is very important that the international community coordinates their efforts cordially to
bring about the modes of positive change to the Middle East. Perhaps the international
community should do nothing in order to allow for organic globalization to take shape across the
region’s landscape. Zbigniew Brzezinski, on the other hand, advocated globalization reform
through a collective effort by Middle Eastern peoples and other international forces:
The war on Middle Eastern terrorism will bring the actual elimination of terrorist
organizations only when they lose their social appeal and therefore their
recruitment ability, and when their financial backing dries up. This victory is
likely to be apparent only retroactively. Proliferation will be brought under
control when suspect national efforts are either subjected to effective international
controls or halted by the duress of outside force. The active involvement of
America will be critical to both outcomes, but achieving them will be much easier
if American initiatives command genuine international support.271
Globalization could also come to the Middle East without emphasizing the need to – by
excluding globalization measures from within U.S. foreign policy. However, upon the Obama
Administration’s re-election victory in 2012, critics of the administration, such as the Iranian
government, have argued that its continued use of drone warfare in the Middle East, and U.S.
avoidance of the Syrian Civil War involvement have indicated that the U.S. continues to push its
own national interests through a unilateral globalization policy. These critics, which includes the
Iranian people, suggest that the Obama Administration should pursue a concrete human rights
agenda and allow Muslims a “greater freedom of expression” on a global level.272 As the United
States continues on a path toward a greater unified world, a decision must be agreed upon by
policymakers on what specific globalization policy should be emphasized and implemented,
even if it means implementing nothing at all.
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Chapter 4
……………………………………………….
A Fork in the Road: Globalization in the Middle East

For decades, the Middle East has taken center stage for the United States in carrying out
its views and desires of a world doctrine. This doctrine, which remains an underlying aim within
American foreign policy - created overwhelmingly by elite businessmen and politicians consisted of an objective to bring about global unity within a political and socioeconomic
structure, or globalization. The diplomatic means by which the United States plans to institute
globalization worldwide, and particularly in the Middle East, is more evident today than ever
before.
In her 2007 article, “America and the World,” renowned historian Emily Rosenberg
explained the course of history regarding American diplomacy. Her analysis indicated that,
since the emergence of the Wisconsin school of historical scholarship of the late 1950s, most
historians agreed that, “economic expansion in search of new markets la[id] at the core of the
American experience.”273 Likewise, historians Charles Beard and William Appleman Williams,
“suggested that the United States had long been an outward-looking empire driven by economic
interests, which used the state to push an open door order that brought militarism, repression, and
war.”274 Rosenberg saw close similarities between the American notion of Manifest Destiny on
the domestic front, and its implementation in U.S. foreign policy. Policymakers in the U.S.
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endorsed this idea of American expansionism, and inserted its cause into foreign policy decades
prior to the beginning of the Cold War in 1945.
Globalization, which has emerged today as a system modeled after Western culture and
society, is becoming an even more momentous force behind the constructs of United States’
foreign policy. Various Middle Eastern and American elite -- those driving the direction of
global economics and politics -- exist as the major proponents behind efforts to push the world
into a globalized society in the image of American expansionism. Moreover, leaders in China,
Japan, Europe, and in other nations around the developed world have tended to support elements
of globalization to serve their nations’ best interests. The major opponents of globalization seem
to consist of groups of Western and Middle Eastern societies who perceive danger or harm from
such a development. Moreover, religious fundamentalists, including those of Islamic, Judaic,
and Christian backgrounds, and defenders of traditional, cultural, ethnical, and statist trends of
thinking, constitute the major opponents of an American effort to globalize developing regions of
the world. Globalization, according to Rosenberg, has “offered new terms and paradigms for
conceptualizing complex state and non-state relationships” beginning in the post-Cold War days
of the 1990s.275 The legacy of globalization remains yet to be seen. As the United States
promotes its vision of a global society, efforts by various political and social reformers to reduce
and eventually diminish the numerous religious conflicts, cultural ideologies, political strife, and
nationalist interests are essential to this endeavor.
Following the conclusion of the Second World War, the U.S. has witnessed, as well as
coordinated, two trends of foreign policy in the Middle East. Beginning at the start of the Cold
War in 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union initiated a diplomatic battle on the world
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stage. The Cold War trend (1945-1991) of U.S. foreign policy aimed to create an international
security shield for the Third World and Eastern European nations against Soviet indoctrination.
The endgame of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union was to demonstrate to the rest of the world
the society that should serve as a path toward the future. Therefore, the United States’ objective
was to prevent the Soviet Union from the global economic system and dissolve any communist
uprisings in order to isolate the Soviet Union from increasing its political might around the
world. The oil trade between the Arab Gulf states and the U.S., the U.S. alliance and steadfast
support for Israel’s welfare, and the overall containment of the spread of Soviet doctrine were
crucial factors of U.S. policy needed for winning the Cold War and protecting Islamic society
from communism.
The U.S. and Soviet Union would, at various times throughout the duration of the Cold
War, flex their potential military might, win over as many secular allies as possible, and aspire to
dominate the world’s political-economic system. The Third World or Developing nations –
including regions around the Middle East, Latin America, and Southeastern Asia - became a
diplomatic battleground for the two superpowers over strategic resources and political alliances
vital to Cold War victory. Middle Eastern petroleum resources and the United States’ unique
alliance with Israel were vital to U.S. policymakers in keeping Soviet expansion at bay while
solidifying a U.S. presence in the region. Once the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and the U.N.American coalition had militarily pressured Saddam Hussein’s army out of Kuwait, the United
States proved itself the dominant world power. The elite American political-economic
establishment embarked on its journey to instill a doctrine of democratic-representative
government, modernization, and capitalism within Middle Eastern society, and likewise, the
remainder of the developing world.
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By the dawn of the 1990s, the United States had transformed the underlying direction of
its foreign policy. As declared by Presidents George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in the
final days of the Cold War, the world was about to embark on a new path toward a singular
political, economic, and social system. For U.S. policymakers, the policy of containment
regarding the prevention of the spread of Soviet influence was dissolved and replaced with a
policy of globalization. Globalization’s prospects included the unilateral support and designation
of a unified socioeconomic system for the entire world, being governed by one global political
coalition orchestrating its power within its unilateral paradigm. This transformation of policy
direction championed in the second trend of U.S. foreign policy: The Globalization trend (1991present). The plan pioneered by U.S. policymakers to spread its doctrine of globalization to the
Muslim world of the Middle East would prove to be a cumbersome task. From this point
forward, the United States carried out a globalization policy that defended Western social,
political, and economic norms that toppled those of Soviet Russia. At its initial stages, instilling
a system of globalization within Muslim culture was met with heavy resistance from Islamic
fundamentalists and Arab nationalists. Shia populations across the region, Palestinians’ devout
dedication to reclaiming its homeland from its U.S.-supported Israeli rivals, the powerful
theocratic government of Iran, and particular Sunni regimes – like Saddam Hussein’s Iraq -- that
displayed animosities toward the West, continuously acted in defiance of U.S. diplomatic actions
and goals.
The al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States in September, 2001 reinforced Muslim
hatred of Western expansion in the Middle East. The calamity of 9/11 also established the battle
lines between globalization efforts spearheaded by the U.S. and Western governments against the
portion of Middle Eastern society that wished to remain isolated from perceived outside threats
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to their traditional culture. Federal administrations under George W. Bush and Barrack Obama
created and managed foreign policies in the Middle East that presented conflicting or similar
means and measures in bringing about desired changes to the Muslim world. Defeating Islamic
terrorism and hostile Islamic regimes was one side of the American policy equation, while
instilling democratic reform and lasting peace between Muslims, Jews, and non-Muslims alike
became the principle elements of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.
Meanwhile, Presidents George H.W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush sought to protect
and enhance big business relationships between U.S. political-economic entities and their Arab
counterparts involved in the petroleum industry, to help solidify the U.S. presence and
undertaking in the Middle East. The Bush Administration’s military crusade against Islamic
extremism and uncooperative Middle Eastern governments - alongside imperialistic ties with
Saudi oil and the unparalleled U.S. support for Israel - left a lasting legacy of bitterness and
divide between the collective social framework of the Muslim peoples and underlying motives of
American foreign policy. Once the Obama Administration took to power and began to manage
foreign policy in the Middle East, curbing Islamic fundamentalism and extremism remained an
essential undertaking, yet implementing a solid policy of globalization in a more turbulent world
remained a gigantic task. Obama’s lack of business interests and personnel in the Gulf oil trade
paradox, combined with new oil extraction techniques in hydro-fracking in North America
distanced the imperialistic relationship between the United States and the Middle East.
Moreover, the Obama Administration’s desire to reconcile with Iran and the Muslim world as a
whole in seeking out a strategy to curb Islamic fundamentalism and extremism in return for a
culturally evolved globalist doctrine has been the staple of Obama’s diplomacy thus far.
Although policymakers have sought to bring about permanent peace and pose as mediators
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between opposing forces within Middle Eastern society, it remains yet to be seen whether or not
globalization will become a viable reality across the entire Middle East. Additionally, what type
of globalization, will breach Middle Eastern society has become a topic of debate.
President Obama has recently decided not to have the U.S. intervene in the Syrian Civil
War in 2013, and has not seriously engaged Russian President Vladimir Putin on his invasion of
Ukraine in early 2014. Instead, the Obama Administration has decided to increase the exporting
of natural gas and has focused on economic and environmental issues at home. These
developments have indicated a change in U.S. foreign policy directive. Each nation or ethnic
group around the globe will have to come to terms with globalization. China has reminded the
world there are numerous ways to approach capitalism and modernity. They have, thus far,
emphasized a state-directed economy from the top downward, but have allowed entrepreneurs to
get wealthy and take advantage of the mechanisms of capitalism, all while clamping down on
political dissent. Turkey has been able to maintain its democratic republic and has gained
favorable international reputation, all while remaining an Islamic state that contains numerous
and different ethnic groups. Iran, meanwhile, is a theocratic republic that views globalization as
a Middle East entirely under the strict rule of Shia Islam. Indeed, many varieties of globalization
exist within the Middle East, so to gauge what form of globalization will prosper and function in
the region’s future, including Western policy, will present an enigma to U.S. policymakers.
BRIC nations and other developed countries around the globe will have to coordinate
their efforts together, accordingly, in order to effectively indoctrinate globalization into regions
of the developing world. On the other hand, the Middle East could enter a stage in its natural
development where each society allows for globalization to organically present itself. As
countries, like China per se, increase its international power, they must be willing and rational
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enough to participate in transcending a benign policy of globalization onto the developing
peoples and nations of the world. The United States cannot afford to take on the task of
globalization in the Middle East alone. Furthermore, the Muslims of Middle Eastern society, as
a whole, must come to recognize how the potential of a global network of democracy and
commerce could provide for and benefit the region. Yet, globalization could also threaten the
traditional religious and cultural patterns of the various groups of people residing in the Middle
East. Writing on the topic of globalization, Lebanese independent writer and elite businessman,
Mohammad S. Moussalli, emphasized the importance of a meticulous and responsible method of
implementing globalization in the Middle East. He declared that, “if globalization is introduced
with significant educational, social, and economic support that could make Arab countries
flourish alongside foreign cultures, then it may turn into a universal culture in which Arabs may
come under its umbrella as equals.”276
United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East remains an unfinished episode. The
current Arab Spring uprisings have raised many questions concerning the impact of globalization
across the entire Middle Eastern region since 2011. Furthermore, the current uprisings indicated
to the world that the region has yet to experience, encounter, and accept or decline the full
reforms of globalization. These uprisings might prove to be the evolutionary initial steps of
globalization, however, as Muslims across the region have become resistant to their corrupt
governments. Middle Eastern Muslims will ultimately have the responsibility in deciding
whether or not they want to partake in a global community or remain isolated from the everchanging world society. In a social climate where religion reigns superior in everyday life,
Muslims, on an individual level, must consider how globalization will impact their own societies.
276
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U.S. policymakers and officials could work tediously in promoting and sponsoring globalization
in the Muslim world, however, the Arab world must accept this proposition in sum, as well as
consider other forms of globalization not explicit to U.S. goals.
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